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Hon MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN, District Judge 
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Briefs and Other Related Doenments 
Supreme Court of Alaska. 
Carl DISOTELL, Appellant, 
v. 
Earl STILTNER, Appellee. 
NO. S-10984. 
Nov. 5,2004. 
Background: Plaintiff partner filed suit against 
defendant partner, seeking dissolution of the 
partnership, judicially supervised windup of 
partnership affairs, appointment of a receiver, and 
damages. Defendant partner counterclaimed, 
seeking rescission of the partnership agreement. 
The Superior Court, Third Judicial District, 
Anchorage, Sen K. Tan, J., in winding up the 
partnership, permitted defendant to buy out 
plaintiff's partnership interest. Plaintiff appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Eastaugh, J., held 
- - 
that: 
(1) Alaska Uniform Partnership Act permitted 
defendant to buy out plaintips partnership interest; 
(2) plaintiffs obligation to pay for his capital 
contribution to partnership was not partnership debt 
upon dissolution; 
(3) neither party was at fault for causing the 
dissolution; and 
(4) plaintiff was entitled to damages for 
defendant's post-dissolution use of the partnership 
property. 
Affmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[I] Appeal and Error -842(1) 
30k842(1) Most Cited Cases 
Interpretation of the Alaska Uniform Partnership 
Page 2 of 1 l 
Page 1 
Act presents a question of law to which the 
Supreme Court applies its independent judgment. 
AS 32.05.040-32.05.995 (Repealed). 
121 Appeal and Error -1008.1(5) 
30k1008.1(5) Most Cited Cases 
The Supreme Court reviews the superior court's 
factual fmdings for clear enor. 
(31 Partnership -277 
289k277 Most Cited Cases 
Alaska Uniform Partnership Act permitted fust 
partner to buy out second partner's partnership 
interest after the partnership was dissolved; 
permitting buyout reduced economic waste by 
avoiding the cost of appointing a receiver and 
conducting a liquidation sale, and also guaranteed 
second partner a fair value for his partnership 
interest. AS 32.05.33qa) (Repealed). 
141 Evidence -555.6(1) 
157k555.6(1) Most Cited Cases 
[4] Partnership -328(3) 
289k328(3) Most Cited Cases 
It was error for court to base valuation of 
partnership interesf for purposes of permitting 
buyout of partner's interest upon dissolution, on tax 
appraisals that were not introduced into evidence, 
but used only hypothetically by expert in report; 
objective evidence of the value of partnership 
interest was required. AS 32.05.330(a) (Repealed). 
[5] Evidence -113(19) 
157k113(19) Most Cited Cases 
Tax appraisals are not necessarily inadmissible in 
determining the value of partnership assets for 
purposes of a buyout upon dissolutiou. 
[6] Partnership -73 
289k73 Most Cited Cases 
161 Partnership -303 
O 2006 Thomson~West. No Claim to W. U.S. Govt. Works. 
100 P.3d 890 
100 P.3d 890 
(Cite as: 100 P.3d 890) 
289k303 Most Cited Cases 
Partner's obligation to pay for his capital 
contribution to the partnership was not partnership 
debt upon dissolution; parties had agreed that 
partner's payment for his interest in the partnership 
property would come from partnership profits, but 
this stipulation was not reasonably susceptible to an 
interpretation that the partnership assumed partner's 
loan obligation. 
171 Contracts -168 
95k168 Most Cited Cases 
Where there is a missing contractual term and there 
is in fact no agreement as to that particular issue 
between the parties to the contract, the court should 
supply a term which comports with community 
standards of faimess and policy rather than analyze 
a hypothetical model of the bargaining process. 
(81 Partnership -276 
289k276 Most Cited Cases 
181 Partnership -295 
289k295 Most Cited Cases 
Evidence supported the iinding that neither party 
was at fault in causing the dissolution of their 
partnership, and, therefore, one partner was not 
entitled to recover damages from the other partner 
for wrongful dissolution of partnership; parties' 
stipulations and trial testimony supported 
conclusion that the impasse over how to proceed 
with construction of partnership's hotel was not the 
fault of either party, but resulted from a difference 
of opinion. AS 32.05.330(b)(l)(B) (Repealed). 
191 Partnership -345 
289k345 Most Cited Cases 
The Supreme Court reviews for clear error fact 
f~ndings determining the causes of dissolution of a 
partnership. 
1101 Partnership -282 
289k282 Most Cited Cases 
Plaintiff partner was entitled to damages for 
defendant partner's post-dissolution use of the 
partnership property; plaintiff had an equal right to 
possess the partnership property, which consisted of 
a commercial building, until the winding up of 
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partnership affairs was complete, and defendant was 
accountable to the partnership for any benefit he 
derived from his personal use of partnership 
property. AS 32.05.200,32.05.250 (Repealed). 
*891 Ronald L. Bliss, Bliss, Wilkens & Clayton, 
Anchorage, for Appellant. 
Kevin G. Brady, Anchorage, for Appellee. 
Before: BRYNER, Chief Justice, MAlTHEWS, 
EASTAUGH, FABE, and CARPENETI, Justices. 
OPINION 
EASTAUGH, Justice. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Two partners formed a partnership in 1997 for the 
purpose of converting an existing building into a 
hotel. One, Earl Stiltner, contributed the parcel of 
land bearing the building that was to be converted. 
The partnership was dissolved in 1998 after the 
partners reached an impasse. We consider here 
whether the superior court, in winding up the 
partnership, should have liquidated the partnership, 
rather than permitting Stiltner to buy out Carl 
Disotell, the other partner. We affum as to the 
buyout, but remand because there was no evidence 
of the objective value of buyout property. We also 
remand for correction of other minor errors. 
11. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Carl Disotell is an Eagle River resident who 
develops properties as a general contractor. [FNl] 
His construction company is Disotell Construction. 
Earl Stiltner is also an Eagle River resident. Stiltner 
owned and operated a real estate office and 
property management company in Eagle River from 
May 1990 until December 1997. In 1994 he and his 
wife purchased Lots 10 and 11 of Block 12 of the 
Revised Plat of the Walter G. Pippel Addition No. 2 
(the "hotel property") for $275,000. There was a 
two-story commercial building on the property. 
Stiltner's wife later quitclaimed her interest in the 
property to him. 
Q 2006 Thornson/West. No Claim to Chig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
100 P.3d 890 
100 P.3d 890 
(Cite as: 100 P.3d 890) 
FNI. Nearly all relevant facts were 
stipulated to by the parties. 
DisoteU and Stiltner met in 1997. They discussed 
Stiltner's property and agreed to form an equal 
partnership to develop, construct, and operate a 
hotel on the property. They never entered into a 
written partnership agreement. They intended to 
convert the two-story commercial building on the 
property into a hotel that would open for business 
by May 15, 1998. Disotell Construction was to 
serve as general contractor; it was to provide its 
services on a cost-only basis. Disotell was to use 
his experience as a developer to plan the project 
and obtain the necessary permits and licenses. 
The parties agreed that Disotell would purchase a 
one-half interest in the hotel property for $137,500, 
one-half of Stiltner's cost. They also agreed that the 
funds from which Disotell would buy the one-half 
interest would come only from the profits of the 
hotel. After Stiltner had recovered his original cost 
basis in the property and certain other costs, he and 
Disotell were to share profits on a fiftylfifty basis. 
The parties dispute what those other costs included. 
Disotell argues that they included the costs of art 
and equipment owned by Stiltner that they had 
planned to use in the hotel and the cash required to 
develop and construct the hotel. Stiltner asserts that 
they only included the former. 
*892 Stiltner quitclaimed one-half of his interest in 
the hotel property to Disotell on March 3, 1998. 
The parties disputed who was obligated to put up 
the cash for the project. DisoteU later testified that 
Stiltner was to have provided all of the cash; 
Stiltner claimed they were to contribute equally to 
the expenses. The superior court later found that 
the partners jointly would provide for the project's 
cash needs. The parties agreed that neither would 
charge interest for the purchase of the hotel 
property or for cash expenses. 
After learning that it could acquire a liquor license 
free of charge for a hotel of fifty or more rooms, the 
partnership agreed to convert the two-story building 
into a four-story hotel, bar, and restaurant. The 
partnership hired an architect, structural engineer, 
Page 4 of 1 1  
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and a civil engineering fm. Disotell testified that 
he contributed hundreds of hours to developing the 
project. 
In 1998 the partnership decided to purchase a 
parking lot for the hotel. Although the lot was 
purchased in Disotell's name, Stiltner provided the 
earnest money and down payment, totaling $50,000. 
He also paid the mortgage for May through 
October 1998 and made one property tax payment. 
Disotell paid the mortgage from November 1998 
through July 2001 andmade several tax payments. 
In May 1998 Disotell advised Stiltner that the 
property required a sewer line. Construction on the 
property bad not yet begun. Stiltner disagreed that 
a sewer line was necessary; he thought there would 
be no increase in sewage from the property, because 
Disotell had not yet commenced construction. He 
denied Disotell the building access needed to assess 
the mechanical, electrical, and other systems. He 
also refused to remove his personal property from 
the building. The superior court later found that "a 
complete breakdown in the relationship between 
Stiltner and Disotell" occurred in May 1998, after 
which Stiltner refused to continue the project. 
The partnership never produced a profit. Stiltner 
has exclusively possessed the hotel property since 
May 15, 1998. He testified that he occupies the 
premises as his residence and has stored his 
personal possessions there. 
Disotell filed suit in the superior court, seeking 
dissolution of the partnership, judicially supervised 
windup of partnership affairs, appointment of a 
receiver, and damages. Stiltner answered and later 
counterclaimed. He sought rescission of the 
partnership agreement. Following a two-day bench 
trial, the court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law on December 11, 2001. Disotell 
unsuccessfully moved to amend the conclusions of 
law. On May 28, 2002 he moved to introduce 
evidence of partnership asset and liability values. 
The court denied this motion. It entered f m l  
judgment on February 7,2003. Disotell appeals. 
HI. DISCUSSION 
O 2006 Thomson~West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
100 P.3d 890 
100 P.3d 890 
(Cite as: 100 P.3d 890) 
A. Standard of Review 
[1][2] Interpretation of the Alaska Uniform 
Partnership Act [FN2] (the Act) presents a 
question of law to which we apply our "independent 
judgment." PN3] We review the superior court's 
factual findings for clear error. [nu41 
FN2. AS 32.05.040-,995. References to 
the Act are to AS 32.05.040-,995. 
Although the Act was repealed in 2000, 
effective January 1, 2004, and replaced by 
AS 32.06.201-,997, it applies to the 
Disotell-Stiltner partnership, which was 
formed in 1997. Ch. 115, $5 7, 8, 10, SLA 
2000. 
EN3. Pieper v. Musarra, 956 P.2d 444, 
446 (Alaska 1998). 
FN4. Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
B. It Was Not Error To Give Stiltner a Buyout 
Opportunity. 
[3] Disotell argues that the superior court failed to 
follow the Act when the court gave Stiltner the 
option to purchase Disotell's partnership interest for 
$73,213.50, the value of Disotell's interest as 
calculated by the court. The superior court proposed 
two altemative methods for winding up the 
partnership. The fust altemative allowed Stilmer to 
purchase Disotell's partnership interest. The court 
reasoned that this would avoid the unnecessary cost 
of appointing a *893 receiver and would reduce 
economic waste. The second altemative was 
available if Stiltner had insufficient funds to pay 
Disotell; the court would then "appoint a receiver 
to take possession of and to sell the partnership 
property, to pay the costs of the receiver, and 
distribute the remaining proceeds according to [its] 
fmdings of fact and conclusions of law." 
Disoteil claims that the Uniform Partnership Act 
made liquidation a matter of right. He argues that 
any partner who has not wrongWy caused 
dissolution of the partnership may demand 
liquidation. He asserts that the superior court erred 
Page 5 of 11 
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when it concluded that "liquidation is not 
mandatory." He therefore seeks a remand with 
instructions for appointment of a receiver to take 
possession of the assets and liquidate them. 
Alaska Statute 32.05.320 provided that "[~Jnless 
otherwise agreed the partners who have not 
wrongllllly dissolved the partnership ... may wind 
up the partnership affairs...!' Alaska Statute 
32.05.330 provided in part: 
(a) When dissolution is caused in any way, except 
in contravention of the partnership agreement, 
each partner, as against the copartners and all 
persons claiming through them in respect of their 
interest in the partnership, unless otherwise 
agreed, may have the partnership property 
applied to discharge its liabilities, and the surplus 
applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to 
the respective partners .... 
(b) When dissolution is caused in contravention 
of the partnership agreement the rights of the 
partners are as follows: (1) each partner who has 
not caused dissolution wrongllllly has (A) all the 
rights specified in (a) of this section, and (B) the 
right, as against each partner who has caused the 
dissolution wrongfully, to damages for breach of 
the agreement .... 
Disotell argues that Stilmer breached the 
partnership agreement by dissolution; Stilmer 
maintains that the superior court's conclusion that 
"neither party was at fault in causing the dissolution 
of the partnership since ... either party could 
terminate it at will" was not clearly erroneous. 
Because neither party argues on appeal that Disotell 
wrongfully caused the dissolution, he may invoke 
the rights granted by AS 32.05.330(a). 
Disotell argues that the most reasonable and 
"almost universally accepted" interpretation of AS 
32.05.330(a) requires sale of partnership assets, 
absent a partnership agreement to the contrary. He 
claims that the Act "makes the policy choice that a 
sale is the most effective means of determining the 
fair market value of partnership assets." Although 
this remedy may seem harsh, he points out that 
partners are free to make alternative provisions in 
the partnership agreement. Because the partnership 
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agreement did not address the consequences of 
dissolution, the statutory provisions govern by 
default. 
We have not previously considered whether 
liquidation was discretionary under the Act. In 
Pieper v. Musarra, we concluded that Pieper had 
"failed to demonstrate that the superior court made 
an error in applying the Alaska Uniform Partnership 
Act" when it allowed Pieper's partner to purchase 
her partnership interest. m 5 ]  We did not explain 
the basis for this conclusion. Because no Alaska 
decisions address the issue, we look to cases from 
other jurisdictions interpreting the uniform statute. 
FN5. Pieper v. Musarra, 956 P.2d 444, 
447 (Alaska 1998). 
In Dreifuerst v. Dreifiterst, cited by Disotell on 
appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, construing 
a statute identical to Alaska's, held that lawful 
dissolution gives each partner the right to force 
liquidation. m 6 ]  Other courts have recognized 
that the winding up that follows partnership 
dissolution generally involves liquidation of the 
partnership assets. [FN7] Indeed, the drafters' 
official comment on the uniform statute explains: 
FN6. Dreifuerst v. Dreifuerst, 90 Wis.2d 
566,280 N.W.2d 335,338 (App.1979). 
FN7. See, e.g., Hyta v. Finley, 137 Idaho 
755, 53 P.3d 338, 340 (2002); Doting v. 
Trunk, 259 Mont. 343, 856 P.2d 536, 541 
(1993); Gull v. Van Epps, 185 Wis.2d 609, 
517 N.W.2d 531,536 (App.1994). 
The right given to each partner b y  the statute], 
where no agreement has been made, to have his 
share of the surplus paid *894 to him in cash 
makes certain an existing uncertainty. At present 
it is not certain whether a partner may or may not 
insist on a physical partition of the propem 
remaining aftkr7third persons have been paid:[ 
FNsll 
FN8. Uniform Partnership Act 5 38 cmt. 
(1914). 
Although the language of the Act and the general 
rule would seem to favor liquidation and cash 
distribution absent agreement to do otherwise, some 
courts construing statutes identical to section ,330 
have refused to compel liquidation. [FN9] 
FN9. See, e.g., Nicholes v. Hunt, 273 Or. 
255, 541 P.2d 820, 827 (1975) ("There is 
no express provision in [the Uniform 
Partnership Act (UPA)] which establishes 
liquidation by sale as the exclusive mode 
of distributing partnership assets after 
dissolution."); see also Logoluso v. 
Logoluso, 233 Cal.App.2d 523, 43 
Cal.Rptr. 678, 682 (1965) (holding that 
court has authority to distribute partnership 
property in kind); Swann v. Mitchell, 435 
So.2d 797, 800 (Fla.1983) (stating that 
"where circumstances exist which would 
render distribution in kind, or another 
method of disposition, to be more 
favorable to the interests of the parties, 
such a distribution is permissible and 
desired"); Creel v. Lilly, 354 Md. 77, 729 
A.2d 385, 399 (1999) (holding that 
"nothing in Maryland's UPA ... or any of 
our case law ... supports an unequivocal 
requirement of a forced sale"); Rinke v. 
Rinke, 330 Mich. 615, 48 N.W.2d 201, 
207 (1951) (stating that "it was not the 
intention of the legislature in the enactment 
of the W A ]  to impose a mandatory 
requirement that, under all circumstances, 
the assets of a dissolved partnership shall 
be sold"); Schoenbom v. Schoenbont, 402 
N.W.2d 212, 214 (Minn.App. 1987) 
(holding that partnership statute "does not 
create an absolute right to a sale"). 
We decline to follow the line of cases holding that 
the statute requires liquidation. We hold that the 
superior court did not err in reading subsection 
.330(a) to allow it to permit Stiltner to buy out 
Disotell's partnership interest. Careful reading of 
the text of AS 32.05.330(a) does not convince us 
that this subsection absolutely compels liquidation 
and forbids a buyout. Under appropriate, although 
perhaps limited, circumstances, a buyout seems a 
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justifiable way of winding up a partnership. The 
superior court reasoned that a buyout would reduce 
economic waste by avoiding the cost of appointing 
a receiver and conducting a sale. Even though there 
was no ongoing business, the superior court noted 
that the expense of a sale could total as much as 
twelve percent of the property's value. This was a 
valid reason and potentially benefitted both 
partners. The potential savings were significant. 
The court's effort to avoid M e r  loss to both 
partners justifies its decision to offer Stiltner the 
buyout option. Further, properly conducted, a 
buyout guaranteed Disotell a fair value for his 
partnership interest. Liquidation exposed Disotell to 
the risk that no buyer would offer to pay fair market 
value for the property. A liquidation sale in which 
no other buyers participated might have given 
Stiltner an opportunity to buy the property for less 
than fair market value, to Disotell's disadvantage. 
C. It Was Error To Permit a Buyout Without 
Objective Evidence of the Value of Disotell's 
Partnership Interest. 
[4] Although it was not error to grant Stiltner the 
option to buy out Disotell's partnership interest, it 
was error to permit the buyout without requiring 
some objective determination of the value of all of 
the partnership assets, particularly the land and 
building Stiltner contributed. The superior court 
used tax appraisals to establish the value of the 
hotel property and parking lot. The court relied on 
a report by an expert witness who, to explain the 
accounting methodology set out in AS 32.05.350, 
"assume[d], for illustrative purposes only," that the 
hotel property and parking lot would sell for their 
tax-appraised values. The tax appraisals were not 
introduced into evidence. The expert discussed 
them only hypothetically to illustrate an entirely 
different point, not as support for an opinion of 
property values. Neither party introduced evidence 
of any appraisal. Disotell and Stiltner both 
acknowledge that neither offered any evidence of 
value of the partnership assets. 
[5] Because a buyout is appropriate only if it is for 
fair market value, and there was no admissible 
evidence of fair market value, we must remand. It 
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will be necessary on remand to determine the value 
of the assets before Stiltner attempts to buy out 
Disotell. The parties may offer any evidence 
relevant *895 to the value of the partnership 
property. [FNIO] The partnership assets include 
both the hotel property and the parking lot. 
Contemporaneous appraisals of both will be 
necessary so that neither party is prejudiced by a 
fluctuation in the value of one asset. On appeal, 
Disotell claims that he had no pretrial notice that the 
superior court would establish a value for the 
partnership property. The remand will provide 
Disotell full opportunity to introduce evidence or 
otherwise address the issue. 
FNIO. We have previously questioned the 
admissibility of tax appraisals. Bennett v. 
Artus, 20 P.3d 560, 565 (Alaska 2001); 
Four Separate Parcels of Land v. City o/ 
Kodiak, 938 P.2d 448, 454 (Alaska 1997) 
(quoting State v. 45,621 Square Feet of 
Land, 475 P.2d 553, 557 (Alaska 1970) 
(reiterating rule "that evidence of a tax 
assessment to establish fair market value is 
inadmissible, since such an assessment is 
'notoriously unreliable as a criterion of true 
vaiue' ")). Nonetheless, tax appraisals are 
not necessarily inadmissible. Harrower v. 
Harrower, 71 P.3d 854, 862 (Alaska 2003) 
(holding that superior court's reliance on 
tax-assessed values was not clearly 
erroneous). 
D. It Was Error To Characterize as Partnership 
Debt Disotell's Obligation To Pay for His 
Capital Contribution. 
161 Disotell argues that the court erred by 
characterizing as partnership debt the obligation he 
incmed to pay for his capital contribution. [FNI I] 
The parties stipulated that the partners had agreed 
that the funds from which Disotell would pay for his 
oue-half interest in the hotel property "would only 
come from the profits of the hotel!' The superior 
court found: 
FNI 1. Disotell also argues that the court 
erred by failing to apply the partnership 
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assets to satisfy the $38,075 (plus interest) 
liability owed to third-party creditors for 
the purchase of the parking lot. AS 
32.05.350 required that "[iln settling 
account behveen the partners after 
dissolutiou," the assets be applied to the 
satisfaction of the liabilities. The statute 
required that liabilities owed to creditors 
other than partners be paid before 
liabilities owed to partners. AS 
32.05.350(2). 
The partnership obligated itself to pay Stiltner 
"all the profits from the partnership until he had 
recovered his original cost basis of the Hotel 
property." ... Further, the partnership took on 
Disotell's loan obligation, and promised to pay 
Stiltner the $137,500. Therefore, this court views 
the $137,500 as a loan obligation the partnership 
owes Stiltner. 
The superior court classified the $137,500 as a 
partnership liability, deducting it from the net value 
of the partnership. 
Our primary concern is determining the partners' 
intent. [FN12] The partners' litigation stipulation 
stated that they had agreed that the funds from 
which Disotell would pay for his one-half interest 
"would only come from the profits of the hotel." 
This stipulation is not reasonably susceptible to an 
interpretation that the partnership assumed 
Disotell's loan obligation. Stiltner's trial testimony is 
also inconsistent with any such interpretation: 
FN12. AS 32.05.350. 
THE COURT: ... [Plart of the stipulation, 
paragraph 7G, essentially says that you were then 
to receive all the profits of the partnership until 
you had recovered your original cost basis in the 
hotel property. Can you explain to me how that 
piece iits into your agreement? 
[STILTNER]: That's my purchase of the hotel. 
THE COURT: Mm-hmm (affiiative). 
A: That--him paying for that half of the hotel was 
delayed until the hotel started turning a profit. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
A. The 150 that he would owe me for a 50 
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percent interest in the hotel, that was delayed 
until the hotel started turning a profit. 
This testimony implies that the loan obligation was 
DisoteU's, not the partnership's. It is unlikely that 
Stiltner would have been willing to assume the 
obligation as a partnership debt and thereby 
effectively agree to pay half of Disotell's obligation. 
We conclude, therefore, that it was error to 
characterize the obligation as partnership debt. 
The partners stipulated that Disotell had promised 
Stiltner: (1) to supply development and 
construction services on a cost-only basis to 
construct a hotel and (2) to contribute his *896 
interest in the hotel property as capital and to 
subordinate his interest in profits until Stiltner had 
recovered his original cost basis in the hotel. The 
partners explicitly agreed that Disotell would pay 
for his one-half interest "only" from profits. It is 
not clear, however, whether the parties 
contemplated the situation before us when they 
entered into the agreement. The superior court did 
not entex_py fmdings as to whether the "repayment 
only out of profits" provision of the parties' 
agreement was intended to apply in the event that 
the partnership dissolved before making profits. 
We therefore remand the case with instructions to 
the superior court to determine whether the parties 
intended the provision to apply in this context. 
[7] If the superior court fmds that the provision was 
not intended to apply in this situation, it may supply 
a provision that is reasonable under the 
circumstances. Under section 204 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "[wlhen the 
parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a 
contract have not agreed with respect to a term 
which is essential to a determination of their rights 
and duties, a term which is reasonable in the 
circumstances is supplied by the court!' EN131 
Comment d to Section 204 instructs on how the 
court should supply an omitted term: 
FN13. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 9 
204 (1981). 
The process of supplying an omitted term has 
sometimes been disguised as a literal or 
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purposive reading of contract language directed 
to a situation other than the situation that arises. 
Sometimes it is said that the search is for the term 
the parties would have agreed to if the question 
had been brought to their attention. Both the 
meaning of the words used and the probability 
that a particular term would have been used if the 
question had been raised may be factors in 
determining what term is reasonable in the 
circumstances. But where there is in fact no 
agreement, the court should supply a term which 
comports with community standards of fairness 
and policy rather than analyze a hypothetical 
model of the bargainingprocess.[ [EN1411 
FN14. Id. at cmt. d (emphasis added). 
In considering what term is reasonable, the superior 
court should consider the risks and obligations each 
party assumed. In exchange for Stiltner's 
contribution of the hotel property to the partnership, 
Disotell agreed to renovate and build the hotel. The 
agreement obliged DisoteU to supply his 
development and construction services to the hotel 
project. Those services were part of the 
consideration he offered for the one-half interest in 
the hotel property that he purchased from Stiltner. 
If Disotell had completed construction of the hotel 
but the project had proven unprofitable, we doubt 
that fairness would demand that Disotell 
nevertheless repay the one-half interest. In reality, 
however, the partnership dissolved before Disotell 
fulfilled his obligations under the agreement. The 
superior court has discretion to decide, therefore, 
that fairness requires that Disotell only repay the 
difference between the value of the services he 
contributed to the hotel property before the project 
became impossible and the value of what he was 
supposed to contribute. 
E. The Superior Court Did Not Err  by Refusing 
To Award Damages for Wrongful Dissolution of 
the Partnership. 
181 Disotell claims that he is entitled to recover 
damages for Stiltner's wrongful dissolution of the 
partnership. The Act provided that "[wlhen 
dissolution is caused in contravention of the 
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partnership agreement the rights of partners 
[include] ... the right, as against each partner who 
has caused the dissolution wrongfully, to damages 
for breach of the agreement!' m l 5 ]  The superior 
court denied Disotell's damages claim, determining 
that "neither party was at fault in causing the 
dissolution of the partnership ...." It found that the 
partnership was "terminated by the inability of the 
partners to agree on how the project should 
proceed." We hold that the superior court's fact 
findings are not clearly erroneous and a f f i  its 
decision to *897 deny damages for dissolution of 
the partnership. 
The superior court found: 
[qhe partnership dissolved in May of 1998. The 
dissolution came about when the parties 
disagreed on how the project should proceed. 
Disotell wanted to put in the sewer line, but 
Stiltner disagreed and did not want the sewer line 
put in before Disotell started getting permits and 
began the actual renovation project. 
[9] We review for clear error fact fmdings 
determining the causes of dissolution. EN161 Per 
AS 32.05.240, dissolution indicated the point in 
time when the partners ceased to carry on the 
business together. [FN17] 
FN16. Wyller v. Madsen, 69 P.3d 482, 485 
(Alaska 2003). 
The court's fmdings are supported by the parties' 
stipulations. The parties agree that their dispute 
over the sewer construction caused a "complete 
breakdown in [their] relationship!' Because they 
disagreed over the necessity of the sewer lime, the 
project could not go forward. Trial testimony also 
suppo& the fmding that the impasse was not the 
fault of either party; it resulted from a difference of 
opinion. It was not clear error, therefore, for the 
superior court to fmd that neither party was at fault 
in causing the dissolution and that the dissolution 
arose out of disagreement on how the project was to 
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proceed. 
F. It Was Error To Deny Disotell Damages for 
Stiltner's Post-Dissolution Use of the Property. 
[lo] Disotell also argues that it was error not to 
award him damages for Stiltner's appropriation of 
the hotel property after the dissolution. He 
maintains that he should recover the value of 
Stiltner's use of the property as determined by its 
rental value for the months Stiltner occupied it. The 
superior court gave three reasons for rejecting 
Disotell's damages claim: (1) "the partnership 
purpose for which Disotell 'ha[d] an equal right with 
the partners to possess specific property' ended" 
when the partnership "terminated" in May 1998; 
(2) any wrongful possession claims were premature 
because the superior court had "yet to determine the 
parties' respective rights vis-a-vis the partnership 
and its assets;" and (3) no order had directed either 
party to put the property to economic use. The 
court relied on Parker v. Northern Mixing Co. for 
support. [FN18] We there affmed a superior court 
mling that the appellee partners were not entitled to 
the rental value of the partnership property as 
damages for the appellant partner's post-dissolution 
possession of the property. m 1 9 ]  
FN18. Parker v. Northern Mixing Co., 756 
P.2d 881 (Alaska 1988). 
FN19. Id. at 891. 
We think that reliance on Parker is misplaced. In 
Parker, the superior court had issued a pre-trial 
order that authorized the partner's continued 
possession of the property. [EN201 The order did 
not require the partner to operate the plant during 
that period. @N21] No such order was issued here. 
FN20. Id. at 890. 
FN21. Id. at 891. 
The determination that Disotell no longer had an 
equal right to possess the partnership property after 
the partnership terminated in May 1998 is 
erroneous. Dissolution does not terminate a 
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partnership; it continues until the winding up of 
partnership affairs is complete. [FN22] Because "a 
partner ... has an equal right with the partners to 
possess specific partnership property for partnership 
purposes," it follows that a partner has no right to 
exclude other partners from the property after 
dissolution but before termination and distribution. 
m 2 3 ]  As of December 2001, Stiltner continued to 
occupy the hotel property. The superior court 
found: 
Although it is a commercial property, Stiltner has 
spent most of his time at this 12,500 square foot 
building, including many nights, and has done so 
as the sole building occupant. Stiltner testified 
that he occupies the premises as his residence and 
has *898 stored personal belongings there, and 
also has, since May 1998, stored the goods from 
his former real estate business. 
Stiltner is accountable to the partnership for any 
benefit he derived from his personal use of 
partnership property. Per Alaska Statute 
32.05.160(a), 
Every partner shall account to the partnership for 
any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits 
derived by the partner without the consent of the 
other partners from any transaction connected 
with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the 
partnership or from any use by the partner of its 
property. 
We therefore remand for determination of the 
value of Stiltner's personal use of the property. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Because the Act did not prohibit the buyout option, 
it was not error to grant Stiltner the option to buy 
out Disotell's partnership interest. It was emor, 
however, to permit a buyout without fmding the fair 
market value of the property, based on admissible 
evidence. We therefore REMAND. We also 
REMAND for a determination of what each partner 
contributed to or took from the partnership. This 
determination should consider the value of the 
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partnership assets and any difference between the 
services Disotell was to contribute to the project 
and those he actually contributed, but should not 
include the $137,500 loan obligation. It should also 
take into account the value of Stiltner's personal use 
of the hotel property during the windup period. 
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
Suffolk. 
James F. MEEHAN et al. [FNl] 
FNI. Leo V. Boyle. 
v. 
Maurice F. SHAUGHNESSY et at. [FN2] 
Cynthia J. Cohen et at., [FN3] 
third-party defendants. 
FN2. Robert L. Farrell, William A. Cotter, 
Jr., James F. Fitzgerald, Jr., John J. 
Mahoney, Louis P. Massaro, Jr., Bany R. 
McDonougb, Francis E. Dooley, Jr., 
Frederick S. Gilman, Robert M. Hacking, 
Paul C. Kelly, Joseph M. McDonnell, 
Charles B. Gray, William H. Murpby, 
Mary Momssey Sullivan, Richard L. 
Neumeier, Thomas P. O'Reilly, and Robert 
T. Gill. The defendants were named 
individually and as partners of Parker, 
Coulter, Daley &White. 
FN3. Steven H. Scbafer and Meehan, 
Boyle & Cohen, P.C. 
Argued Oct. 6,1988. 
Decided March 28,1989. 
Departing partners of law firm commenced action 
to recover from former partners amounts allegedly 
owed them under partnership agreement, and to 
obtain declaration as to amounts they owed former 
partners for work done at partnership on cases 
removed to new f m .  Partnership counterclaimed, 
asserting departing partners violated their fiduciary 
duties, and breached partnership agreement, and 
tortiously interfemed with advantageous business 
and contractual relations. The Superior Court, 
Suffolk County, Robert L. Steadman, J., rejected all 
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of partnership's claim for relief, and found that 
departing partners were entitled to recover amounts 
owed them on partnership agreement, and that 
partnership was entitled to recover from departing 
partners for time billed and expenses incurred on 
cases removed to new fum. Appeal was taken. 
On grant of direct appellate review, the Supreme 
Judicial Court, Hennessey, C.J., held that: (1) 
judge's determination that departing partners did not 
violate fiduciary duty by handling cases for their 
own benefit was supported by substantial evidence; 
(2) departing partners did not breach fiduciary duty 
not to compete with partners by secretly setting up 
new fm during tenure at old partnership; and (3) 
departing partners breached their fiduciary duties by 
unfairly acquiring consent from clients to remove 
cases. 
Reversed and remanded 
West Headnotes 
[I] Attorney and Client -30 
45MO Most Cited Cases 
Pursuant to partnership agreement and general 
ethical standards prohibiting restrictive covenants 
between attorneys, upon payment of fair charge, any 
case could be removed from law iirm regardless of 
whether case came to fm through personal efforts 
of departing partner. 
121 Partnership -92 
289k92 Most Cited Cases 
As fiduciary, parfner must consider his or her 
partners' welfare, and refrain from acting for purely 
private gain. 
[3] Attorney and Client -30 
45WO Most Cited Cases 
Trial judge was warranted in determining that 
departing partners handled cases no differently as 
result of their decision to leave law fum, and that 
they thus hlfilled their fiduciary duty in that 
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404 Mass. 419,535 N.E.2d 1255,57 USLW 2642 
(Cite as: 404 Mass. 419,535 N.E.2d 1255) 
respect; judge found that departing attorneys 
worked full schedules, and that they tried cases, 
worked on discovery, settled cases and made 
reasonable effolts to avoid continuances. 
141 Attorney and Client -30 
45k30 Most Cited Cases 
Departing partners did not breach their fiduciary 
duty to law f m  partnership not to compete with 
their partners by secretly setting up new f m  during 
their tenure at partnership; departing partners, 
logistical arrangements for establishment of new 
fm including execution of lease, preparation of 
client list, and endeavors to obtain financing on 
basis of list, were permissible. S.J.C.Rule 3:09, 
Code of Jud.Conduct, Canon 7. 
151 Attorney and Client -30 
45k30 Most Cited Cases 
Departing partners breached their fiduciary duties 
by unfairly acquiring consent from clients to 
remove cases from former partnership, where one 
departing partner affmtively denied to his 
partners that he had any plans for leaving 
partnership, when in fact he was laying groundwork 
for new partnership, departing partners continued to 
use their position and confidence to disadvantage of 
partnership after giving notice by communicating 
with clients and referring attorneys, and departing 
partners delayed providing partners with list of 
clients intended to be transferred to new partnership 
until departing partners had obtained authorization 
from majority of clients. 
161 Attorney and CIient -30 
45MO Most Cited Cases 
Departing partners did not forfeit their right to 
recover capital contributions and to receipt of 
portion of partnership profirs by simply breach'mg 
partnership agreement. 
171 Attorney and CIient -30 
45M0 Most Cited Cases 
Departing partners who improperly removed cases 
from old law firm had burden of proving that clients 
would have consented to removal in absence of any 
breach of duty. 
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181 Trusts -103(5) 
390k103(5) Most Cited Cases 
Departing partners held in constructive trust for 
benefit of former partnerships any profits departing 
partners derived or may have derived from cases 
which they unfairly removed from old partnership; 
imposition of constructive trust would enforce 
obligations resulting from breach of duty and would 
not harm innocent clients. 
*421 **I256 John J. Cur&& Jr. (Meghan H. 
Magruder & Rosy FitzPatrick, Boston, with him), 
for Maurice F. Shaughnessy et al. 
Edward J. Barshak (Regina E. Roman, Boston, 
with him), for James F. Meehan et al. 
Before *419 HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, 
LIACOS, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ. 
*421 HENNESSEY, Chief Justice. 
The plaintiffs, James F. Meehan (Meehan) and Leo 
V. Boyle (Boyle), were partners of the law f m  
Parker, Coulter, Daley & White (Parker Coulter). 
After Meehan and Boyle terminated their 
relationship with Parker Coulter to start their own 
fm they commenced this action both to recover 
amounts they claim the defendants, their former 
partners, owed them under the partnership 
agreement, and to obtain a declaration as to 
amounts they owed the defendants for work done at 
Parker Coulter on cases they removed to their new 
fm. The defendants (hereinafter collectively 
Parker Coulter) m4] counterclaimed that Meehan 
and Boyle violated their fiduciary duties, breached 
the partnership agreement, and toaiously interfered 
with their advantageous business and contractual 
relationships. **I257 As grounds for these claims, 
Parker Coulter asserted that Meehan and Boyle 
engaged in improper conduct in withdrawing cases 
and clients from the firm, and in inducing 
employees to join the new fm of Meehan, Boyle & 
Cohen, P.C. (MBC). Parker Coulter also filed a 
third-party action with similar claims against MBC 
and against Cynthia J. Cohen *422 Cohen), a 
former junior partner, and Steven H. Schafer 
(Schafer), a former associate, who, among others, 
left the fm to join MBC. 
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FN4. When a partner leaves a partnership, 
the partnership is dissolved. G.L. c. 108A, 
5 29 (1986 ed.). When necessary, we will 
distinguish between the Parker, Coulter, 
Daley & White which included Meehan 
and Boyle as partners, and which has been 
dissolved, and the current Parker, Coulter, 
Daley & White, which includes only the 
defendants as partners. 
After a jury-waived trial, a Superior Court judge 
rejected all of Parker Coulter's claims for relief, and 
found that Meehan and Boyle were entitled to 
recover amounts owed to them under the 
partnership agreement. The judge also found, 
based on the partnership agreement and a quantum 
meruit theory, that Parker Coulter was entitled to 
recover from Meehan and Boyle for time billed and 
expenses incurred on the cases Meehan and Boyle 
removed to their own fm. Parker Coulter appealed 
from the judgment, and we granted direct appellate 
review. 
Although we are in agreement with most of the 
judge's reasoning and conclusions which he reached 
after lengthy and painstaking proceedings, we 
nevertheless reverse the judgment entered below 
and remand for further fmdings and a hearing, 
consistent in all respects with this opinion. This 
result follows from our conclusion, infa, that the 
judge erred in deciding that Meehan and Boyle 
acted properly in acquiring consent to remove cases 
to MBC. FJ5] 
FN5. We repeatedly, later in this opinion, 
refer to "preemptive conduct" of Meehan 
and Boyle, as well as their "breach of 
duty." Undoubtedly these are accurate 
descriptions, but we do not wish to leave 
the impression that the MBC attorneys 
were unfair in the totality of their conduct 
in depaxting from the &XI. For instance, 
we recount early in this opinion that 
Meehan and Boyle left undisturbed with 
their partners, and made no attempt to 
claim, a very large amount of business 
which Meehan had attracted to Parker 
Coulter. 
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We summarize the facts as found by the judge. 
Aside from certain conclusions which the judge 
reached, and which we address in more detail 
below, the parties agree that these fmdings were 
warranted by the evidence. Parker, Coulter, Daley 
& White is a large partnership which specializes in 
litigation on behalf of both defendants and 
plaintiffs. Meehan joined the fm in 1959, and 
became a partner in 1963; his practice focuses 
primarily on complex tort litigation, such as product 
liability and aviation defense work. Boyle joined 
Parker Coulter in 1971, and became a partner in 
1980; he has concentrated on *423 plaintiffs' work. 
Both have developed outstanding reputations as 
trial lawyers in the Commonwealth. Meehan and 
Boyle each were active in the management of 
Parker Coulter. They each sewed, for example, on 
the partnership's executive committee and, as 
members of this committee, were responsible for 
considering and making policy recommendations to 
the general partnership. Boyle was also in charge 
of the "plaintiffs department" within the firm, which 
managed a roximately 350 cases. At the time of 
their lea V# g, Meehan's interest in the partnerslp 
was 6% and Boyle's interest was 4.8%. 
Meehan and Boyle had become dissatisfied at 
Parker Coulter. On June 27, 1984, after 
unsuccessfully opposing the adoption of a 
fm-wide pension plan, the two first discussed the 
possibility of leaving Parker Coulter. Another 
partner met with them to discuss leaving but told 
them their proposed fm would not be suitable for 
his type of practice. On July 1, Meehan and Boyle 
decided to leave Parker Coulter and form their own 
- partnership. 
Having decided to establish a new f i  Meehan 
and Boyle then focused on whom they would invite 
to join them. The two spoke with Cohen, a junior 
partner and the de facto head of Parker Coulter's 
appellate department, about joining the new fm as 
a partner. They arranged to meet with her on July 
5, and told her to keep their conversations 
confidential. The day before the July 5 meeting, 
Boyle prepared two lists of what he considered to 
be his cases. The lists contained approximately 
eighty to 100 cases, and for each case indicated the 
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status, fee arrangement, estimated settlement value, 
and potential fee to MBC. Boyle **I258 save 
these lists to Cohen for her to examine in 
preparation for the July 5 meeting. 
At the July 5 meeting, Meehan and Boyle outlined 
to Cohen their plans for the new firm, including 
their intent to offer positions to Schafer, Peter Black 
(Black), and Warren Fitzgerald (Fitzgerald), who 
were associates at Parker Coulter. Boyle stated 
that he hoped the clients he had been representing 
would go with him to the new firm; Meehan said he 
would take the aviation work he had at Parker 
Coulter with him. Both stated that they felt others 
at Parker Coulter were getting paid *424 as much as 
or more than they were, but were not working as 
hard. Cohen decided to consider the offer from 
Meehan and Boyle, and agreed to keep the plans 
confidential until formal notice of the separation 
was given to the partnership. Although the 
partnership agreement required a notice period of 
three mouths, the three decided to give only thirty 
days' notice. They chose to give shorter notice to 
avoid what they believed wuuld be an 
uncomfortable situation at the fum, and possible 
retaliatory measures by the partnership. Meehan 
and Boyle had agreed that they would leave Parker 
Coulter on December 31, 1984, the end of Parker 
Coulter's fiscal year. 
Fitzgerald had worked with Meehan in the past on 
general defense work, and Black worked with 
Meehan, particularly in the aviation area. Meehan 
was instrumental in attracting Black, who had 
previously been employed by U.S. Aviation 
Underwriters (USAU), to Parker Coulter. 
Although Black had already considered leaving 
Parker Coulter, he was concerned about whether 
USAU wuuld follow him to a small fm like MBC, 
and wanted to discuss his leaving Parker Coulter 
with the vice president of USAU. In October, 
1984, Black and Meehan met with the USAU vice 
president in New York. They later received 
assurances from him that he would be interested in 
sending USAU business to the proposed new firm. 
Black then accepted the offer to join MBC. 
Fitzgerald also accepted. Schafer, Black, and 
Fitzgerald *425 were the only associates Meehan, 
Boyle, and Cohen approached concerning the new 
f m .  
During July and the following months, Meehan, 
Boyle, and Cohen made arrangements for their new 
practice apart from seeking associates. They began 
to look for office space and retained an architect. 
In early fall, a lease was executed on behalf of 
MBC in the name of MBC Realty Trust. They also 
retained an attorney to advise them on the formation 
of the new fm. 
During the fwst week of August, Cohen accepted Boyle was assigned the task of arranging fmancing. 
the offer to join the new f m  as a partner. Her He prepared a personal fmancial statement and 
primary reason for leaving Parker Coulter to join obtained a bank loan in September, 1984. During 
MBC was that she enjoyed working with Meehan that fall, two other loans were made on MBC's 
and Boyle. credit. Cohen, at the request of an accountant, had 
been trying to develop projections of MBC's 
In July, 1984, Boyle offered a position at MBC to expected revenue in order to obtain long-term 
Schafer, who worked closely with Boyle in the financing. The accountant requested a list of cases 
plaintiffs department. Boyle told Schafer to with indications as to MBC's expected fees for this 
organize his cases, and "to keep an eye towards purpose. In November, Boyle updated and revised 
cases to be resolved in 1985 and to handle these the list of cases he expected to take to MBC which 
cases for resolution in 1985 rather than 1984." He he had compiled in July. The November list 
also told Schafer to make a list of cases he could contained approximately 135 cases. The increase in 
take with him to MBC, and to keep all their Boyle's caseload from July to November resulted in 
conversations confidential. part from the departure of a Parker Coulter attorney 
in early September, 1984. Boyle was in charge of 
Late in the summer of 1984, Meehan asked Black reassigning the cases this attorney worked on. 
and Fitrgerald to become associates at MBC. Although another attorney requested transfer of 
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some of these cases, Boyle assigned none to that 
attorney, and assigned most of the cases to himself 
and Schafer. Meehan, Cohen, and **I259 Black 
also prepared lists of cases which they anticipated 
they would remove, and included the potential fee 
each case would generate for MBC. 
Toward the end of November, Boyle prepared form 
letters to send to clients and referring attomeys as 
soon as Parker Coulter was notified of the 
separation. He also drafted a form for the clients to 
return to him at his home address authorizing him to 
remove cases to MBC. An outside agency typed 
these materials on Parker Coulter's letterhead. 
Schafer prepared similar letters and authorization 
forms. 
While they were planning their departure, from 
July to approximately December, Meehan, Boyle, 
Cohen, Schafer, *426 Black, and Fitzgerald all 
continued to work full schedules. They settled 
cases appropriately, made reasonable efforts to 
avoid continuances, tried cases, and worked on 
discovery. Each generally maintained his or her 
usual standard of performance. 
Meehan and Boyle had originally intended to give 
notice to Parker Couiter on December 1, 1984. 
Rumors of their leaving, however, began to 
circulate before then. During the period from July 
to early fall, different Parker Coulter partners 
approached Meehan individually on three separate 
occasions and asked him if the rumors about his 
leaving were true. On each occasion, Meehan 
denied that he was leaving. On November 30, 
1984, a partner, Maurice F. Shaughnessy 
(Shaughnessy), approached Boyle and asked him 
whether Meeban and Boyle intended to leave the 
fim~. Shaughnessy interpreted Boyle's evasive 
response as an affmation of the rumors. Meehan 
and Boyle then decided to distribute their notice 
that afternoon, which stated, as their proposed date 
for leaving, December 31, 1984. A notice was left 
on the desk of each partner. When Meehan, Boyle, 
and Cohen gave their notice, the atmosphere at 
Parker Conlter became "tense, emotional and 
unpleasant, if not adversarial." 
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On December 3, the Parker Coulter partners 
appointed a separation committee and decided to 
communicate with "important sources of business" 
to tell them of the separation and of Parker Coulter's 
desire to continue representing them. Meehan and 
Boyle asked their partners for financial information 
about the fm, discussed cases and clients with 
them, and stated that they intended to communicate 
with clients and referring attomeys on the cases in 
which they were involved. Sometime during the 
week of December 3, the partners sent Boyle a list 
of cases and requested that he identify the cases he 
intended to take with him. 
Boyle had begun to make telephone calls to 
referring attomeys on Saturday morning, December 
1. He had spoken with three referring attomeys by 
that date and told them of his departure from Parker 
Coulter and his wish to continue handling *427 
their cases. On December 3, he mailed his 
previously typed letters and authorization forms, 
and by the end of the first two weeks of December 
he had spoken with a majority of referring 
attomeys, and had obtained authorizations &om a 
majority of clients whose cases he planned to 
remove to MBC. 
Although the partners previously were aware of 
Boyle's intention to communicate with clients, they 
did not become aware of the extent of his 
communications until December 12 or 13. Boyle 
did not provide his partners with the list they 
requested of cases he intended to remove until 
December 17. Throughout December, Meehan, 
Boyle, and Schafer continued to communicate with 
referring attorneys on cases they were currently 
handling to discuss authorizing their transfer to 
MBC. On December 19, 1984, one of the partners 
accepted on behalf of Parker Coulter the December 
31 departure date and waived the three-month 
notice period provided for by the partnership 
agreement. Meehan, Boyle, and Cohen formalized 
their arrangement as a professional corporation on 
January 1,1985. 
MBC removed a number of cases from Parker 
Coulter. Of the roughly 350 contingent fee cases 
pending at Parker Coulter in 1984, Boyle, Schafer, 
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and Meehan removed approximately 142 to MBC. 
Meehan advised **I260 Parker Coulter that the 
4,000 asbestos cases he had attracted to the fum 
would remain, and he did not seek to take certain 
other major clients. Black removed thirty-five 
cases; Fitzgerald removed ten; and Cohen 
removed three. A provision in the partnership 
agreement in effect at the separation provided that a 
voluntarily retiring partner, upon the payment of a 
"fair charge," could remove "any matter in which 
the partnership had been representing a client who 
came to the f m  through the personal effort or 
connection of the retiring partner," subject to the 
right of the client to stay with the fm. 
Approximately thirty-nine of the 142 contingent fee 
cases removed to MBC came to Parker Coulter at 
least in part through the personal efforts or 
connections of Parker Coulter attorneys other than 
Meehan, Boyle, Cohen, Schafer, Black, or 
Fitzgerald. In all the cases removed to MBC, 
however, MBC attorneys had direct, existing 
relationships with the clients. In all the removed 
cases, MBC attorneys *428 communicated with the 
referring attorney or with the client directly by 
telephone or letter. In each case, the client signed 
an authorization. 
Schafer subsequently separated his practice from 
MBC's. He took with him a number of the cases 
which had been removed from Parker Coulter to 
MBC. 
Based on these fmdings, the judge determined that 
the MBC attorneys did not manipulate cases, or 
handle them differently as a result of their decision 
to leave Parker Coulter. He also determined that 
Parker Coulter failed to prove that the clients whose 
cases were removed did not freely choose to have 
MBC represent them. Consequently, he concluded 
that Meehan and Boyle neither violated the 
partnership agreement nor breached the fiduciary 
duty they owed to their partners. In addition, the 
judge also found that Meehan and Boyle did not 
tortiously interfere with Parker Coulter's relations 
with clients or employees. He similarly rejected 
Parker Coulter's claims against Cohen and Schafer. 
1. Statutory Considerations; the Partnership 
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Agreement, 
Before we address Parker Coulter's claims of 
wrongdoing, we fmt review the statutory right a 
partner has to cease his or her association with a 
partnership, and the statutory right the partner has to 
assets of the partnership upon leaving. We then 
examine how the partners in this case have modified 
these statutory rights in their partnership agreement. 
General Laws c. 108A (1986 ed.) governs the 
formation, conduct, and liquidation of partnerships. 
Under 8 29, a "change in the relation of the 
partners caused by any partner ceasing to be 
associated in the canying on ... of the business" 
results in dissolution of the partnership. The 
statute enumerates specific changes which cause a 
dissolution. A partnership may be dissolved at any 
time, for example, by the express will of a partner. 
G.L. c. 108A, 5 31(l)(b), (2). 
Where a partnership agreement provides that the 
partnership is to continue indefinitely, and the 
partnership is therefore "at will," a partner has the 
right to dissolve the partnership, and the dissolution 
occurs "[wlithout violation of the agreement 
between the partners." G.L. c. 108A, 9 31(1). See 
*429Johnson v. Kennedy, 350 Mass. 294, 298, 214 
N.E.2d 276 (1966); Steele v. Estabrook, 232 Mass. 
432, 439, 122 N.E. 562 (1919). In a dissolution 
which occurs "[wlithout violation of the 
agreement," the statute expressly defers to the 
method of dividing the partnership's assets which 
the parties bargained for in their partnership 
agreement. G.L. c. 108A, 38(1). In contrast, 
where the partnership agreement provides that the 
partnership is to continue for a defmite term, a 
partner has merely the power to dissolve, and the 
dissolutiou occurs "[iln contravention of the 
agreement between the partners." G.L. c. 108A, 8 
31(2). If the dissolution occurs in contravention of 
the agreement, the dissolving partner is subject to 
certain damages, and the statute does not expressly 
allow the partnership agreement to control the 
division of the partnership's assets. G.L. c. 108A, 5 
38(2). See generally 2 A.R. Brornberg & L.E. 
Ribstein, Partnership 9 7.02(c) **I261 (1988). 
PN61 
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FN6. The wrongful conduct described in $5 
31 and 38 consists of dissolving the 
partnership before its term. We have 
noted that the dissolution of a partnership 
at will, "however unseemly in manner and 
method, [is] not a legal wrong." Johnson, 
supra (citing G.L. c. 108A, 5 38[1] ). 
This statement from Johnson recognizes 
that dissolution of a partnership at will is 
not "wrongll" or "in contravention of the 
agreement" within the meaning of either 5 
31 or § 38, and is therefore not a "legal 
wrong" which would trigger the remedies 
of 5 38(2). See id. We emphasize that 
the 5 38(2) remedy is in addition to, and 
distinct from, the remedy provided by 21 
for wrongdoing which is not connected 
with a premature dissolution. Cf. 
Gaberman, Corporations and Partnerships: 
Wrongful Dissolution and Damages for 
Breach of Agreement, 1966 Ann. Survey 
Mass. Law 5 8.8, at 122 (1966) 
(suggesting that statute can be read to 
allow no remedy for intentional 
misconduct at dissolution). 
In addition to giving a partner the power to 
dissolve a partnership, and to specifying the effects 
of a premature dissolution, c. 108A also provides a 
method for dividing the assets of a dissolved 
partnership. In the absence of an agreement 
otherwise, upon dissolution a partner may liquidate 
the partnership's assets and obtain his or her share 
of the surplus. G.L. c. 108A, 5 38(1). Because it 
may be impossible to liquidate certain partnership 
assets immediately, the statute provides that "[oln 
dissolution [a] partnership is not terminated, but 
continues until the winding-up of partnership affairs 
is completed." *430G.L. c. 108A, 30. Each 
partner has a fiduciary duty to wind up this 
d i s h e d  partnership business solely for the 
benefit of the former partnership. G.L. c. 108A, $5 
18(f ), 21, 35. See Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susrnan v. 
Cohen, 146 Cal.App.3d 200, 216-217, 194 
Cal.Rptr. 180 (1983), S.C., 191 Cal.App.3d 1035, 
237 Cal.Rptr. 14 (1987); Resnick v. Kaplan, 49 
Md.App. 499, 507-508, 434 A.2d 582 (1980), 
quoting Frates v. Nichols, 167 So.2d 77, 80-81 
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(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1964). See generally Note, 
Winding Up Dissolved Law Partnerships: The 
No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 
Calif.L.Rev. 1597, 1604-1610 (1985). Once the 
windup is complete, the total value of the dissolved 
partnership's assets can be determined. Each 
partner then receives his or her share. G.L. c. 
108A, $8 18,38(1). 
The Parker Coulter partnership agreement provided 
for rights on a dissolution caused by the will of a 
partner which are different from those c. 108A 
provides. [FN7] Because going concerns are 
typically destroyed in the dissolution process of 
liquidation and windup, see J. Crane & A. 
Bromberg, Partnership 419 (1968), the agreement 
m i n i i e s  the impact of this process. The 
agreement provides for an allocation to the 
departing partner of a share of the f m ' s  current net 
income, and a return of his or her capital 
contributions. In addition, the agreement also 
recognizes that a major asset of a law fm is the 
expected fees it will receive from unfmished 
business currently being transacted. Instead of 
assigning a value to the departing partner's interest 
in this d i s h e d  business, or waiting for the 
d i s h e d  business to be "wound up" and 
liquidated, which is the method of division c. 108A 
provides, the agreement gives the partner the right 
to remove any case which came to the fum "through 
the personal effort or connection" of the partner, if 
the partner compensates the dissolved partnership 
*431 "for the services to and expenditures for the 
client." FN8] Once the partner has removed a 
case, the agreement provides that the partner is 
entitled to retain all future fees in the case, with the 
exception of the "fair charge" owed to the dissolved 
f.m. ~ 9 1  
FN7. Chapter 108A is intended to be a 
type of "form contract." See 1 A.R. 
Bromberg & L.E. Ribstein, Partnership 
l.Ol(d) (1988). Parties are therefore 
allowed the freedom to provide for rights 
at dissolution and during the wind-up 
period which are different from those 
provided for in the statute. See G.L. c. 
108A, 5 38(1). 
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FN8. The agreement expressly protects a 
client's right to choose his or her attorney, 
by providing that the right to remove a 
case is "subject to the right of the client to 
direct that the matter be retained by the 
continuing f m  of remaining partners." 
F'N9. The agreement provides that this 
"fair charge" is a "receivable account of 
the earlier partnership ... and [is] divided 
between the remaining partners and the 
retiring partner on the basis of which they 
share in the profits of the f i  at the time 
of the withdrawal." This fair charge is 
thus treated as an asset of the former 
partnership. Because the partnership, upon 
the receipt of the fair charge, gives up all 
future rights to income from the removed 
case, the partnership's collective interest in 
the case is effectively "wound up." The 
fair charge, therefore, is a method of 
valuing the partnership's d i s h e d  
business as it relates to the removed case. 
**I262 [I] Although the provision in the 
partnership agreement which divides the dissolved 
f m ' s  unfinished business does not expressly apply 
to the removal of cases which did not come to 
Parker Coulter through the efforts of the departing 
partner, we believe that the parties intended this 
provision to apply to these cases also. We interpret 
this provision to cover these additional cases for 
two reasons. First, according to the Canons of 
Ethics and Disciplinary Rules Regulating the 
Practice of Law (S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon 2, as 
amended through 398 Mass. 1108 [I9861 ), a 
lawyer may not participate in an agreement which 
restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law after 
the termination of a relationship created by the 
agreement. One reason for this d e  is to protect 
the public. See Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J.Super. 
343, 349, 336 A.2d 498 affd, 137 N.J.Super. 135, 
348 A.2d 208 (1975); Hagen v. O1Conne1l, Goyak, 
& Ball, 68 0r.App. 700, 703-704, 683 P.2d 563 
(1984); Gray v. Martin, 63 0r.App. 173, 181-182, 
663 P.2d 1285 (1983). The strong public interest 
in allowing clients to retain counsel of their choice 
outweighs any professional benefits derived from a 
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restrictive covenant. Thus, the Parker Coulter 
partners could not restrict a departing partner's right 
to remove any clients who freely choose to retain 
him or her as their legal counsel. Second, we 
believe the agreement's carefully drawn *432 
provisions governing dissolution and the division of 
assets indicate the partners' strong intent not to 
allow the provisions of c. 108A concerning 
liquidation and wind-up to govern any portion of 
the dissolved f m ' s  unfinished business. [F'NIO] 
Therefore, based on the partners' intent, and on the 
prohibition against restrictive covenants between 
attorneys, we interpret the agreement to provide 
that, upon the payment of a fair charge, any case 
may be removed regardless of whether the case 
came to the fm through the personal efforts of the 
departing partner. This privilege to remove, as is 
shown in our later discussion, is of course 
dependent upon the partner's compliance with 
fiduciary obligations. 
FN10. The parties have not suggested to us 
a method, and one is not readily apparent, 
of applying the statute to only a portion of 
the f i t s  d i s h e d  business. 
Under the agreement, therefore, a partner who 
sepmtes his or her practice fram that of the fm 
receives (1) the right to his or her capital 
contribution, (2) the right to a share of the net 
income to which the dissolved partnership is 
currently entitled, and (3) the right to a portion of 
the f i t s  d i i s h e d  business, and in exchange 
gives up all other rights in the dissolved firm's 
remaining assets. As to (3) above, "unfiished 
business," the partner gives up all right to proceeds 
from any unfinished business of the dissolved f m  
which the new, surviving firm retains. Under the 
agreement, the old firm's unfmished business is, in 
effect, "wound up" immediately; the departing 
partner takes certain of the unfinished business of 
the old, dissolved Parker Coulter on the payment of 
a "fair charge," and the new, surviving Parker 
Coulter takes the remainder of the old partnership's 
d i s h e d  business. [FNII] The two entities 
surviving after the dissolution possess "new 
business," unconnected with that of the old f i  
and the former partners no longer have a continuing 
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fiduciary obligation to *433 windup for the benefit 
of each other the business they shared in their 
former partnership. 
FNll. A more equitable provision would 
require that the new, surviving partnership 
also pay a "fair charge" on the cases it 
takes from the dissolved paxtnership. This 
"fair charge" from the new finn, as is the 
"fair charge" from the departing partner, 
would be an asset of the dissolved 
partnership, in which the departing partner 
has an interest. 
In sum, the statute gives a partner the power to 
dissolve a partnership at any time. Under the 
statute, the assets of the dissolved partnership are 
divided among the former partners through the 
process of liquidation and windup. The statute, 
however, allows parlners to design their own **1263 
methods of dividing assets and, provided the 
dissolution is not premature, expressly states that 
the partners' method controls. Here, the partners 
have fashioned a division method which 
immediately winds up untinished business, allows 
for a quick separation of the surviving practices, 
and minimizes the dismptive impact of a dissolution. 
2. Fiduciaiy Duties; Breach 
We now consider Parker Coulter's claims of 
wrongdoing. Parker Coulter claims that the judge 
erred in fmding that Meehan, Boyle, Cohen, and 
Schafer fulfilled their fiduciary duties to the former 
partnership. In particular, Parker Coulter argues 
that these attomeys breached their duties (1) by 
improperly handling cases for their own, and not the 
partnership's benefit, (2) by secretly competing with 
the partnership, and (3) by unfairly acquiring from 
clients and referring attomeys consent to withdraw 
cases to MBC. pN12] We do not agree with 
Parker Coulter's fust two arguments but agree with 
the third. We fust address the claims against 
Meehan and Boyle, and then turn to those against 
Cohen and Schafer. 
FN12. Parker Coulter does not claim that 
Meehan and Boyle wrongfully dissolved 
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the partnership by leaving prematurely. 
The partnership agreement, although 
providing that the fm "shall continue 
indefinitely," required that a partner who 
leaves to continue practicing elsewhere 
give three-montbs' advance notice. Tbis, 
therefore, may not have been a purely "at 
will" partnership which a partner has a 
right to dissolve at any time without 
higgering the remedies of G.L. c. 108A, 5 
38(2). See G.L. c. 108A, $5 31(1), 38. 
Johnson v. Kennedy, 350 Mass. 294, 298, 
214 N.E.2d 276 (1966). Here, Parker 
Coulter waived compliance with the 
agreement's three-month notice provision. 
Meehan and Boyle, therefore, dissolved 
the partnership "[w]ithout violation of the 
agreement between the partners." G.L. c. 
lO8A, 5 31. 
[2] It is well settled that partners owe each other a 
fiduciary duty of "the utmost good faith and 
loyalty!' *434Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 8, 
105 N.E.2d 843 (1952). Shelley v. Smith, 271 
Mass. 106, 115, 170 N.E. 826 (1930). Holmes v. 
Darling, 213 Mass. 303, 305, 100 N.E. 611 (1913). 
As a fiduciary, a partner must consider his or her 
partners' welfare, and refrain from acting for purely 
private gain. Shelley, supra. Holmes, supra. 
Partners thus "may not act out of avarice, 
expediency or self-interest in derogation of their 
duty of loyalty." Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 
of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 593, 328 
N.E.2d 505 (1975). Meehan and Boyle owed their 
copartners at Parker Coulter a duty of the utmost 
good faith and loyalty, and were obliged to consider 
their copartners' welfare, and not merely their own. 
[3] Parker Coulter first argues that Meehan and 
Boyle violated their fiduciary duty by handling 
cases for their own benefit, and challenges the 
judge's finding that no manipulation occurred. 
F1\113] Parker Coulter attempts to avoid the 
burden of demonstrating that this fmding is clearly 
erroneous by characterizing it as an "inference," and 
claiming that, as such, it is entitled to no weight. 
We disagree. The judge's determination was one of 
fact, and was based on the assessment of the 
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credibility of individuals with personal knowledge 
of the facts about which they were testifying. We 
therefore review this finding under the "clearly 
erroneous" standard. See New England Canteen 
Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass. 671, 675, 363 
N.E.2d 526 (1977). 
FN13. The judge found, specifically, that: 
"MBC, Schafer, Black and Fitzgerald 
worked full schedules from July to 
November 30, 1984, and some beyond. 
There was no manipulation of the cases 
nor were the cases handled differently as a 
result of the decision by MBC to leave 
Parker Coulter. They tried cases, worked 
on discovery, settled cases and made 
reasonable efforts to avoid continuances, 
to try their cases when reached, and settle 
where appropriate and in general maintain 
the same level of industry and 
professionalism that they had always 
demonstrated." 
Parker Coulter also claims that we should disregard 
the judge's fmding of no manipulation because the 
finding is clearly contradicted by other subsidiary 
fmdings, namely that Boyle planned to, and told 
Schafer to, handle cases for resolution at MBC 
rather than at Parker Coulter; that Boyle reassigned 
a number of a departing attorney's cases to himself 
and Schafer; **I264 and that a number of cases 
which were ready to resolve at Parker Coulter were, 
in fact, not resolved there. We do not *435 agree 
that there is a conflict. The judge's finding that 
Boyle spoke of engaging in improper conduct does 
not require the conclusion that this conduct actually 
took place. Similarly, his finding that the 
reassignment of cases did not establish 
manipulation is consistent with a determination that 
the reassignment was based on merit and workload. 
Furthermore, the judge's fmding that the MBC 
attorneys worked full schedules provides a reason 
for the delayed resolution of certain cases other than 
the improper motivation which Parker Coulter 
urges. Finally, Parker Coulter points to no specific 
case which the MBC attorneys manipulated for their 
own benefit. There is thus no contradiction 
between the judge's fmdings. We have reviewed 
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the record, and conclude that the judge was 
warranted in determining that Meehan and Boyle 
handled cases no differently as a result of their 
decision to leave Parker Coulter, and that they thus 
hlfilled their fiduciary duty in this respect. 
[4] Parker Coulter next argues that the judge's 
findings compel the conclusion that Meehan and 
Boyle breached their fiduciary duty not to compete 
with their p m e r s  by secretly setting up a new fm 
during their tenure at Parker Coulter. We disagree. 
We have stated that fiduciaries may plan to 
compete with the entity to which they owe 
allegiance, "provided that in the course of such 
arrangements they [do] not otherwise act in 
violation of their fiduciary duties." Chelsea Indus. 
v. Gaffitey, 389 Mass. 1, 10, 11-12, 449 N.E.2d 320 
(1983). Here, the judge found that Meehan and 
Boyle made certain logistical arrangements for the 
establishment of MBC. These arrangements 
included executing a lease for MBC's office, 
preparing lists of clients expected to leave Parker 
Coulter for MBC, and obtaining fmancing on the 
basis of these lists. We believe these logistical 
arrangements to establish a physical plant for the 
new fm were permissible under Chelsea Indus., 
especially in light of the attorneys' obligation to 
represent adequately any clients who might continue 
to retain them on their departure from Parker 
Coulter. Canons of Ethics and Disciplinary Rules 
Regulating the Practice of Law (S.J.C. Rule 3:07, 
Canon 7, as appearing in 382 Mass. 784 [I9811 ). 
There was no error in *436 the judge's 
determination that this conduct did not violate the 
partners' fiduciary duty. m 1 4 ]  
FN14. Parker Coulter also argues that 
Meehan and Boyle impermissibly 
competed with the fm by inducing its 
employees to join MBC. Because Parker 
Coulter identifies no specific loss resulting 
from this claimed breach, see, e.g., 
Chelsea Indus., supra 389 Mass. at 19 n. 
23, 449 N.E.2d 320, (costs of retraining 
new employees), we need not address this 
issue. 
[5] Lastly, Parker Coulter argues that the judge's 
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findings compel the conclusion that Meehan and 
Boyle breached their fiduciary duties by unfairly 
acquiring consent from clients to remove cases from 
Parker Coulter. We agree that Meehan and Boyle, 
through their preparation for obtaining clients' 
consent, their secrecy conceming which clients they 
intended to take, and the substance and method of 
their communications with clients, obtained an 
unfair advantage over their former partners in 
breach of their fiduciary duties. 
A partner has an obligation to "render on demand 
true and full information of all things affecting the 
partnership to any partner!' G.L. c. 108A, 5 20. 
See Shelley, supra 271 Mass. at 115, 170 N.E. 826. 
On three separate occasions Meehan affmtively 
denied to his partners, on their demand that he had 
any plans for leaving the partnership. During this 
period of secrecy, Meehan and Boyle made 
preparations for obtaining removal authorizations 
from clients. Meehan traveled to New York to 
meet with a representative of USAU and interest 
him in the new fm. Boyle prepared form letters 
on Parker Coulter's letterhead for authorizations 
from prospective MBC clients. Thus, they were 
"ready to move" the instant they gave notice to their 
partners. See BBF, Inc. v. Germanium Power 
Devices Cop. ,  13 Mass.App.Ct. 166, 172, 430 
N.E.2d 1221 (1982). 
On giving their notice, Meehan and Boyle 
continued to use their position of trust and 
confidence to the disadvantage of Parker **I265 
Coulter. The two immediately began 
communicating with clients and referring attorneys. 
Boyle delayed providing his partners with a list of 
clients he intended to solicit until mid-December, 
by which time he had obtained authorization from a 
majority of the clients. 
*437 Finally, the content of the letter sent to the 
clients was unfairly prejudicial to Parker Coulter. 
The ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, in Informal Opinion 1457 (April 29, 
1980), set forth ethical standards for attorneys 
announcing a change in professional association. 
@W5] Because this standard is intended primarily 
to protect clients, proof by Parker Coulter of a 
technical violation of this standard does not aid 
them in their claims. See Fishman v. Brooks, 396 
Mass. 643, 649, 487 N.E.2d 1377 (1986). We will, 
however, look to this standard for general 
guidelines as to what partners are entitled to expect 
from each other conceming their joint clients on the 
division of their practice. The ethical standard 
provides that any notice explain to a client that he 
or she has the right to decide who will continue the 
representation. Here, the judge found that the 
notice did not "clearly present to the clients the 
choice they had between remaining at Parker 
Coulter or moving to the new fm!' By sending a 
one-side announcement, on Parker Coulter 
letterhead, so soon after notice of their departure, 
Meehan and Boyle excluded their partners from 
effectively presenting their services as an alternative 
to those of Meehan and Boyle. 
FN15. These standards provide the 
following guidelines for notice to clients: 
"(a) the notice is mailed; (b) the notice is 
sent only to persons with whom the lawyer 
had an active lawyer-client relationship 
immediately before the change in the 
lawyer's professional association; (c) the 
notice is clearly related to open and 
pending matters for which the lawyer had 
direct professional responsibility to the 
client immediately before the change; (d) 
the notice is sent promptly after the 
change; (e) the notice does not urge the 
client to sever a relationship with the 
lawyer's former fm and does not 
recommend the lawyer's employment 
(although it indicates the lawyer's 
willingness to continue his responsibility 
for the matters); (0 the notice makes it 
clear that the client has the right to decide 
who will complete or continue the matters; 
and (g) the notice is brief, dignified, and 
not disparaging of the lawyer's former 
fm." See also ABA Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
Informal Opinion 1466 (Feb. 12, 1981) 
(extending Informal Opinion 1457 to 
departing associates as well as partners). 
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Meehan and Boyle could have foreseen that the 
news of their departure would cause a certain 
amount of codision and disruption among their 
partners. The speed and preemptive character of 
their campaign to acquire clients' consent took 
advantage of their partners' confusion. By 
engaging in these "438 preemptive tactics, Meehan 
and Boyle violated the duty of utmost good faith 
and loyalty which they owed their partners. 
Therefore, we conclude that the judge erred in 
deciding that Meehan and Boyle acted properly in 
acquiring consent to remove cases to MBC. 
We next consider Parker Coulter's claims against 
Cohen and Schafer. We have determined that 
"[eJmployees occupying a position of trust and 
contideuce owe a duty of loyalty to their employer 
and must protect the interests of their employer!' 
Chelsea Indus., supra 389 Mass. at 11, 449 N.E.2d 
320. Coben was a junior partner, and acting head 
of Parker Coulter's appellate department. Schafer 
was an associate responsible for a substantial case 
load. Both had access to clients and informatiou 
concerning clients and therefore occupied positions 
of trust and confidence. We conclude that their 
participation in the preemptive tactics of Meeban 
and Boyle violated the duty they owed the 
partnership. 
3. Consequences of Breach. 
Before we examine the consequences of the MBC 
attorneys' breach of duty, we briefly outline what is 
at stake. If there had been no hreach of duty, the 
assets of the partnership upon dissolution would be 
divided strictly according to the partnership 
agreement. Under the agreement, Meehan and 
Boyle would be entitled to the retum of their capital 
contributions and their share of the dissolved iirm's 
profits. They would also possess the right to 
remove cases from the old partnership, and **I266 
to retain all future fees generated by these cases in 
excess of the fair charge owed to the partnership for 
work performed there on the removed cases. 
Because the fair charge is an asset of the dissolved 
fm under the agreement, Meehan and Boyle would 
share in this amount according to their respective 
interests in the former partnership. Thus, of the fair 
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charges returned to their former partnership, 
Meehan and Boyle would receive their combined 
10.8% partnership share, and their former partners 
would receive the remainder. 
Parker Coulter essentially argues that, because of 
their breach of fiduciary duty, Meehan and Boyle 
forfeit all rights under the partnership agreement. 
Thus, Parker Coulter contends, Meehan and Boyle 
are not entitled to their capital contributions *439 or 
their share of the dissolved partnership's profits. 
More importantly, according to Parker Coulter, 
because of their breach Meehan and Boyle have lost 
the right to retain any fees generated by the cases 
they removed. Instead, Parker Coulter claims, 
these fees are owed to them directly. Parker 
Coulter further argues that, because the third-party 
defendants, Cohen and Schafer, breached their duty 
to Parker Coulter, they also owe any fees they may 
receive on removed cases directly to Parker Coulter. 
Finally, Parker Coulter contends that the MBC 
attorneys have forfeited all rights to the 
compensation they received from July through 
December, 1984. We reject this extreme remedy. 
Fist, we examine the consequences to Meehan and 
Boyle of their breach; then we tum to Cohen and 
Scbafer. 
For Parker Coulter to recover any amount in 
addition to what it would be entitled to receive upon 
dissolution under the partnership agreement or the 
statute, there must be a causal connection between 
its claimed losses and the breach of duty on the part 
of the MBC attorneys. Production Mach. Co. v. 
Howe, 327 Mass. 372, 378, 99 N.E.2d 32 (1951). 
Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 
198-199, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948). Holmes v. Darling, 
213 Mass. 303, 306, 100 N.E. 611 (1913). See 
BBF, Inc. v. Germanium Power Devices Corp., 13 
Mass.App.Ct. 166, 173, 430 N.E.2d 1221 (1982). 
We have concluded that the MBC attorneys unfairly 
acquired consent from clients. Parker Coulter, 
therefore, is entitled to recover only those amounts 
which flow from this breach of duty. 
[6] There is no conceivable connection between the 
attorneys' breach of duty and Parker Coulter's 
claims to the capital contributions and profit shares 
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of Meehan and Boyle. We have ruled that a 
partner does not forfeit his or her right to the 
accrued profits of a partnership by simply breaching 
the partnership agreement. Fisher v. Fisher, 349 
Mass. 675, 677, 212 N.E.2d 222 (1965). Walsh v. 
Atlantic Assocs., 321 Mass. 57, 64, 71 N.E.2d 580 
(1947). The same rule applies to a partner's capital 
contributions. These amounts are not a form of 
liquidated damages to which partners can resort in 
the event of a hreach. We conclude, therefore, that 
Parker Coulter is not entitled to recover these 
amounts. The judge correctly found that Meehan 
and Boyle are entitled to a *440 return of their 
capital contrihutions (their interest, as determined 
by the judge, in the paltners' reserve account and 
the partners' capital account), and to the receipt of a 
portion of the old fm ' s  profits (their interest in the 
income earned hut not distributed account). 
We similarly reject Parker Coulter's claims that the 
MBC attorneys should he required to forfeit all 
compensation dnring the period of their hreach. 
Parker Coulter is correct in stating that a fiduciary 
"can be required to forfeit the right to retain or 
receive his compensation for conduct in violation of 
his fiduciary duties." Chelsea Indus. v. Gafiey, 
389 Mass. 1, 12, 449 N.E.2d 320 (1983). See 
Production Mach. Co., supra 327 Mass. at 379, 99 
N.E.2d 32; BBF, Inc., supra 13 Mass.App.Ct. at 
177, 430 N.E.2d 1221. Parker Coulter fails to 
consider, however, that a fiduciary may be required 
"to repay only that portion of his compensation, if 
any, that was in excess of the worth of his services 
to his employer!' Chelseq Indus., supra. Here, the 
judge found that throughout the period in question 
the MBC attorneys worked as hard, and were as 
productive as they had always **I267 been. This 
fmding was warranted, and is unchallenged by 
Parker Coulter. In these circumstances, we 
conclnde that the value of the MBC attorneys' 
services was equal to their compensation. Parker 
Coulter, therefore, is not entitled to this relief. 
Parker Coulter's claim that it is entitled to all fees 
from removed cases, however, rests on a different 
footing from its claims to compensation, capital 
contrihutions, and profit shares. We therefore 
examine more closely Parker Coulter's allegations 
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of a causal connection between the hreach of duty 
and its loss of clients. 
Although the jndge found that the MBC attorneys 
did not hreach their fiduciary duties in acquiring 
consent from clients, he nonetheless stated, as an 
alternative ground for denying relief on this claim, 
that Parker Coulter had shown no causal connection 
between the departing attorneys' acts and its loss of 
clients. He ruled that Parker Coulter failed to show 
that clients who left the firm would have remained 
had the plaintiffs and third-party defendants acted 
properly. Parker Coulter argues that the standard 
of causation the jndge imposed was too *441 strict. 
We agree that the judge's ruling placed an 
inappropriate burden on Parker Coulter. 
[7] In these circumstances, it is appropriate to place 
on the party who improperly removed the case the 
hurden of proving that the client would have 
consented to removal in the absence of any hreach 
of duty. See Knowles v. Gilchrist Co., 362 Mass. 
642, 651, 289 N.E.2d 879 (1972) (where goods are 
damaged in hailee's hands, bailor is relieved of 
traditional hurden of proving hailee's negligence, 
and hurden is on hailee to prove that loss was not 
caused by any lack of due care). See also William 
Rodman & Sons v. State Tar Comm'n, 373 Mass. 
606, 611, 368 N.E.2d 1382 (1977) (application of 
rule to cigarette stamper-wholesaler). We have 
recognized that shifting the hurden of proof may he 
justified on policy grounds because it encourages a 
defendant both to preserve information concerning 
the circumstances of the plaintiffs injury and to use 
best efforts to fulfill any duty he or she may owe the 
plaintiff. See William Rodman & Sons, supra. 
Based on similar reasoning, courts in other 
jurisdictions have shifted the burden of proof in 
cases involving a hreach of fiduciary duty. Once it 
is established that a partner or corporate manager 
has engaged in self-dealing, or has acquired a 
corporate or partnership opportunity, these courts 
require the fiduciary to prove that his or her actions 
were intrinsically fair, and did not result in harm to 
the corporation or partnership. See Ohio Drill & 
Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186, 195 (6th 
Cir.1974) (interpreting Ohio common law); 
Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221 (Del. 1976) 
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; Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 518, 
582 P.2d 1136 (1978); Hufington v. Upchurch, 
532 S.W.2d 576,579 (Tex.1976). 
We conclude that Meehan and Boyle had the 
burden of proving no causal connection between 
their breach of duty and Parker Coulter's loss of 
clients. Cf. Energy Resources Cop. v. Porter, 14 
Mass.App.Ct. 296, 302, 438 N.E.2d 391 (1982) 
(fiduciary who secretly acquires corporate 
opportunity barred from asserting that corporation 
would have been unable to exploit opportunity). 
Proof of the circumstances of the preparations for 
obtaining authorizations and of the actual 
communications with clients was more accessible to 
Meehan and Boyle than to Parker *442 Coulter. 
Furthermore, requiring these partners to disprove 
causation will encourage partners in the future to 
disclose seasonably and fully any plans to remove 
cases. This disclosure will allow the partnership 
and the departing partner an equal opporhmity to 
present to clients the option of continuing with the 
partnership or retaining the departing partner 
individually. [EN161 
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To guide the judge on remand in his reexamination 
of the record and his subsidiary findings, we briefly 
outline factors relevant to determining whether a 
client freely chose MBC and, thus, whether the 
MBC attorneys met their burden of disproving a 
causal relationship between their preemptive tactics 
and the removal of the case. We note at the outset 
that the partnership agreement's specific terms offer 
no direct assistance in resolving this issue. It is 
true that the partnership agreement provides that a 
departing partner has the right to remove any case 
which came to the partnership through his or her 
personal efforts or connections. Resorting to this 
provision alone to determine which cases were 
properly removed, however, is inappropriate. The 
partnership agreement states that the right to 
remove is subject to the client's right freely to 
choose who will continue handling his or her case. 
Thus, the parties expressly bargained with each 
other that they would *443 allow a client a free 
choice. To give effect, therefore, to the entire 
agreement of the parties before us, there must he 
some examination of a client's reasons for choosing 
to retain MBC. 
EN16. As between the attorneys, a mutual Although the record contains no evidence as to the 
letter, from both the partnership and the actual preference of a particular client, expressed 
departing partner, outlining the separation and unaffected by the MBC attorneys' improper 
plans and the clients' right to choose, communications, the record is replete with 
would be an appropriate means of opening circumstantial evidence bearing on this issue. 
the discussion between the attorneys and Circumstantial factors relevant to whether a client 
their clients concerning the clients' choice fieely exercised his or her right to choose include 
of continuing representation. the following: (1) who was responsible for initially 
attracting the client to the firm; [FN17] (2) who 
We remand the case to the Superior Court for managed the case at the fum; (3) how sophisticated 
findings consistent with our conclusion **I268 that the client was and whether the client made the 
the MBC attorneys bear the burden of proof. We decision with full knowledge; m 1 8 ]  and (4) what 
emphasize that we do not remand the case for the was the reputation and skill of the *444 removing 
presentation of additional evidence on this issue. attorneys. Therefore, the judge is to reexamine the 
At trial, both parties argued whether the MBC record and his subsidiary fmdings in light of the 
attorneys' actions in removing cases affected the factors we have identified, and to reach a 
clients' right to choose, and introduced a substantial conclusion as to whether Meehan and Boyle have 
amount of evidence bearing on clients' reasons for met their burden of proof on each of the removed 
selecting MBC. The parties have had a full cases. With the burden of proof on Meehan and 
opportunity to present evidence concerning what Boyle, Parker Coulter will prevail if the **I269 
might have influenced clients' decisions, and are not evidence is in balance. Trustees of Forbes Library 
now entitled to a further evidentiary hearing on this v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 384 Mass. 559, 566, 
issue. 428 N.E.2d 124 (1981). 
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FN17. As shown above, while specific 
provisions of the partnership agreement do 
not directly assist in resolving the 
causation issue, who was responsible for 
generating a case is nonetheless a 
significant factor. The attorney to whom a 
case is directly referred, or whose personal 
efforts and connections brought the case to 
the f m ,  generally has a significant, close 
relationship with the client or refening 
attorney. The partnership agreement in 
this case attests to the significance of this 
relationship within the profession. 
Approximately 100 of the 142 contingent 
fee cases removed to MBC originally were 
brought to Parker Coulter entirely by the 
efforts of Meehan, Boyle, or Schafer, and 
were managed solely by an MBC attorney 
within Parker Coulter. 
On the contrary, approximately thirty-nine 
of the contingent fee cases, although 
managed by an MBC attomey, were 
brought to the firm entirely by a Parker 
Coulter attorney or were brought to the 
fm by a Parker Coulter attomey in 
conjunction with an MBC attorney. We 
identify these cases as the jndge did. The 
judge found that twenty-four of the 
contingent fee cases removed to MBC did 
not originally come to Parker Coulter 
through the efforts or connections of an 
MBC attorney, or were not originally 
referred to an MBC attorney. These 
consist of Nos. 12, 17, 18, 22, 24, 40, 51, 
55, 56, 59, 65, 68, 69, 74, S18, S25, S41, 
S42, S44, S45, Bengar, O'Brien, Gaglione, 
and Rohmdi. The judge found that fifteen 
contingent fee cases came to Parker 
Coulter only in part through the efforts of 
an MBC attomey. These consist of Nos. 
20, 36, 45, 46, 52, 53, 63, 67, 72, 73, 82, 
S19, S24, S26, and S27. The jndge made 
no specific fmdings as to how three of the 
cases came to Parker Coulter. These 
cases are Nos. 7, 14, and S20. 
FN18. In a minor number of removed 
cases, the insurance defense cases, the 
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judge found the client was sophisticated, 
and made the decision to retain MBC with 
fuU knowledge of the circumstances. In 
this situation, other factors, such as who 
originally brought the client in, may 
become less significant. 
In those cases, if any, where the judge concludes, 
in accordance with the above analysis, that Meehan 
and Boyle have met their burden, we resolve the 
parties' dispute over fees solely under the 
partnership agreement. [FN19] Under the 
agreement's terms, as we have interpreted them, 
Meehan and Boyle owe a fair charge to their former 
partnership for its "services to and expenditures for" 
the clients in these matters. Meehan and Boyle are 
entitled to their combined 10.8% partnership share 
of this amount, and their former partners are entitled 
to the remainder. We agree with the judge that a 
"fair charge" on a removed case consists of the 
f m ' s  unreimbursed expenses plus the rate hilled 
per hour by members of the f m  multiplied by the 
hours expended on the case. m 2 0 ]  In fixing this 
hourly rate, the fum made a determination that the 
time charged was reasonable and fair compensation 
for the services rendered. We conclude, therefore, 
that, in accordance with the partnership agreement, 
*445 Meehan and Boyle must reimburse their 
former partnership for time billed and expenses 
incurred at that fm on all cases which were fairly 
removed. [FN21] We further conclude that, under 
the agreement, Meehan and Boyle have the right to 
retain all fees generated by these cases in excess of 
the fair charge. [FN22] 
FN19. As we noted above, Parker Coulter 
does not claim that Meehan and Boyle 
dissolved the partnership prematurely. 
FN20. MBC attorneys removed from 
Parker Couiter a number of insurance 
company cases, where the fee is 
determined on an hourly basis, and a 
number of contingent fee cases, where the 
fee does not depend on the time involved. 
Deciding that billable hours is a fair charge 
on contingent fee cases has two effects 
which are arguably unfair both to Parker 
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Coulter and to MBC. If the client is 
unsuccessful, MBC will nonetheless have 
reimbursed Parker Coulter for services 
which generated no contingent fee. 
Conversely, if the client is successful, 
MBC will retain all the potential 
"windfall" of the amount by which the 
contingent fee exceeds MBC's investment 
of time in the case and its payment of a fair 
charge to Parker Coulter. Treating a 
contingent fee case as if the fee were 
determined on an hourly basis is justified 
here, however, because the parties did not 
bargain otherwise. 
FN21. Parker Coulter does not argue that 
Cohen or Schafer is responsible for any 
portion of this fair charge. We therefore 
do not address this issue. Mass.R.A.P. 
16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 
(1975). 
FN22. Parker Coulter claims that, even if 
there were no breach of duty, the provision 
concerning the division of unfinished 
business on dissolution is unenforceable 
because the parties reached no agreement 
as to a fair charge. Consequently, Parker 
Coulter argues, c. lO8A applies which, 
they claim, requires MBC to wind up all 
removed cases for the benefit of the former 
partnership. These arguments are 
unconvincing. First, if c. 108A were to 
apply, both the Parker Coulter defendants 
and MBC would be obligated to wind up 
all business originated in Parker Coulter 
for the benefit of the dissolved firm. G.L. 
c. 108A, $8 18(f ), 21, 35. See Jewel v. 
Boxer, 156 Cal.App.3d 171, 177-178, 203 
Cal.Rptr. 13 (1984); Resnick v. Kaplan, 
49 Md.App. 499, 507, 434 A.2d 582 
(1982). Second, a contractual term 
requiring future negotiations as to specific 
details (a so-called "agreement to agree") 
is not unenforceable merely because such 
negotiations break down. As long as the 
contract, or reference to trade practice, 
provides "some objective method" for 
0 2006 Thomsoflest. No 
Page 17 of 19 
Page 16 
determining the missing term "independent 
of either party's mere wish or desire, ... the 
court will fill the gaps!' 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Scheider, 
40 N.Y.2d 1069, 1071, 392 N.Y.S.2d 252, 
360 N.E.2d 930 (1976). The term "fair 
charge," given trade practice and evidence 
of a reasonable hourly billing rate, is 
sufficiently defmite. 
We now address the correct remedy in those cases, 
if any, which the judge determines Meehan and 
Boyle unfairly removed. In light of a conclusion 
that Meehan and Boyle have failed to prove that 
certain clients would not have preferred to stay with 
Parker Coulter, granting Parker Coulter merely a 
fair charge on these cases pursuant to the 
partnership agreement would not make it whole. 
We tum, therefore, to c. 108A. Section 21 of c. 
108A provides: "Every partner must account to the 
partnership for any benefit, and bold as trustee for it 
any profits derived by him without the consent of 
the other partners from any transaction connected 
with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the 
partnership ...." We have consistently applied this 
statute, and held that a partner must *446 account 
for any profits which flow from a breach of 
fiduciary duty. **1270Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 
Mass. 184, 192- 193, 16 N.E.2d 644 (1938). 
Shelley v. Smith, 271 Mass. 106, 118, 170 N.E. 826 
(1930). See Holmes v. Darling, 213 Mass. 303, 
100 N.E. 611 (1913) (common law rule). Cf. 
Production Mach. Co. v. Howe, 327 Mass. 372, 
378, 99 N.E.2d 32 (1951) (similar remedy for 
corporate fiduciary's breach); Durjee v. Durjee & 
Channing, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 198, 80 N.E.2d 522 
(1948) (same). We have reasoned that this rule 
requiring the imposition of a constructive trust 
"does not rest [merely] upon the narrow ground of 
injury or damage to the [partnership] resulting from 
a betrayal of coniidence, but upon a broader 
foundation of a wise public policy that, for the 
purpose of removing all temptation, extinguishes all 
possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the 
conftdence imposed by the fiduciary relation." 
DurJke, supra at 198- 199, 80 N.E.2d 522, quoting 
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del.Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503 
(1939). Under this rule, "the innocent partner is to 
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be put as nearly as possible in the same position 
which he would have occupied if there had been no 
wrongdoing." Shulkin, supra 301 Mass. at 193, 16 
N.E.2d 644, quoted with approval in Zimmerman v. 
Bogog 402 Mass. 650, 661, 524 N.E.2d 849 (1988) 
. We do not, however, seek to "deprive the 
wrong-doing partner of any participation in the 
fruits of his wrongful actions" (emphasis added). 
Shulkin, supra 301 Mass. at 193, 16 N.E.2d 644. 
We merely require that the fruits be shared among 
the parties as if they had been "eamed by the 
partnership in the usual course of its business!' Id. 
Meehan and Boyle breached the duty they owed to 
Parker Coulter. If the judge determines that, as a 
result of this breach, certain clients left the fm, 
Meehan and Boyle must account to the partnership 
for any profits they receive on these cases pursuant 
to c. 108A, in addition to paying the partnership a 
fair charge on these cases pursuant to the 
agreement. The "profit" on a particular case is the 
amount by which the fee received from the case 
exceeds the sum of (1) any reasonable overhead 
expenses MBC incurs in resolving the case, see 
Jewel v. Boxer, 156 Cal.App.3d 171, 180, 203 
Cal.Rptr. 13 (1984); Ellerby v. Spiezer, 138 
Ill.App.3d 77, 83, 92 II1.Dec. 602, 485 N.E.2d 413 
(1985), and (2) the fair charge it owes under the 
partnership agreement. We emphasize that 
reasonable overhead expenses on a particular case 
are not the equivalent *447 of the amount 
represented by the hours MBC attorneys have 
expended on the case multiplied by their hourly 
billing rate. Reasonable overhead expenses are to 
include only MBC's costs in generating the fee, and 
are not to include any profit margin for MBC. We 
treat this profit on a particular case as if it had been 
earned in the usual course of business of the 
partnership which included Meehan and Boyle as 
partners. Shulkin, supra 301 Mass. at 193, 16 
N.E.2d 644. Failing to treat this profit as if it bad 
been eamed by Meehan or Boyle while at their 
former partnership would exclude Meehan and 
Boyle from participating in the fmits of their labors 
an4 more importantly, would provide Parker 
Coulter with an unjustified windfall. Parker Coulter 
would receive a windfall because there is no 
guarantee that the profit would have been generated 
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had the case not been handled at MBC. Meehan's 
and Boyle's former partners are thus entitled to their 
portion of the fair charge on each of the unfairly 
removed cases (89.2%), and to that amount of profit 
from an unfairly removed case which they would 
have enjoyed had the MBC attorneys handled the 
case at Parker Coulter (89.2%). Id. 
The MBC attorneys argue that any remedy which 
grants Parker Coulter a recovery in excess of a fair 
charge on cases removed impemrissibly infringes 
on an attorney's relationship with clients and 
reduces his or her incentive to use best efforts on 
their behalf. We agree that punitive measures may 
infringe on a client's right to adequate 
representation, and to counsel of his or her own 
choosing. Cf. Jewel, supra 156 Cal.App.3d at 178, 
203 Cal.Rptr. 13 (how fee distributed among former 
partners of no concern to client); Ellerby, supra 
138 IlI.App.3d at 81, 92 111.Dec. 602, 485 N.E.2d 
413 (same). We believe, however, that the remedy 
we impose does not suffer from the MBC attorneys' 
claimed defects. Under **I271 the constructive 
trust we impose, Meehan and Boyle will receive a 
share of the fruits of their efforts in the unfairly 
removed cases which is the same as that which they 
would have enjoyed at Parker Coulter. We note, 
moreover, that incentives other than profit motivate 
attorneys. These incentives include an attorney's 
ethical obligations to the client and the profession, 
and a concern for his or her reputation. See 
generally 2 A.R. Bromberg & L.E. Ribstein, 
Partnership 8 7.08, at 7:85 (1988). 
*448 181 Furthermore, the MBC attorneys' 
argument would provide us with no mechanism to 
enforce the partners' fiduciary duties. Imposition 
of a narrowly tailored constructive trust will enforce 
the obligations resulting from a breach of duty and 
will not harm the innocent clients. We conclude, 
therefore, that Meehan and Boyle hold in a 
constructive trust for the benefit of the former 
partnership the profits they have derived or may 
derive from any cases which they unfairly removed. 
We now address the Consequences to Cohen and 
Sehafer of their breach of fiduciary duty. The 
judge found that Cohen participated in the removal 
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of some insurance defense cases, and that Schafer 
participated in the removal of a number of 
contingent fee cases. Therefore, we conclude that 
Schafer must hold in a constructive hust for the 
benefit of the former partnership any profits, as we 
have defined this term, which he has received or 
may receive in his separate practice from cases 
which the judge determines were unfairly removed. 
Cohen also must hold any profits she has received 
or may receive from unfairly removed cases in a 
similar constructive trust. Although Cohen and 
Schafer were not parties to the partnership 
agreement, and thus were not contractually bound to 
remove cases fairly, we believe their fiduciary 
duties require this result. See Chelsea Indus. v. 
Gaffney, 389 Mass. 1, 11-12, 449 N.E.2d 320 
(1983). [FN23] 
FN23. We dismiss Parker Coulter's claims 
of tortious interference with its relations 
with clients and employees. Parker 
Coulter seeks .the same damages from 
these claimed wrongs as it sought from its 
breach of fiduciary duty claims, namely all 
fees from the cases removed to MBC. We 
have determined the portion of these fees 
to which Parker Coulter is entitled. 
Therefore, we do not consider further its 
claims of tortious interference. 
4. Conclusion and Order. 
In sum, we conclude that the MBC attorneys' 
breach of duty consisted of their method of 
acquiring consent from clients to remove cases. 
We therefore limit Parker Coulter's recovery to only 
those losses which were caused by this breach of 
duty, but place on the MBC attorneys the burden of 
disproving causation. On remand, the judge is to 
determine, based on the record and his findings as 
they now stand, whether the MBC attorneys have 
met their burden as to each ease removed from *449 
Parker Coulter. A constructive trust for the benefit 
of the former partnership is to be imposed on any 
profits which Meehan, Boyle, Cohen, or Schafer 
receive on cases which the judge determines they 
unfairly removed. Because the fair charge which 
Meehan and Boyle owe on all removed cases is an 
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asset of the former partnership, and because the 
constructive trust we impose is for the benefit of the 
former partnership, each former partner is entitled 
to his or her partnership share of these amounts. 
The Parker Coulter defendants are thus entitled to 
89.2% of the fair charges on all removed cases, and 
89.2% of the profits from the unfairly removed 
cases; Meehan and Boyle are entitled to 6% and 
4.8%, respectively, of these amounts. Additionally, 
under the agreement's terms, Meehan and Boyle are 
to receive the return of their capital contributions 
and their profit shares. 
The judgment below is reversed and the case is 
remanded to the Superior Court (1) for fmdings, in 
accordance with the factors we have identified, as to 
which cases were unfairly removed, (2) for a further 
evidentiary hearing to determine the reasonable 
overhead and thus the "profits" on the cases, if any, 
which were unfairly removed, and (3) for entry of a 
new judgment dispositive of all issues. 
SO ORDERED. 
404 Mass. 419,535 N.E.2d 1255,57 USLW 2642 
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Supreme Court of Montana. 
Joan K. McCORMICK, W a  Joan K. Brevig, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Clark A. BREVIG, Brevig Land Live and Lumber, 
a Montana General Partnership 
Consisting of Joan K. Brevig and Clark A. Brevig, 
Defendants, Respondents and 
Cross-Appellants. 
No. 03-256. 
Submitted on Briefs Dec. 11,2003. 
Decided July 13,2004. 
Rehearing Denied Aug. 24,2004. 
Background: Sister in family ranch partnership 
sought partnership accounting and dissolution, and 
brother, who alleged he would have received the 
partnership property as trust beneficiary if trust had 
been validly formed, brought fiaud and negligent 
misrepresentation claims against sister and 
professional negligence claims against accountants. 
Cross appeals were taken from the district court's 
grant of partial summary judgment for accountants 
and sister. The Supreme Court, 294 Mont. 144, 980 
P.2d 603, affirmed in part and reversed in part. On 
remand, the District Court, Fergus County, Wm. 
Nets Swandal, J., ordered sale of sister's interest to 
brother and ordered appraisal. Parties appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Rice, J., held that: 
(1) liquidation of partnership assets is required 
upon dissolution; 
(2) special master's accounting was sufficient for 
limited purpose in referral order; 
(3) special master's report complied with rule 
governing powers of special masters; 
(4) finding that brother did not dissociate himself 
from partnership was not erroneous; 
(5) cattle transferred from mother to brother were 
not partnership assets; and 
(6) taped telephone call was not admissible. 
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Affumed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[I] Appeal and Error -1008.1(5) 
30k1008.1(5) Most Cited Cases 
A district court's fmdings of fact are reviewed to 
determine whether the fmdings are clearly 
erroneous. 
[2] Appeal and Error -1008.1(5) 
30k1008.1(5) Most Cited Cases 
A district court's fmdings are clearly erroneous if 
substantial credible evidence does not support them, 
if the trial court has misapprehended the effect of 
the evidence or if a review of the record leaves the 
reviewing court with the definite and f m  
conviction that a mistake has been committed. 
131 Appeal and Error -842(2) 
30k842(2) Most Cited Cases 
A district court's conclusions of law are reviewed 
for correctness. 
141 Partnership -267 
289k267 Most Cited Cases 
[4] Partnership -305 
289k305 Most Cited Cases 
Liquidation of partnership assets and distribution of 
net surplus in cash to partners is required upon 
dissolution entered by judicial decree when it is no 
longer reasonably practicable to carry on the 
business of the partnership. MCA 35-10-624. 
151 Partnership -22 
289k22 Most Cited Cases 
[5] Partnership -70 
289k70 Most Cited Cases 
An informal or oral agreement will usually suffice 
to create a partnership, and where a partnership 
agreement exists, it will generally govern relations 
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among partners. 
161 Constitutional Law -70.1(2) 
92k70.1(2) Most Cited Cases 
161 Statutes -176 
361k176 Most Cited Cases 
161 Statutes -186 
361k186 Most Cited Cases 
The role of courts in applying a statute has always 
been to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in 
substance contained therein, not to insert what has 
been omitted or to omit what has been inserted. 
173 Statutes -181(1) 
361k181(1) Most Cited Cases 
The intent of the legislature is controlling when 
construing a statute. 
181 Statutes -188 
361k188 Most Cited Cases 
In construing a statute, intention of the legislature 
must fust be determined from the plain meaning of 
the words used, and if interpretation of the statute 
can be so determined, the courts may not go further 
and apply any other means of interpretation. 
191 Partnership -332 
289k332 Most Cited Cases 
Special master's accounting of family partnership 
assets was sufficient given limited purpose in 
referral order to determine sister's excess capital 
contributions and resolving disputes concerning 
ownership of certain assets, in partnership 
dissolution proceeding; special master performed 
detailed accounting of assets, liabilities, and capital 
contributions of each partner by reviewing tax 
returns and through several extensive meetings with 
parties in which he heard oral arguments and 
received evidence, and special master testified 
before district court and was subject to 
cross-examination concerning his fmdings. MCA 
35-10-409(2)(b)(iii), 35-10-624. 
1101 Partnership -313 
289k3 13 Most Cited Cases 
When an action for an accounting is being used to 
wind up the partnership's affairs, the court is 
obligated to provide for a full accounting of the 
partnership assets and obligations and distribution 
of any remaining assets or liabilities to the partners 
in accordance with their interests in the partnership. 
Ill] Partnership -332 
289k332 Most Cited Cases 
Special master's report in partnership dissolution 
proceeding complied with requirements of rule 
governing powers of special masters, even though 
special master failed to make record of evidence 
offered and excluded in manner provided by Rules 
of Evidence; special master held hearings with 
parties, their attorneys and accountants, received 
evidence and issued report to district court and 
made determinations on issues in referral order, and 
neither party requested formal record of evidence. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 53(e). 
1121 Reference -100(6) 
327k100(6) Most Cited Cases 
The burden of challenging a master's fmdigs is on 
the party objecting to the fmdings. 
1131 Partnership -224 
289k224 Most Cited Cases 
District court's fmding that brother in family 
partnership did not dissociate himself from 
partnership was not erroneous, in partnership 
dissolution proceeding; brother did not give sister 
notice of express will to withdraw as partner, 
brother continued to work on behalf of partnership, 
brother obtained loans in his individual name due to 
parties inability to communicate about partnership 
finances, and reporting partnership gains and losses 
on his individual tax returns was reasonable in tight 
of deeds and hust that purported to transfer 
partnership to him. MCA 35-10-616(5). 
1141 Partnership 423300 
289k300 Most Cited Cases 
Cattle transferred from mother to son individually 
were not family partnership assets subject to 
dissolution, even though cattle were listed and 
treated as partnership assets for tax purposes; cattle 
were presumed to he separate property in absence 
of evidence that they were purchased with 
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partnership assets or transferred to son in his For Respondents: David A. Veeder, Jolane D. 
capacity as partner, and sister failed to demonstrate Veeder, Veeder Law Firm, P.C., Billings, Montana. 
any equitable interest in cattle by virtue of 
partnership's care and feeding of cattle. MCA Justice JIM RICE delivered the Opinion of the 
35-10-203(5). Court. 
1151 Evidence -380 
157k380 Most Cited Cases 
Taped telephone conference call between partners 
in family partnership, mother of partners, and 
accountants regarding mother's admission that 
brother should receive salary as ranch manager was 
inadmissible for lack of authentication in 
partnership dissolution proceeding; there was 
evidence that tape had been intentionally altered to 
capture only certain phrases or sentences, and 
original recording was no longer available. Rules 
of Evid., Rule 901. 
1161 Evidence 6=5359(5) 
157k359(5) Most Cited Cases 
1161 Evidence -380 
157k380 Most Cited Cases 
Standards for admissibility of sound recordings are: 
(1) showing that recording device was capable of 
taking testimony, (2) showing that operator of 
device was competent, (3) establishment of 
authenticity and correctness of recording, (4) 
showing that changes, additions or deletions have 
not been made, (5) showing of manner of 
preservation of recording, and (6) identification of 
the speakers. Rules of Evid., Rule 901. 
1171 Appeal and Error -970(2) 
30k970(2) Most Cited Cases 
1171 Evidence -99 
157k99 Most Cited Cases 
A district court bas broad discretion in determining 
whether evidence is relevant and admissible and 
reviewing court will not overturn that determination 
absent an abuse of discretion. 
**699 *I14 For Appellant: Kenneth R. Dyrud, 
Glenn E. Tremper, and Cindy L. Cate, Church, 
Harris, Johnson & Williams, P.C., Great Falls, 
Montana. 
7 1 This case involves a protracted dispute 
between a brother and sister concerning their 
respective interests in a ranching partnership that is 
before the Court a second time. The litigation 
began in 1995 when Joan McCormick ("Joan") 
brought this action against her brother, Clark Brevig 
("Clark"), and their Partnership, Brevig Land Live 
and Lumber (hereinafter, "the Partnership"), 
seeking a Partnership accounting and dissolution. 
Clark counterclaimed for fraud, deceit, negligent 
misrepresentation, and to quiet title. He also filed a 
third-party complaint against several accounting 
defendants for *I15 professional negligence and 
against his sister for breach of fiduciary duty. 
Thereafter, Joan moved for partial summary 
judgment in relation to Clark's counterclaim and 
third-party complaint, and Clark moved for partial 
summary judgment on the issue of liability raised in 
his counterclaim and third-party complaint against 
Joan. Clark also moved for partial summary 
judgment on the issue of liability against the 
third-party accounting defendants. The District 
Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Fergus County, 
granted Joan's motion for partial summary judgment 
on her claims and denied Clark's motion for partial 
summary judgment against Joan. The court 
additionally dismissed Clark's claims for fraud, 
deceit, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of 
fiduciary duty against Joan. 
7 2 The accounting defendants also moved for 
summary judgment on all claims asserted against 
them by Clark, which the court granted. Following 
certification of the summary judgment orders as 
iinal pursuant to Rule 54@), M.R.Civ.P., the parties 
appealed to this Court. We affmed the District 
Court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Joan, 
but concluded that the court had erred in granting 
summary judgment to the accounting defendants, 
and therefore reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings. McCormick v. Brevig, 1999 MT 86, 
294 Mont. 144, 980 P.2d 603 (hereinafter referred 
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to as, "McCormick 2"). 
g 3 Following remittitur and substitution of the 
original trial judge, the District Court resumed 
proceedings concerning the Partnership accounting 
and dissolution, and Clark settled his claims with 
the accounting defendants. A bench trial was held 
January 18 through 21, 2000. On April 3, 2000, the 
District Court entered fmdings of fact and 
conclusions of law, dissolving the Partnership, and 
ordering its business wound up, pending a hearing 
before a special master and a determination of the 
proper method for dissolution. 
7 4 A limited accounting by a special master was 
thereafter performed. On December 27, 2001, the 
District Court concluded that the parties' 
Partnership agreement did not apply, and that a 
judicial dissolution of the Partnership was 
warranted pursuant to (j 35-10-624(5), MCA. The 
court further recognized that 35-10-629, MCA, 
explicitly required any surplus assets after paying 
creditors to be paid to the partners in cash in 
accordance with their right to distribution. 
Nonetheless, the court found. that it would be 
inequitable to order the liquidation of the 
Partnershio assets in order to satisfi- Joan's interest 
in the ~aknershi~.  Therefore, in ieeping with its 
desire to preserve the family farm, the court ordered 
Joan to sell her interest in the *I16 Partnership to 
her brother following an appraisal and 
determination of the value of her share. With the 
assistance of a special master, and following an 
accounting **700 of Partnership assets, the District 
Court eventually fixed a price of $1,107,672 on 
Joan's 50 percent interest in the Partnership. Joan 
appeals from the District Court's accounting and 
order requiring her to sell her interest in the 
Partnership to her brother, and Clark cross-appeals 
&om the courts determination regard'mg certain 
Partnership assets, as well as from an evidentiq 
ruling made at trial. We affum in part, reverse in 
part, and remand for further proceedings. 
order liquidation of the Partnership assets, and 
instead granting Clark the right to purchase Joan's 
Partnership interest at a price determined by the 
court? 
7 7 2. Did the District Court err by failing to grant 
Joan's petition for an accounting of the Partnership's 
business affairs? 
g 8 3. Did the District Court err by adopting the 
fmdings of the special master? 
g 9 4. Did the District Court err in ruling that 
Clark did not dissociate by withdrawing from the 
Partnership? 
g I0 5, Did the District Court err in concluding 
that the Charolais cattle constituted partnership 
assets? 
g 11 6. Did the District Court err by excluding 
evidence of a teleconference and concluding that 
Clark was not entitled to compensation? 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
n 12 Joan and Clark are the children of Charles 
&d Helen Brevig (hereinafter, "Charles" and 
"Helen"). In 1960 Charles purchased the Brevig 
Ranch outside of Lewistown from his parents. In 
1971, Charles transferred his sole interest in the 
ranch by warranty deed to himself and Helen as 
joint tenants. The following year, Charles and 
Helen conveyed the ranch to Clark and Helen as 
joint tenants. 
7 13 When Charles and Helen divorced in 1977, 
Helen conveyed her interest in the ranch to Charles 
in the property settlement agreement. Thereafter, 
Clark and his father owned the ranch in equal 
shares, and began operating the ranch as Brevig 
Land, Live & Lumber, a partnership, pursuant to a 
written agreement. 
9 5 The following issues are presented on appeak g 14 Although she was not a partner in the ranch 
operation, Joan lived on the ranch and assisted in 
g 6 1. After ordering dissolutiou of the ranch operations from 1975 until 1981. In *I17 
Partnership, did the District Court err by failing to 1981, with the ranch facing severe fmaneial 
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hardship, Joan left the ranch to work as an oil and 
gas "landman," in order to generate outside income 
to enable the ranch to meet its financial obligations. 
In her capacity as a landman, Joan sewed as a 
liaison behveen the oil industry and the mineral 
owners. This work required her to travel 
throughout the United States performing title 
searches on aper diem basis. 
15 In 1982, Charles and Clark sought to 
refmance the farm debt in the amount of $422,000 
with the Federal Land Bank. Because the ranch 
operation did not generate sufficient cash flow to 
meet the projected debt payment, the bank required 
Joan to sign the mortgage which was secured by the 
ranch real estate. Joan's income as a landman 
became committed to assist in repayment of the 
ranch debt. 
7 16 During the time of Joan's employment as a 
landman from 1981 through 1986, it was Joan's 
practice to contribute all of her income, less 
expenses, to the support of the ranch operation. In 
1983, Joan closed her personal bank account and 
began to deposit all of her income into the 
partnership bank account. From this account, Joan 
would pay her personal expenses and the balance 
would be applied to the obligations of Charles and 
Clark's partnership. After she married in 1986, Joan 
made payments directly to the banks for the ranch 
obligations rather than to deposit the money in the 
ranch operating account. Joan also made direct 
payments for taxes and insurance. 
7 17 On October 28, 1982, Charles died 
unexpectedly after a short illness. Thereafter, 
pursuant to Charles' Last Will and Testament, Clark 
and Joan were appointed co-personal 
representatives and probated Charles' estate. Clark 
and Joan each received one-half of Charles' estate, 
which principally **701 consisted of his 50 percent 
interest in the ranch and Partnership. As a result of 
the distributions, Clark then owned 75 percent of 
the ranch assets, and Joan 25 percent. A written 
partnership agreement was thereafter executed by 
Clark and Joan reflecting their respective 75/25 
percent interests in the Partnership. Except for 
these ownership percentages, the written agreement 
was identical to the one executed between Charles 
and Clark in 1978. 
7 18 After Charles' death, Joan continued her 
work as a landman, and made fmancial 
contributions to the new Partnership. She also 
maintained the Partnership's books and records. 
Meanwhile, Clark assumed responsibility for the 
day-to-day affairs of the ranch. Clark and Joan 
made management decisions together. 
7 19 In 1984, Joan obtained an additional 25 
percent in the *I18 Partnership, fully paying for this 
interest by the following year. For his share of the 
sale, Clark received a capital credit of 
approximately $60,000. From 1984 to 1993, Joan 
was listed as a 50150 partner on all the tax returns 
for the Partnership. 
7 20 Around November 1986, at the 
recommendation of the Partnership's principle 
accountant, Clark and Joan executed an addendum 
to the Partnership agreement, reflecting their 
agreement to make adjustments in the Partnership 
interests based on varying capital contributions. 
The addendum was needed to account for the 
excess capital contributions made by Joan, and to 
conform that part of the agreement to the tax returns 
which showed Clark and Joan as equal partners. 
The parties had agreed, however, that Joan's interest 
in the Partnership would not exceed 50 percent, 
regardless of the amount of her excess capital 
contributions. 
7 21 Disagreements concerning management of 
the ranch, and particularly, management of the debt 
load on the ranch, caused Clark and Joan's 
relationship to deteriorate. By the early 1990s, 
cooperation between Clark and Joan regarding the 
operation of the ranch and securing of loans 
necessary to fund the ranch had essentially ceased, 
and they began looking for ways to dissolve the 
Partnership. 
7 22 In 1995, Joan brought suit against Clark and 
the Partnership, alleging that Clark had converted 
Partnership assets to his own personal use, and 
sought an accounting of the Partnership's affairs. 
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She also requested a determination that Clark had matters of record and charged with determining the 
engaged in conduct warranting a decree of amount, if any, of Joan's excess capital 
expulsion. Alternatively, Joan sought an order contributions to the Partnership as well as to resolve 
dissolving and wind'mg up the Partnership. disputes concerning Partnership assets. 
7 23 Clark answered by denying that the ranch 
property was held by the Partnership, and asserted 
counterclaims for fraud, deceit, negligent 
misrepresentation and to quiet title. Clark 
maintained that he owned the ranch, either by virtue 
of a trnst allegedly created by his father, or through 
two incomplete deeds to the property that Clark had 
completed and recorded without Joan's knowledge. 
Clark also brought third-party claims against the 
Partnership's accountants. 
7 24 On appeal, this Court affirmed the District 
Court's detennination that neither the alleged trust 
nor the incomplete deeds transferred the ranch 
property to Clark. We remanded the case for 
resolution of Joan's claims for an accounting and 
other relief, and for a determination as to Clark's 
claims against the accountants. McCormick I, 7 
119. 
a 25 Clark thereafter settled his claims against the 
Partnership accountants, and the matter proceeded 
to a bench trial as to Joan's claims for dissolution 
and an accounting. On April 3, 2000, the District 
*I19 Court issued findings of fact and conclusions 
of law, finding that neither Clark nor Joan had 
dissociated fiom the Partnership, that Joan was a 50 
percent partner and should be credited for any 
excess capital contributions she made to the 
Partnership, and that Clark was not entitled to 
receive compensation as a partner. The court 
fitrther concluded that the Partnership should be 
dissolved and its business wound up, and reasoned 
that appointment of a special master was 
appropriate in order to determine the amount of the 
parties' respective capital contributions and 
Partnership assets. 
7 26 On February 7, 2001, following the 
appointment and discharge of the two previous 
masters, Lany Blakely, CPA, ("Blakely") **702 
was appointed special master. Blakely was vested 
with the authority to inquire into all pertinent 
3 27 After meeting with the parties on an informal 
basis and reviewing Partnership tax rehn'ns for the 
period of 1985 through 1998, Blakely filed his 
initial report with the court. In his report, Blakely 
concluded that there were no excess capital 
contributions made by Joan to the Partnership, and 
that Clark had not utilized any Partnership assets for 
his own benefit. 
7 28 Joan objected to Blakely's report, arguing 
that he had improperly limited himself to draft and 
unfiled tax returns previously prepared by Russ 
Spika, CPA ("Spika"), and had failed to consider 
evidence which Joan had presented showing 
significant contributions to the Partnership. Joan 
further argued that Blakely had failed to follow the 
historical methods of accounting that had been used 
by the Partnership up through 1993, which Clark 
was estopped from challenging pursuant to the 
court's April 3,2000 order. 
7 29 A hearing on the parties' objections to the 
special master's fmdings was held on November 26, 
2001. On December 27, 2001, the District Court 
ordered the value of Joan's interest in the 
Partnership to be determined following an appraisal 
conducted and paid for by the Partnership. 
Following such determination, Clark would have 
sixty days in which to purchase Joan's interest, or 
the Partnership assets would be liquidated and the 
net assets distributed to the partners. 
7 30 A real estate appraiser was subsequently 
appointed by the court, and a new series of disputes 
concerning the appraisal process began. On August 
7, 2002, the court entered an order appointing 
additional real estate appraisers to assist in the 
appraisal process, and reenlisted *I20 the services 
of special master Blakely to review the revised 
Partnership income tax returns prepared by Spika 
for the 1994 through 2001 tax years. In making his 
report, the court directed Blakely to meet separately 
with the respective parties, their counsel and 
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accountants, and to determine whether the 
partnership income tax returns prepared by Spika 
should be fded with the Intemal Revenue Service. 
The court further ordered Blakely to determine the 
net value of Joan's share of the appraised 
Partnership assets. 
3 31 On December 12, 2002, Blakely filed his 
final report with the court, accepting Spika's tax 
returns, and valuing Joan's interest in the 
Partnership at $795,629. Joan objected to Blakely's 
fmdings and a hearing followed. On January 29, 
2003, the District Court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, accepting Blakely's fmdings and 
valuing Joan's interest in the Partnership at 
$1,107,672. Clark thereafter tendered this amount 
to Joan for the purchase of her interest, which Joan 
rejected. This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2][3] 7 32 We review a district court's fmdings 
of fact to determine whether the fmdings are clearly 
erroneous. Baltrusch v. Baltrusch, 2003 MT 357, 
7 23, 319 Mont. 23, f 23, 83 P.3d 256, 7 23. A 
district court's findings are clearly erroneous if 
substantial credible evidence does not support them, 
if the trial court has misapprehended the effect of 
the evidence or if a review of the record leaves this 
Court with the defmite and fum conviction that a 
mistake has been committed. Ray v. Nansel, 2002 
MT 191, 7 19, 311 Mont 135, f 19, 53 P.3d 870, 
f 19. We review a district court's conclusions of 
law for correctness. Baltnuch, 7 23. 
DISCUSSION 
7 33 After ordering dissolution of the 
Partnership, did the District Court err by failing 
to order liquidation of the Partnership assets, 
and instead granting Clark the right to pnrehase 
Joan's Partnership interest at a price 
determined by the court? 
[4] f 34 Joan contends that when a partnership is 
dissolved by judicial decree, Montana's Revised 
Uniform Parhership Act, 35-10-101 et seq., MCA 
(2001), requires **703 liquidation by sale of 
partnership assets and distribution in cash of any 
surplus to the partners. In response, Clark asserts 
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that there are other judicially acceptable methods of 
distributing partnership assets upon dissolution 
besides liquidating assets through a forced sale. For 
the reasons set forth below, we *I21 conclude that 
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act requires 
liquidation of partnership assets and distribution of 
the net surplus in cash to the partners upon 
dissolution entered by judicial decree when it is no 
longer reasonably practicable to carry on the 
business of the partnership. 
[5] 7 35 We begin our analysis by reviewing the 
law of partnerships as it pertains to the issues in this 
case. A partnership is an association of two or more 
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for 
profit. See 5 35-10- 102(5)(a), MCA; see also 5 
35-10-201(1), MCA (1991). An informal or oral 
agreement will usually suffice to create a 
partnership, and where a partnership agreement 
exists, it will generally govem relations among 
partners. Thus, statutory rules are merely default 
rules, which apply only in the absence of a 
partnership agreement to the contrary. See 5 
35-10-106, MCA. In the present case, the parties do 
not dispute that the partnership agreement did not 
apply to situations involving a court ordered 
dissolution of a partnership. 
7 36 Partnership law in Montana and throughout 
the United States has been primarily derived from 
the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"), which was 
originally promulgated by the Uniform Law 
Commissioners in 1914. Under the UPA, the law of 
partnership breakups was couched in terms of 
dissolution. A partnership was dissolved and its 
assets liquidated upon the happening of specific 
events, the most significant of which was the death 
of a partner or any partner expressing a will to leave 
the partnership. Montana adopted the UPA in 1947. 
7 37 In 1993, our legislature significantly 
amended the UPA by adopting the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act, or RUPA. FJl]  Unlike the UPA, 
RUPA now provides two separate tracks for the 
exiting partner. The fust track applies to the 
dissociating partner, and does not result in a 
dissolution, but in a buy-out of the dissociating 
partner's interest in the partnership. See 8 
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35-10-616, MCA. The term "dissociation" is new to 
the act, and occurs upon the happening of any one 
of ten events specified in 5 35-10-616, MCA. 
Examples of events leading to dissociation include 
bankruptcy of a partner and death, see 5 
35-10-616(6)(a) and (7)(a), MCA, but does not 
include a judicially ordered dissolution of the 
partnership. 
FNI. Although the 1993 Legislature did 
not amend the title of the WA, it adopted 
the changes embodied within the Revised 
Uniform Partnership Act ("RWA") and, 
therefore, we shall refer to the act 
throughout this opinion as "RUPA." 
7 38 The second track for the exiting partner does 
involve dissolution and winding up of the 
partnership's affairs. Section 35-10-624, MCA, 
*I22 sets forth the events causing dissolution and 
winding up of a partnership, and includes the 
following: 
Events causing dissolution and winding up of 
partnership business. 
... 
(5) a judicial decree, issued upon application by a 
partner, that: 
(a) the economic purpose of the partnership is 
likely to be unreasonably frustrated; 
(b) another partner has engaged in conduct 
relating to the partnership business that makes it 
not reasonably practicable to carry on the 
business in partnership with that partner; or 
(c) it is not otherwise reasonably practicable to 
carry on the partnership business in conformity 
with the partnership agreement[.] 
7 39 In this case, the District Court dissolved the 
Partnership pursuant to 5 35-10-624(5), MCA. In 
so doing, it recognized that, in the absence of a 
partnership agreement to the contrary, the only 
possible result under RUPA was for the partnership 
assets to be liquidated and the proceeds distributed 
between the partners proportionately. The court 
reasoned, however, that the term "liquidate" had a 
variety of possible meanings, one of which was "to 
assemble and mobilize **704 the assets, settle with 
the creditors and debtors and apportion the 
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remaining assets, if any, among the stockholders or 
owners!' Applying this deffition, which the court 
had obtained from Black's Law Dictionary, the 
court concluded that a judicially ordered buy-out of 
Joan's interest in the Partnership by Clark was an 
acceptable alternative to liquidation of the 
partnership assets through a compelled sale. 
[6][7][8] 7 40 It is well established that "the role 
of courts in applying a statute has always been to 
'ascertain and declare what is in terms or in 
substance contained therein, not to insert what has 
been omitted or to omit what has been inserted! " 
State v. Goebel, 2001 MT 73, 7 16, 305 Mont. 53, 
7 16, 31 P.3d 335, 7 16 (citation omitted). "[Tlhe 
intent of the Legislature is controlling when 
construing a statute. The intention of the 
Legislature must first be determined from the plain 
meaning of the words used, and if interpretation of 
the statute can be so determined, the courts may not 
go fnrther and apply any other means of 
interpretation." Goebel, 7 17. 
7 41 It is hue that this Court has previously 
utilized dictionaries when seeking to define the 
common use and meaning of terms. See Ravalli 
County v. Erichon, 2004 MT 35, 7 13, 320 Mont. 
31, 7 13, 85 P.3d 772, 7 13. However, in this 
case, we conclude that it was not necessary for *I23 
the District Court to resort to such devices. Section 
35-10-629(1), MCA, clearly provides that "[iln 
winding up a partnership's business, the assets of 
the partnership must be applied to discharge its 
obligations to creditors, including partners who are 
creditors. Any surplus must be applied to pay in 
cash the net amount distributable to partners in 
accordance with their right to distributions pursuant 
to subsection (2)." (Emphasis added.) 
Furthermore, subsection (2) of the statute provides: 
Each partner is entitled to a settlement of all 
partnership accounts upon winding up the 
partnership business. In settling accounts among 
the partners, the profits and losses that result from 
the liquidation of the partnership assets must be 
credited and charged to the partners' accounts. 
The partnership shall make a distribution to a 
partner in an amount equal to that partner's 
positive account balance. 
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(Emphasis added.) Thus, the common purpose 
and plain meaning of the term "liquidation," as it is 
used in 5 35-10-629(2), MCA, is to reduce the 
partnership assets to cash, pay creditors, and 
distribute to partners the value of their respective 
interest. See also 59A Am.Jur.2d Partnership 5 
1100 (2003). This is all part of the process of 
"winding up" the business of a partnership and 
terminating its affairs. 
7 42 Clark invites this Court to take a liberal 
reading of 5 35-10-629, MCA, and cites Creel v. 
Lilly (1999), 354 Md. 77, 729 A.2d 385, in support 
of the proposition that judicially acceptable 
alternatives exist to compelled liquidation in a 
dissolution situation. At issue in Creel was whether 
the surviving partners of a partnership had a duty to 
liquidate all partnership assets because there was no 
provision in the partnership agreement providing 
for the continuation of the partnership upon a 
partner's death, and the estate had not consented to 
the continuation of business. Creel, 729 A.2d at 387 
. After examining cases in which other courts had 
elected to order an in-kind distribution rather than a 
compelled liquidation, or had allowed the remaining 
partners to purchase the withdrawing partner's 
interest in the partnership, the court concluded that 
the UPA did not mandate a forced sale of all 
partnership assets in order to ascertain the true 
value of the business, and that "winding up" was not 
always synonymous with liquidation. Creel, 729 
A.2d at 403. The court fnrther noted that it would 
have reached the same conclusion regardless of 
whether the UPA or RUPA governed since, under 
RUPA, the remaining partners could have elected to 
continue business following the death of one of the 
partners. Creel, 729 A.2d at 397. 
7 43 However, of critical distinction between the 
facts in Creel and the *I24 ease subjudice is the 
manner in which the partners exited the entity. In 
Creel one of the partners had died. Here, Joan 
sought a court ordered dissolution of the 
Partnership. Under RUPA, the death of a partner 
triggers the provisions of 5 35-10-619, MCA, which 
allows for the purchase of the dissociated **705 
partner's interest in the partnership, much like what 
was ordered in Creel. Conversely, a court ordered 
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dissolution pursuant to 5 35-10-624(5), MCA, as in 
this case, results in the dissolution and winding up 
of the partnership. Thus, Creel is both legally and 
factually distinguishable. 
7 44 Furthermore, the cases relied upon by the 
court in Creel in reaching its conclusion that 
liquidation of assets was not always mandated upon 
dissolution, Nicholes v. Hunt (1975), 273 Or. 255, 
541 P.2d 820, Logoluso v. Logoluso (1965), 233 
Cal.App.2d 523, 43 Cal.Rptr. 678, Gregg v. 
Bernards (1968), 250 Or. 458, 443 P.2d 166, 
Goergen v. Nebrich (1958), 12 Misc.2d 101 1, 174 
N.Y.S.2d 366, and Fortugno v. Hudson Manure Co. 
(1958), 51 N.J.Super. 482, 144 A.2d 207, are 
likewise pre-RUPA holdings, which are inapposite 
to the facts at issue in this case. 
7 45 Accordingly, we conclude that when a 
partnership's dissolution is court ordered pursuant 
to 5 35-10-624(5), MCA, the partnership assets 
necessarily must be reduced to cash in order to 
satisfy the obligations of the partnership and 
distribute any net surplus in cash to the remaining 
partners in accordance with their respective 
interests. By adopting a judicially created 
alternative to this statutorily mandated requirement, 
the District Court erred. 
7 46 Did the District Court err by failing to 
grant Joan's petition for an accounting of the 
Partnership's business affairs? 
7 47 Joan maintains that the accounting performed 
by special master Blakely was inadequate as it was 
limited to a review of tax returns, some of which 
were unfiled drafts, for the years 1985 to 2001. She 
argues that the partnership tax returns failed to 
account for the nearly $400,000 Clark allegedly 
removed from the Partnership for his own personal 
use. Clark responds that the District Court found no 
competent evidence supporting Joan's claim that he 
wrongfully took funds from the Partnership, and 
argues that Joan agreed to the special master's 
limited accounting. However, the record reveals no 
such stipulation by Joan. 
[9] 7 48 Every partner is generally entitled to have 
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an accounting of the partnership's affairs, even in 
the absence of an express contract so providing. 
59A Am.Jur.2d Partnership 5 617. Moreover, 
RUPA provides that a partner may maintain an 
action against the *I25 partnership or another 
partner for legal or equitable relief, including an 
accounting as to partnership business, or to enforce 
a right to compel a dissolution and winding up of 
the partnership business under $ 35-10-624, MCA. 
See 9 35-10- 409(2) (b)(iii), MCA. 
[lo] 7 49 The pulpose of an accounting is to 
determine the rights and liabilities of the partners, 
and to ascertain the value of the partners' interests in 
the partnership as of a particular date, such as the 
date of dissolution. 59A Am.Jur.2d Partnership at 5 
667. "When an action for an accounting is being 
used to wind up the partnership's affairs, the court is 
obligated to provide 'for a full accounting of the 
partnership assets and obligations and distribution 
of any remaining assets or liabilities to the partners 
in accordance with their interests in the partnership! 
" Guntle v. Barnen (1994), 73 Wash.App. 825, 871 
P.2d 627, 630. This is often accomplished through 
the appointment of a special master subject to court 
review, who conducts a comprehensive 
investigation of the transactions of the partnership 
and the partners. Guntle, 871 P.2d at 630. In 
rendering the accounting, mere summaries or lump 
listings of types of items, or schedules of cash to be 
distributed without detailing the firm's transactions, 
are generally insufficient, as are mere tax returns. 
59A AnJur.2d Partnership at 5 621; Juliano v. Rea 
(1982), 89 A.D.2d 618,452 N.Y.S.2d 668,669. 
7 50 In this case, special master Blakely was 
charged with determining the amount of Joan's 
excess capital contributions and resolving disputes 
concerning ownership of Partnership assets. In this 
regard, Blakely performed a detailed accounting of 
the assets, liabilities, and capital contributions of 
each of the partners. While he accomplished much 
of this by reviewing the partnership tax returns &om 
1985 to 2001, some of which were apparently in 
draft form, Blakely also held several extensive 
meetings with the parties in which he heard oral 
arguments and received evidence. From these 
meetings, **706 and information obtained from the 
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partnership tax returns, Blakely prepared and 
submitted two reports to the Dishict Court, 
detailing the partners' respective capital 
contributions and withdrawals, as well as 
partnership assets and liabilities. These reports 
further itemized transactions occurring within the 
Partnership from 1995 through 2001, and included 
a break-down for Blakely's determination of the 
suggested purchase price for Joan's interest in the 
Partnership. This was sufficient given the issues 
which were presented for Blakely's review, and 
given the fact that he testified before the District 
Court and was subject to cross-examination 
concerning his findings. 
7 51 Because we conclude, however, that the 
Partnership's assets *I26 must be liquidated in 
order to satisfl the Partnership's obligations to its 
creditors and distribute the net surplus of any assets 
in cash to the partners, on remand it will become 
necessary for the District Court to perform a full 
accounting of the Partnership's affairs. Once again, 
this requires a detailed accounting of all the 
Partnership's assets and liabilities, as well as 
distributions of assets and liabilities to the partners 
in accordance with their respective interests in the 
Partnership. Blakely's reports may very well be of 
assistance in this process. 
7 52 Did the District Court err by adopting the 
findings of the special master? 
7 53 Joan challenges the District Court's adoption 
of the special master's findings by arguing that the 
procedures before the special master failed to 
comply with Rule 53, M.R.Civ.P., and takes 
particular issue with the master's failure to hold 
proceedings on the record, as well as what she 
perceives as his failure to prepare fmdings of fact 
and conclnsions of law. 
7 54 Rule 53, M.R.Civ.P., allows a district court 
to appoint a master in complicated cases to examine 
a matter and make a report thereon. Maloney v. 
Home and Investment Center, Inc., 2000 MT 34, 7 
28, 298 Mont. 213, 7 28, 994 P.2d 1124, 28. 
Rule 53(c), M.R.Civ.P., pertains to the power of 
masters and provides in relevant part: 
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events causing a partner's dissociation from a 
partnership. Pursuant to $ 35-10-616(5), MCA, one 
of the ways a partner may be dissociated is 
expulsion by judicial decree, made upon the 
application by the partnership or another partner, 
because: 
(a) the partner engaged in wrongful conduct that 
adversely and materially affected the partnership 
business; 
(b) the partner willfully or persistently committed 
a material breach of the partnership agreement or 
of a duty owed to the partnership or other 
partners under 35-10-405, MCA; 
(c) the partner engaged in conduct relating to the 
partnership business that made it not reasonably 
practical to carry on business in partnership with 
that partner[.] 
Dissociation under 5 35-10-616(5), MCA, is 
considered wrongful. Section 35-10-617(l)(b)(ii), 
MCA. 
[I31 7 61 In this case, Joan's amended complaint 
did not specifically request relief pursuant to 5 
35-10-616(5), MCA, and it is evident from the 
record that the District Court considered her claim 
generally under 5 35-10- 616, MCA. In so doing, 
the District Court found that Clark had not given 
notice of his express will to withdraw as a partner, 
that the partnership agreement did not apply, and 
that Clark had continued to work the ranch since his 
alleged dissociation in 1994, which Joan and the 
Partnership had benefited from. The court further 
noted that, although Clark had obtained loans in his 
individual name from 1994 forward, this did not 
constitute dissociation since it was a necessary 
action in light of the parties' inability to 
communicate about ranch fmances. Furthermore, 
the court concluded that Clark had not dissociated 
from the Partnership by virtue of reporting 
Partnership gains and losses on his individual tax 
returns. The court reasoned that Clark had filed the 
appropriate Partnership tax returns following this 
Court's decision in McCormick I,  77 67, 84, 
holding that the deeds transferring the ranch from 
Joan to Clark were void and the irrevocable trust 
allegedly established by the parties' father was 
invalid, and that Clark's prior reliance upon the 
deeds was reasonable. 
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**708 1 62 Based upon these findings, which 
Joan does not dispute, we cannot disagree with the 
District Court's conclusion that Clark did not *I29 
dissociate from the Partnership. While Joan 
contends that the District Court failed to consider 
evidence that Clark wrongfully converted over 
$400,000 of Partnership funds to his personal use, it 
does not appear from the record that Joan raised this 
argument before the District Court in a timely 
fashion. Rather, the record shows that these 
allegations first surfaced foliowing trial and the 
appointment of a special master. 
7 63 Additionally, Joan's contention that Clark 
dissociated from the Partnership by instigating 
criminal theft charges against her fails. The District 
Court weighed this evidence at trial and rejected it, 
finding that both parties were at least partially at 
fault for the deterioration of the Partnership. The 
court also noted that the act of taking alternate legal 
positions during the course of the dispute did not 
amount to dissociation. Because Joan has not 
established that the District Court's findings were 
clearly erroneous, we conclude the court did not err 
in concluding that Clark did not dissociate from the 
Partnership pursuant to $35-10-616, MCA. 
7 64 Did the District Court err in concluding 
that the Charolais cattle constituted partnership 
assets? 
65 In 1990 Helen Brevig purchased 
approximately ten head of Charolais cattle to live 
on the ranch. The following year, Helen transferred 
ownership of the cattle and the brand to Clark and 
his two sons. Thereafter, these cattle were listed 
and treated as Partnership property for all tax 
purposes, and proceeds from the sale of the cattle's 
offspring was placed into a Partnership account. 
Today, all the Charolais cattle residing on the ranch 
are offspring of those cattle originally purchased by 
Helen in 1990. 
[I41 7 66 The issue concerning ownership of the 
Charolais cattle arose as a result of the special 
master's treatment of the cattle as Partnership assets 
in his accounting. At trial, Clark argued that the 
Charolais cattle should be regarded as separate 
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property due to the fact that his mother, who was 
not a partner, had gifted the cattle to Clark and his 
two sons, neither of whom are partners. The 
District Court concluded, however, that since Clark 
had signed tax retums indicating that the cattle were 
Partnership property, and had placed proceeds from 
the sale of calves into Partnership accounts, the 
cattle should be treated as Partnership assets. 
q 67 On cross-appeal, Clark challenges the 
District Court's characterization of the Charolais 
cattle as Partnership assets, and argues that the mere 
inclusion of the cattle in the Partnership tax returns 
is legally insufficient to transfer title of the cattle to 
the *I30 Partnership. We agree. 
1[ 68 Section 35-10-203, MCA, pertains to 
partnership property and provides as follows: 
(1) Property transferred to or otherwise acquired 
by a partnership is property of the partnership and 
not of the partners individually. 
(2) Property is partnership property if acquired in 
the name of: 
(a) the partnership; or 
(b) one or more partners with an indication in the 
instrument transfemng title to the property of the 
person's capacity as a partner or of the existence 
of a partnership but without an indication of the 
name of the partnership. 
(3) Property is acquired in the name of the 
partnership by a transfer to: 
(a) the partnership in its name; or 
(h) one or more partners in their capacity as 
partners in the partnership if the name of the 
partnership is indicated in the instrument 
transfening title to the property. 
(4) Property is presumed to be partnership 
property if purchased with partnership assets even 
if not acquired in the name of the partnership or 
of one or more partners with an indication in the 
instrument transferring title to the property of the 
person's capacity as a partner or of the existence 
of a partnership. 
(5) Property acquired in the name of one or more 
of the partners without an indication in the 
instrument transferring title to the property of the 
person's capacity as a partner or of the existence 
of a partnership and without use of partnership 
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**709 assets is presumed to be separate property 
even if used for partnership purposes. 
(Emphasis added.) As reflected in the statute, 
property purchased with partnership assets, or 
transferred in the partnership's name, or to one or 
more of the partners in their capacity as partners of 
the partnership, is presumed to be partnership 
property. On the other hand, property acquired in 
the name of a partner without an indication that the 
property is being transferred to that person in his or 
her capacity as a partner of the partnership is 
presumed to be separate property, even if used for 
partnership purposes. See # 35-10-203, MCA. 
69 In the present case, special master Blakely 
included the cattle as partnership assets in his 
accounting because they were listed on the 
partnership tax returns. However, nothing in the 
record suggests that the Charolais cattle were 
purchased with Partnership assets or '131 
transferred to Clark and his two sons in their 
capacity as partners of the Partnership. Nor has 
their been any assignment of the cattle to the 
Partnership. Therefore, despite the fact that the 
cattle were included in the Partnership tax returns, 
and proceeds from the sale of the cattle's offspring 
placed in Partnership accounts, the cattle are to be 
presumed separate property pursuant to 5 35- 
10-203(5), MCA. 
9 70 As Joan correctly points out, this 
presumption is a rebuttable one. Nonetheless, Joan 
did not introduce any evidence to overcome the 
presumption but, rather, has relied on appeal upon 
the District Court's fmdings that money from the 
sale of calves had been placed into Partnership 
accounts, and that the cattle had been listed on 
Partnership tax returns. However, we have 
previously considered and rejected arguments that a 
third party acquires an interest in cattle simply by 
feeding, watering, and pasturing them. In In re 
Marriage of Schulfz (1982), 199 Mont. 332, 649 
P.2d 1268, the respondent in a divorce proceeding 
claimed he had an interest in a caale brand which 
had been transferred to the parties' daughter because 
he had fed and watered the cattle and had taken care 
of them on his land. The respondent cited no 
authority in support of his contentious and, on 
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appeal, we held that his claim was meritless. We 
further noted that proceeds from the sale of the 
daughter's calves had been used by the ranch in its 
operation, and thus concluded that the respondent 
had been equitably compensated for his 
contributions. Schulk, 199 Mont. at 338, 649 P.2d 
at 1271. 
7 71 As in Schultz, here proceeds from the sale of 
calves had been deposited in Partnership accounts 
and used for Partnership purposes. Joan has not 
demonstrated any equitable interest in the cattle by 
virtue of the Partnership's care and feeding of the 
cattle, nor has she provided any authority which 
would compel the conclusion that ownership of the 
cattle passed to the Partnership. Because the 
presumption established by 5 35-10-203(5), MCA, 
has not been overcome by evidence to the contrary, 
we conclude the District Court erred in categorizmg 
the Charolais cattle as Partnership assets, and 
reverse the court's determination in that regard. 
7 72 Did the District Court err by excluding 
evidence of a teleconference and concluding that 
Clark was not entitled to compensation? 
[15] 7 73 Clark asserts that the District Court 
erred in excluding evidence of a taped telephone 
conference between himself, Helen, Joan, and two 
accountants, which allegedly contained Joan's 
admission that Clark should receive a salary as 
ranch manager in the amount of $24,000 per *I32 
year. The District Court excluded the taped 
testimony on the ground that it was not clear that all 
persons involved in the conversation were aware 
that it was being tape-recorded, in violation of g 
45-8-213, MCA, which pertains to privacy in 
communication. The court finther found that the 
tape recording offered by Clark as evidence in 
support of his claim that Joan had agreed to pay him 
a salary had been intentionally altered, and 
therefore lacked the necessary foundation to be 
authenticated under Rule 901, M.R.Evid. Because 
we conclude the District Court correctly denied 
admission of the proffered evidence on the grounds 
that it was incapable of being authenticated, we 
decline to address whether it was also proper for the 
court to exclude the **710 tape recording pursuant 
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[16] 7 74 The requirement of authentication or 
identification is a condition precedent to 
admissibility. Rule 901, M.R.Evid. In State v. 
Warwick (1972), 158 Mont. 531, 542, 494 P.2d 
627, 633, this Court set forth the standards for 
admissibility of sound recordings. They are (1) a 
showing that the recording device was capable of 
taking testimony, (2) a showing that the operator of 
the device was competent, (3) establishment of 
authenticity and correctness of the recording, (4) a 
showing that changes, additions or deletions have 
not been made, (5) a showing of the manner of the 
presetvation of the recording, and (6) identification 
of the speakers. 
[I71 7 75 In this case, the District Court found 
that the tape recording had been intentionally 
altered so as to capture only certain phrases or 
sentences from the original recording and the 
original version of the recording was no longer 
available. Consequently, it was impossible to 
authenticate the recording pursuant to the standards 
set forth in Warwick. As we have often noted, a 
district court has broad &scretiou in determining 
whether evidence is relevant and admissible and we 
will not overturn that determination absent an abuse 
of discretion. Glacier Tennis Club at Summit, LLC 
v. Treweek Const. Co., Inc., 2004 MT 70, 7 47, 
320 Mont. 351, 7 47, 87 P.3d 431, 7 47. Here, 
Clark has not even attempted to discredit the 
District Court's Tidings that he intentionally altered 
the tape. Accordingly, we conclude the District 
Court was correct to deny admission of the tape 
recorded conversation. 
7 76 Affumed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
KARLA M. GRAY, C.J., W. WILLIAM 
LEAPHART, PATRICIA 0. CO'ITER and JIM 
REGNIER, JJ., concur. 
322 Mont. 112,96 P.3d 697,2004 MT 179 
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C By filing suit to dissolve three-man medical 
Supreme Court of Oregon. partnership, two partners were not entitled to 
Arthur F. HUNTER and 0. D. Haugen, dissolution in accordance with Uniform Partnership 
Respondents, Cross-Appellants, Law, in view of provision of partnership agreement 
v. limiting dissolution to withdrawing partners and 
Kurt R. STRAUBE, Appellant, Cross-Respondent. expressly providing that retirement of any partner 
should not dissolve partnership as to the other 
Argued and Submitted Oct. 9,1975. partners. ORS 68.310, 68.420, 68.440, 68.530, 
Decided Dec. 12, 1975. 68.590,68.600,68.620. 
Suit to dissolve three-man medical partnership was 
filed by two members against the third member. 
The Circuit Court, Mulmomah County, William M. 
Dale, J., held that it had no jurisdiction to wind up 
affairs of partnership and plaintiffs appealed. The 
Supreme Court, McAlliiter, J., held that plaintiffs 
by merely calling their withdrawal from partnership 
a dissolution could not avoid requirement of giving 
six months' notice of withdrawal or provisions 
governing rights to partnership property upon 
withdrawal of a partner; that filing of the suit was an 
election to withdraw from partnership in 
contravention of partnership agreement; and that 
defendant partner was entitled to continue 
partnership business, to settle affairs of partnership 
in accordance with terms of partnership agreement 
and to recover from plaintiffs for any damage he 
might have suffered from breach. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Partnership -2595 
289k259.5 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 289k2591/2,289k259) 
Partners expressed their wills to dissolve medical 
partnership by filing suit 
to dissolve. ORS 68.310, 68.420, 68.440, 68.530, 
67.590,68.600, 68.620. 
121 Partnership -261 
289k261 Most Cited Cases 
131 Partnership -261 
289k261 Most Cited Cases 
If partnership agreement provides for distribution of 
partnership property, rights of partners are governed 
by partnership agreement rather than by Uniform 
Partnership Law. ORS 68.310, 68.420, 68.440, 
68.530,68.590,68.600,68.620. 
141 Partnership -261 
289k261 Most Cited Cases 
141 Partnership -263 
289k263 Most Cited Cases 
Two partners had the power to dissolve 
three-member partnership by electing to withdraw 
as partners but they did not have the right to do so 
without complying with terms of partnership 
agreement. ORS 68.310,68.420,68.530, 
68.590,68.600,68.620. 
151 Partnership -261 
289k261 Most Cited Cases 
Any partner may have power to dissolve partnership 
at any time, even though dissolution is in 
contravention of partnership agreement, but, if 
partner who exercises power does not have right to 
do so, he must suffer the penalties. ORS 68.310, 
68.420,68.440,68.530,68.590,68.600,68.620. 
161 Partnership -99 
289k99 Most Cited Cases 
Noncompetition clauses in partnership agreement 
are lawful if freely entered into by partners and 
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reasonable in effect. 
171 Partnership -225 
289k225 Most Cited Cases 
171 Partnership 67231.1 
289k231.1 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 289k231) 
Two members of three-member medical partnership 
could not, by merely calling their withdrawal from 
partnership a dissolution, escape from liabilities 
which they assumed when they executed partnership 
agreement, they could not avoid requirement of six 
months' notice of withdrawal and they must comply 
with provisions governing rights to partnership 
property upon withdrawal of a partner. ORS 68.310 
,68.420,68.440,68.530,68.590,68.600,68.620. 
[8] Partnership -225 
289k225 Most Cited Cases 
Filing of suit by two members of three-member 
medical partnership against third member was an 
election by plaintiffs to withdraw from partnership 
in contravention of partnership agreement requiring 
six months' notice of withdrawal, defendant partner 
was entitled to continue partnership business and to 
settle affairs of partnership in accordance with 
terms of partnership agreement and he had right to 
recover for any damage he might have suffered on 
account of breach of notice provision. ORS 68.310, 
68.420,68.440,68.530,68.590,68.600,68.620. 
*721 **279 Richard E. Alexander of Williams, 
Montague, Stark, Hiefield & Norville, P.C., 
Portland, argued the cause and fded briefs for 
appellant, cross-respondent. 
John R. Faust, Jr., Portland, argued the cause and 
filed a brief for respondents, cross-appellants. With 
him on the brief were Hardy, Buttler, McEwen, 
Weiss *722 & Newman, Paul N. Wonacott, Wood, 
Wood, Taturn Mosser & Brooke, Portland. 
Before O'CONNELL, C.J., and McALLISTER, 
DENECKE, TONGUE, HOWELL and BRYSON, 
JJ. 
McALLISTER Justice. 
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This suit was fded by the plaintiffs, Dr. Arthur F. 
Hunter and Dr. 0. D. Haugen, to dissolve a 
three-man medical partnership in which the 
defendant, Dr. Kurt R. Straube, was the third 
member. The three doctors were radiologists 
practicing in Portland under the firm name of Lloyd 
Center X-Ray. The partnership was created by a 
partnership agreement dated July 26, 1969 and a 
written addendum dated November 24, 1971 which 
added the plaintiff Haugen to the partnership. 
On September 11, 1974 the plaintiffs filed this suit 
in Multnomah County to dissolve the partnership 
and prayed for the appointment of a receiver and 
the winding up of the partnership. The defendant 
counterclaimed, alleging that he was entitled to 
continue the partnership business, to recover 
damages from plaintiffs for the breach of the 
partnership agreement, and to settle with the 
plaintiffs as withdrawing partners as provided by 
the partnership agreement. 
The only regular pleading filed was the plaintiffs' 
complaint. Thereafter, the parties, at the request of 
the trial court, prepared a pretrial order stating the 
admitted facts and the contentions of the parties, 
which order was approved by the court on 
November 29, 1974. The case was tried on the 
facts admitted in the pretrial order and the issues 
framed by that order. 
The pretrial order states the nature of the 
proceedings as follows: 
'This is a suit of equity in which plaintiffs *723 
seek judicial supervision over the winding up of 
the affairs of a partnership they claim is dissolved 
and a liquidation of respective partnership 
interests **280 in accordance with Oregon's 
Uniform Partnership Law and defendant seeks 
continuation of the partnership business, damages 
for breach of the partnership contract, and a 
distribution to plaintiffs in accordance with the 
partnership agreement! 
The trial court found that by the filing of this suit 
the plaintiffs 'did not cause by express will a 
dissolution of their partnership with defendant! 
The court further found that since 'the partnership 
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continues as an entity,' the court had no jurisdiction 
to wind up the affairs of the partnership. The court 
also dismissed the counterclaims of defendant 
because 'no dissolution had occurred! 
The pertinent portions of the partnership agreement 
read as follows: 
'3. TERM: The partnership shall continue until 
the partnership is dissolved as herein provided. 
* * *  
'16. TERMINATION: In the event of the death 
of retirement of any Partner or the voluntary 
liquidation of the partnership, the following 
procedure shall be observed: 
'A. Death: 
'(I) The death of any Partner Shall not dissolve 
the partnership as to the other Partners, * * *! 
(Emphasis added.) 
'B. Retirement: 
'The retirement of any Partner Shall not dissolve 
the partnership as to the other Partners, and each 
Partner hereby does bind his estate, heirs or 
personal representatives *724 to receive the sums 
as in this paragraph computed as full acquittance 
and payment of his interest in this partnership and 
all undistributed or uncollected earnings therein 
and does hereby agree to execute such receipts 
and bills of sale, deeds, or other instruments of 
conveyance or satisfaction as may be required to 
carry out the terms, conditions and stipulations 
herein set forth. (Emphasis added.) 
'(1) Upon the voluntary or involuntary retirement 
of a Partner from the partnership, Or upon the 
withdrawal of a Partner from the partnership, the 
books of the partnership shall be closed as of the 
fust day of the month in which the retirement or 
withdrawal becomes effective, and such Partner 
shall be entitled to receive the following sums and 
no more, all subject to Paragraph 16B(2) hereof: 
'(a) An amount equal to the capital account of the 
withdrawing or retiring Partner as of the close of 
the last fiscal year of the partnership, adjusted for 
additional capital investment subsequent thereto 
and reduced by any distributions during the 
current fiscal year of net profits in excess of said 
O 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim 
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net profits. The capital amount, as so determined, 
shall be paid in forty-eight (48) equal monthly 
installments, with the fust installment payable on 
the fifth (5th) day of the fourth (4th) month 
following the closing date and remaining 
installments on the fifth (5th) day of the ensuing 
months, all without interest. 
'(b) An amount equal to the retiring or 
withdrawing Partner's share in the undistributed 
net profits, if any, of the partnership as of the 
closing date *725 determined as provided in said 
Partnership Agreement reduced by any accounts 
payable relating to the collection of accounts 
receivable. The amount of such undistributed 
profits shall be paid as soon as reasonably 
practical. 
'(c) A share in future income of the partnership, 
as evidenced by the accounts receivable for 
services of the partnership as of the closing date, 
computed as provided in this subparagraph. 
Accounts receivable shall be valued at 75%, 
except that accounts **281 which were first 
billed more than one year prior to the closing date 
shall be valued at zero. The amount to which the 
retiring or withdrawing partner shall be entitled 
shall be computed on the basis of the following 
formula: . 
I to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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( Percentage ) ( Value ) ( Number of full years as ) 
( of ) ( of ) ( Partner of partnership, or ) 
( participation ) ( Accounts ) ( predecessor partnerships, ) 
( in ) X (  as ) X ( as of the first day of the ) 
( netprofits ) ( computed ) ( current partnership year ) 
( of 1 ( ) ( . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ) 
( Partner ) ( ) ( 20 ) 
'For example, if the total value of such accounts 
receivable is $40,000, and the retiring or 
withdrawing Partner is entitled to 25% Of the net 
profits on the closing date, such Partner would 
receive $500 for each of such full years as a 
Partner. The amount thus determined shall be 
paid as a distribution of income in forty-eight 
(48) equal installments, without interest, at the 
same times as provided for under subparagraph 
(a) above. (Emphasis added.) 
(2) Nou-Competition: 
'If a Partner shall voluntarily withdraw *726 or 
retire and shall engage in the practice of medicine 
or participate in any association, group or clinic 
so engaged within a forty-mile radius of the City 
of Portland, Oregon, during a period of three 
years from the effective date of withdrawal or 
retirement, such Partner shall have no right to 
receive any distributions under Paragraph B(l) 
above, from the date he so engages in the practice 
of medicine. (Emphasis added.) 
'(3) Procedure re Retirement: 
'(a) Any Partner voluntarily resigning from the 
Partnership shall give six months' written notice 
to each of the other Partners of his desire to 
retire, and such retirement shall take effect six 
months from the date of delivery of such notice to 
the other Partners! 
contention of the plaintiffs that by the filing of this 
suit they are entitled to a dissolution in accordance 
with the Uniform Partnership Law. The plaintiffs 
ignore the provision of the partnership agreement 
that limits the dissolution to the withdrawing 
partners and expressly provides that 'the retirement 
of any Partner shall not dissolve the partnership as 
to the other Partners'. 
[3] The power to dissolve a partnership is governed 
by ORS 68.530 and provides for dissolutiou both 
without violation of the partnership agreement and 
in contravention of the partnership agreement. In 
either case, it is clear that If the partnership 
agreement provides *727 for the distribution of the 
partnership property the rights of the partners are 
governed by the partnership agreement rather than 
by the Uniform Partnership Law. See provisions in 
ORS 68.310, 68.420, 68.440, 68.590, 68.600 and 
68.62O.[FNl] 
FNl. All the provisions cited, relating to 
the rights and duties of the partners, make 
clear that they are subject to any agreement 
between the parties to the contrary. For 
example, ORS 68.620 provides: 
'Rules for distribution. In settling accounts 
between the partners after dissolution, the 
following rules shall be observed, subject 
to any agreement to the contrary: * * *! 
[1][2] Plaintiffs contend that they expressed their **282 [4][5] In the case at bar the plaintiffs had the 
will to dissolve the partnership by the filing of this power to dissolve the partnership by electing to 
suit, citing Carrey v. Haun et al, 11 1 Or. 586, 592, withdraw as partners, a choice which they made by 
227 P. 315 (1924). We agree with this contention. filing this suit. Plaintiffs, however, did not have the 
See Clark v. Allen et al, 215 Or. 403, 410, 333 right to dissolve the partnership without complying 
P.2d 1100 (1959). However, we disagree with the with the terms of the partnership agreement. As 
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was succinctly stated in Straus v. Straus, 254 Minn. 
234,94 N.W.2d 679,686 (1959): 
'A distinction must be recognized between the 
power to dissolve a partnership and the right to 
dissolve a partnership. Any partner may have the 
power to dissolve a partnership at any time * * * 
and this is true even though such dissolution is in 
contravention of the partnership agreement. * * * 
If a partner exercises his power to dissolve a 
partnership, but does not have the right to do so, 
he must suffer the penalties * * *! 
[6] The pertinent provisions of this partnership 
agreement have been set out earlier verbatim in the 
opinion. In brief, the agreement required the 
plaintiffs to give defendant, the remaining partner, 
six months' notice of their desire to withdraw and 
provided that the 'retirement shall take effect six 
months from the date of delivery of such notice to 
the other Partners.' The agreement also provided a 
specific plan of distribution to a withdrawing 
partner and contained *728 a restriction on 
competition. It should be noted that Oregon law 
does uphold non-competition clauses if freely 
entered into by the partners and reasonable in 
effect. Such clauses are typical of professional 
partnerships. McCallum v. Asbury, 238 Or. 257, 
263-264,393 P.2d 774 (1964). 
[7] The plaintiffs attempted by filing this suit to 
divest the defendant from his right to continue the 
partnership business, which he clearly had the right 
to do. They attempted to avoid the requirement of 
giving six months' notice. They also attempted to 
render nugatory the provisions of the partnership 
agreement governing the rights to the partnership 
property upon the withdrawal of a partner. We 
think the plaintiffs cannot, by merely calling their 
withdrawal a dissolution, escape from the liabilities 
which they assumed when they executed the 
partnership agreement. The plaintiffs have not cited 
a single authority in support of their contention. 
A recent case from our sister state of Washington is 
in accord with our decision today. Ashley v. Lance, 
75 Wash.2d 471, 451 P.2d 916, 920 (1969) and 80 
Wash.2d 274, 493 P.2d 1242, 1245 (1972), in a 
very similar fact situation, held that the restrictive 
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covenant in the partnership agreement would be 
enforced for the benefit of the remaining partner. 
The withdrawing partners could not avoid the 
covenant by devising 'the legalistic theory that they 
would dissolve their partnership * * * and not 
withdraw therefrom.' 451 P.2d at 918. 
In Devlin v. Rockey, 295 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1961), 
the partnership agreement provided for termination 
upon a two-thirds majority vote of all the partners 
or upon the unanimous consent of all the partners. 
Two of the ten partners sought a decree declaring 
they had effected a dissolution of the partnership, 
alleging *729 that the partnership was one at will 
and therefore subject to dissolution by any partner 
at any time. The court held that, despite use of the 
word dissolution by the plaintiffs, it was clear that 
they were to be treated as withdrawing partners 
under the agreement, the partnership was not 
dissolved, and distribution to the plaintiffs was to be 
controlled by the partnership agreement provisions 
pertaining to withdrawal of a partner. 295 F.2d at 
269. 
Similarly, in Adams v. Jarvis, 23 Wis.2d 453, 127 
N.W.2d 400 (1964), the partnership agreement 
specifically provided that the partnership would not 
terminate upon the withdrawal of a partner. The 
plainm withdrew but contended this effected a 
dissolution **283 under a Wisconsin statute 
identical to O W  68.510.pN21 The court refused 
to construe the statute so as to invalidate an 
otherwise enforceable contract. In one sense 
plaintias withdrawal constituted a dissolution, the 
court said, but the partnership was not wholly 
dissolved so as to require complete winding up. 
The partnership continued to exist under the terms 
of the agreement. 127 N.W.2d at 403-404. 
FN2. O W  68.510 provides: 
'Dissolution defined. The dissolution of a 
partnership is the change in the relation of 
the partners caused by any partner ceasing 
to be associated in the carrying on as 
distinguished from the winding up of the 
business! 
Gibson v. Angros, 30 Colo.App. 95, 491 P.2d 87 
O 2006 ThomsonIWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Page 7 of 7 
Page 6 
273 Or. 720,543 P.2d 278 
(Cite as: 273 Or. 720,543 P.2d 278) 
(1971), involved a covenant not to compete upon 
withdrawal of a partner from the partnership. 
Plaintiff argued that his notice to resign from the 
partnership operated as a dissolution and he was 
therefore no longer bound by the restrictive 
covenant. The court held that plaintiffs actions 
constituted a voluntary retirement under the terms 
of the partnership agreement, and the terms of the 
agreement which became operative upon such 
retirement were not rendered *730 nugatory by the 
dissolution of the partnership. 491 P.2d at 91. 
181 We hold that the filing of this suit by the 
plaintiffs was an election by each of them to 
withdraw from the partnership in contravention of 
the partnership agreement. Under those 
circumstances the withdrawal entitles the defendant 
to continue the partnership business and to settle the 
affairs of the partnership in accordance with the 
terms of the partnership agreement. The defendant 
also has the right to any damages he may have 
suffered on account of the plaintiffs' breach of the 
provision for six months' notice of withdrawal. 
This suit is reversed and remanded to the court 
below for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
273 Or. 720,543 P.2d 278 
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United States District Court,D. New Jersey. 
Dorothy Poplar LAPLACE and Lisa J. Laplace 
Smith, as Co-Executrixes of the Estate of Maurice 
Leonard Laplace, and on behalf of L.J. & M. 
Laplace, New Jersey General Partnership, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Saniel LAPLACE, Defendant. 
No. Civ.A. 03-4291JAG. 
Jan. 12,2006. 
Deborah A. Holzman, Richard D. Wilkinson, 
Lowenstein Sandier PC, Roseland, NJ, for Plaintiffs. 
Francis M. Devito, Frank Rivellini, Francis J. Devito 
, PA, Hackensack, NJ, for Defendant. 
OPINION 
GREENAWAY. J. 
fixed sum buyout provision is unenforceable under 
New Jersey Partnership law and on public policy 
grounds, FN4 and the R & R errs in its analysis of 
the waiver, estoppel, and contract modification 
issues. 
FNI. This Court will consider Defendant's 
motion to dismiss as a motion for  summa^^ 
judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) provides that a 
court shall treat a motion to dismiss as a 
motion for summary judgment when 
matters outside the pleadings are presented 
to, and not excluded by, the court. Here, 
that prerequisite has been met. 
FN2. Plaintiffs' motion should have been 
styled as a cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment, pursuant to L. Civ. R. 
7.lthI. 
. .-\-,. 
*1 This mat& comes before the Court on 
Defendant Saniel Laplace's ("Defendant") motion FN3. Based on the submission of affidavits 
to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint or in the by both parties, Judge Haneke considered 
alternative, for summary judgment, and Defendant's motion to dismiss as a motion 
Plaintiffs' Dorothy Poplar Laplace and Lisa J. for sununary judgment. (R & R at 4-5.) 
Laplace Smith (collectively, "Plaintiffs") motion for The R & R made the following findings: 
partial summary judgment, m2 pursuant to Fed. R. (I) Defendant's argument that the parties' 
Civ. P. 12@)(6) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) dispute must be submitted to arbitration on 
respectively. On August 26, 2005, United States the one hand, yet, need not be submitted to 
Magistrate Judge G. Donald Haneke issued a arbitration on the other, (because language 
Report and Recommendation ("R & R"), pursuant in the parties' partnership agreement made 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) and L. Civ. R. 72.1(a)(2). certain sections "forever binding" upon the 
In that R & R he recommended that this Court: (1) parties), was without merit (R & R at 6-8); 
deny Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary (2) the dispute should not be submitted to 
judgment; and (2) deny Defendant's motion for arbitration because language in the 
summary judgment. FN3 The parties both filed partnership agreement specifically states 
timely objections to the R & R. Defendant objected that "no submission to arbitration shall 
to the R & R on the basis that the R & R failed to take place after the death of any of the 
address affmtively Defendant's motion for parties has occurred" and Plaintiffs are 
summary judgment "to dismiss Counts, [sic] One, entitled to a forum for their grievances 
Two and Three," of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. because a "forum preclusion" clause is 
Plaintiffs objected to the R & R on the basis that the unenforceable as against public policy (R 
R & R failed to address Plaintiffs' argument that a & R at 8-9); (3) Plaintiffs' argument that 
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the parties had engaged in a course of 
conduct that effectively modified the 
partnership agreement's buyout clause was 
not persuasive because (with the exception 
of one alleged modification of the buyout 
provision) all of the modifications to the 
buyout provision were written, in 
accordance with the partnership agreement 
(R & R at 9-11); and (4) Plaintiffs' 
argument that the partners intended there 
to be a distinction between the real 
property owned by the partnership and the 
other assets of the partnership was without 
merit because "[ilf the Partners had 
intended to exclude the real estate of the 
Partnership from the 'partnership interest,' 
there would have been a clear indication in 
the 1959 Partnership Agreement." (R & R 
at 11-12.) 
FN4. Plaintiffs have raised a public policy 
argument asserting that New Jersey law is 
clear that a contractual provision that 
undermines a statutory requirement is 
contrary to public policy, and is therefore 
void and unenforceable. Tbis argument 
fails for the reasons set forth in section A 
of the Discussion, infa. 
As a result of this Court's de novo review of the R 
& R, the parties objections and submissions, the R 
& R will not he adopted. This Court concludes that 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment should 
he granted, and Plaintiffs' motion for partial 
summary judgment should he denied, for the 
reasons set forth in this Opinion. 
BACKGROUND 
During the 19301s, brothers Oscar Laplace ("Oscar" 
) and Louis J. Laplace ("Louis"), founded LJM, a 
chemical manufacturing and distribution business. 
(Pls! Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 9 2 (" 
Pls! Statement"); Amended Complaint dated June 
18, 2004 ("Am.Compl."), at 7 9.) Maurice Laplace 
("Maurice"), Saniel Laplace ("Saniel" or " 
Defendant"), and Oscar B. Laplace ("Oscar B.") 
were the sons of Louis and the nephews of Oscar. 
(Pls! Statement 7 4.) In August 1959, Louis and 
Oscar, along with Louis' three sons, Maurice, 
Saniel and Oscar B., formalized their existing 
business relationship by entering into the 1959 
Partnership Agreement (the "Agreement"). (Pls.' 
Statement (/$ 4-5; Certification of Saniel Laplace 
dated October 17, 2005 ("Saniel Cert."), at rn 
4-5, Ex. B; see also AMidavit of Richard D. 
Wilkinson dated November 18, 2004 ("Wilkinson 
Aff."), at 7 2, Ex. A.) LJM is a New Jersey general 
partnership, with its principal place of business 
located on Le l ids  M5 Lane in Elmwood Park, 
New Jersey, on property owned by the partnership. 
(Saniel Cert. 7 1, 3; Wilkinson Aff. 7 19, Ex. 
R.) LJM also owns a vacant parcel of land adjacent 
to their office. (Pls! Statement 7 20-21; 
Wilkinson Aff. 7 19, Ex. R.) 
FN5. Throughout the pleadings, motions, 
and accompanying documents, "Leliart's," 
is spelled both with, and without, the 
apostrophe. 
*2 The Agreement states the rights and obligations 
of the parties as to each other and the partnership. FN6 
(Saniel Cert. 7 5, Ex. B, Wilkinson Aff. 7 2, 
Ex. A,) Specifically, and for the purposes of this 
lawsuit, the Agreement contains clauses which 
relate to a party's interest in the partnersbip upon 
death (Paragraph 11) M7 and the submission of 
disputes to arbitration (Paragraph 13). (Saniel Cert. 
W 11, 16; Wilkinson Aff. 7 2, Ex. A.) After 
signing the Agreement, over time, various partners 
of LJM have taken ill, retired, or died. (Pls.' 
Statement 77 8-11, 16; Saniel Cert. 37 7-8.) 
The departing partners or their estates have received 
differing amounts of money for their partnership 
interest. (Pls! Statement % 8-11, 16.) When 
Oscar B. died in February 1986, Maurice and Saniel 
were left as the only remaining partners of LJM. 
(Pls! Statement 7 16-17; Saniel Cert. 1 7.) In 
March of 2002, Maurice was diagnosed with 
advanced-stage cancer. (Pls! Statement 7 18; 
Saniel Cert. 1 9.) Maurice died in February 2003 
(Pls.' Statement 18; Saniel Cert. 7 9) and 
Plaintiffs are the co-executrixes of his estate. 
(Am.Compl.7 18.) 
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FN6. There is no dispute as to whether the 
Agreement was executed by all parties. 
FN7. Paragraph ll(a) includes a $100,000 
buyout provision for a deceased party's 
partnership interest. (See Wilkinson Aff. 1 
2, Ex. A at 5-6.) Regarding the figure 
stated in the buyout provision, Plaintiffs 
allege that it was based on a perceived 
value of the Partnership business of 
$500,000 at the time of the Agreement. 
(Am.Compl.l 13.) Defendant vehemently 
contests this theory, and states that in fact, 
at the time of the Agreement, the business 
wasn't prosperous and $100,000 (a figure 
determined by Louis, and agreed to by all 
the partners) was a tremendous amount of 
money. (Saniel Laplace Dep. April 2, 
2004, attached as Ex. B. to Wilkinson Aff. ( 
"Saniel Dep. Ex. B )  at 39:15-25; 40:l-25; 
41:l-25; 42:l-4.) No evidence has been 
presented to substantiate Plaintiffs' 
allegation. 
Plaintiffs initially filed a two-count Complaint, on 
September 11, 2003, alleging that the Agreement's 
buyout provision was unenforceable under the 
revised New Jersey Uniform Partnership Act (1996) 
(hereinafter "RUPA"), N.J. Stat. Ann.. 5 42:lA-1 to 
42:lA-56 (2005). Plaintiffs amended their 
Complaint on June 18, 2004, to assert an additional 
ground for not enforcing the buyout provision. In 
the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs essentially state 
three causes of action, namely: 
FN8. Originally, Plaintiffs also demanded 
a formal accounting. The Amended 
Complaint does not include this demand. 
Defendant filed his answer and 
counterclaim to the initial complaint on 
November 14, 2003, and an amended 
answer and counterclaim to the initial 
complaint on November 21, 2003. 
Defendant essentially stated four assertions 
in his amended answer and counterclaim: 
1) the complaint should be dismissed for 
failure to abide by the arbitration 
provisions in the Agreement, and the Court 
should issue an order dissolving the 
partnership; 2) Defendant is entitled to 
attorney's fees and costs because Plaintiffs' 
action is frivolous, and in violation of N.J. 
Stat. Ann.. 2A:15-59.1; 3) the Court 
should issue a judgment declaring that 
Plaintiffs are "estopped from voiding or 
canceling the Agreement based on 
principals [sic] of equitable or promissory 
estoppel;" and 4) pursuant to the terms of 
the Agreement, Maurice's estate "owes the 
partnership or Saniel Laplace as the sole 
surviving partner, the sum of $161,321.00 
for overdrafts of the capital account of 
Maurice Laplace." (See Def!s Am. Answer 
to Compl. attached as Ex. J to Wilkinson 
Aff. ("Def!s Am. Answer") at 1 11, 
Count One (n 12, Count Two 7 2, Count 
Three 1 4, Count Four 1 2.) Defendant's 
answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, 
filed July 8, 2004, however, is devoid of 
counterclaims. 
1. a request for a declaration that "Paragraph 11 of 
the Agreement is void as contrary to N.J.S.A. 
42:lA-34" and for a d e t e h t i o n  of "the fair value 
of Maurice's 50 percent partnership interest in LJM 
in accordance with N.J.S.A. 42:lA-34(b)[,]" 
(Am.Compl.f[ 28(1), (2)) (Pls! Count One); 
2. a request for "[a] declaratory judgment 
determining that the $100,000 purchase price set 
forth in Paragraph 11 of the Agreement does not 
apply to the underlying real estate of LJM" and for 
a determination of "the fair value of Maurice's 50 
percent interest in the real estate of LJM in 
accordance with N.J.S.A. 42:lA-34(b)[,]" 
(Am.Compl.f/ 32(1), (2)) (Pls! Count Two); 
3. a request for a determination of "the fair value of 
Maurice's 50 percent partnership interest in the 
business and real estate of LJM in accordance with 
N.J.S.A. 42:lA-34@)" because "Saniel has waived 
any right to enforce Paragraph 11 against the estate 
of Maurice by reason of a pattern of [a] 
decades-long course of conduct" (Am.Compl.1 
43(2), f[ 34.) (PIS! Count Three) FN9 
FN9. In addition, each count of Plaintiffs' 
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Amended Complaint includes: 1) a request 
for an order requiring "Saniel to pay said 
fair value to Plaintiffs, together with pre- 
and post-judgment interest, costs, 
reasonable attorneys' fees and fees and 
expenses of any appraisers or experts" 
(Am.Compl.7 28(3), 7 32(3), 7 43(3)); 
and 2) a request for an order requiring " 
Saniel to indemnify the estate of Maurice 
against any and all partnership liabilities 
and obligations of LJM, whether incurred 
before or after the date of Maurice's 
dissociation from LJM, pursuant to 
N.J.S.A. 42:lA-34 (d), including but not 
limited to the aforesaid potential 
environmental liability" (Am.Compl.7 
28(4), n 32(4), n 4 x 4  .)) 
In essence, Plaintiffs claim: (1) that Paragraph 11 of 
the Agreement is unenforceable under RUPA (Pls! 
Count One); (2) that if the buyout provision is 
enforceable, it only applies to LJM's operating 
business and not to the underlying real estate of the 
partnership (Pls! Count Two); and (3) that even if 
RUPA does not govern Paragraph 11 of the 
Agreement, the buyout provision was modified, 
waived, or is equitably estopped by the course of 
the parties' conduct over a more than forty year 
period (Pis! Count Three). 
*3 Plaintiffs have requested that Defendant 
repurchase Maurice's alleged fifty percent 
partnership interest in LJM at its fair market value 
(in accordance with RUPA), which they allege is 
approximately $3.5 million. (Am.Comp1.n 
1.) Defendant rejected this request and moved to 
dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, or in the 
alternative, for s judgment seeking 
enforcement of the $100,000 fixed-sum buyout 
provision of the Agreement on the following 
grounds: (1) RUPA does not govern Paragraph 11 
of the Agreement; (2) the underlying real estate of 
the partnership forms part of a partner's interest in 
the partnership; and (3) the conduct of the parties 
could not constitute modification or waiver of 
Paragraph 11 of the Agreement because the 
modifications were in writing. (Def!s Br. in Supp. 
of Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ. J. 7-10.) 
Defendant's motion also includes an arbitration 
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demand (e.g., Defendant argues that pursuant to the 
Agreement, the only proper fonun for partnership 
disputes is arbitration). (Def!s Br. in Supp. of 
Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ. J. 10-1 1.) 
FNlO. According to Plaintiffs' 
submissions, this estimate does not include 
the value of the partnership's underlying 
real estate. Plaintiffs claim that one parcel 
is already under contract for $2.335 
million and that an offer of $1,950,000 has 
been received on the other parcel. (Pls.' 
Statement tYfi 20-21; Wilkinson A& a 
15-16, Exs. N-0.) 
FNl1. However, Defendant did not raise 
this issue as a counterclaim in his answer 
to the Amended Complaint. 
In response, Plaintiffs moved for partial summary 
judgment, seeking a determination that the 
Agreement's buyout provision is unenforceable, and 
that arbitration is prohibitedIi under the 
circumstances. m'Z (Pls! Br. in Supp. of Mot. for 
Partial Summ. J. 1.) In his opposition, Defendant 
contends that the Agreement is enforceable as 
written, because the conduct of the partners over the 
years demonstrates their desire to abide by the 
Agreement. (Def!s Br. in Opp'n to Pls! Mot. for 
Partial Summ. J. 9.) Since Plaintiffs commenced 
this action, Defendant has not paid Plaintiffs any 
amount of money for Maurice's partnership interest. 
(Am. Compl. 7 21; see also Saniel Cert. 7 15.) m13 
FN12. In their motion for partial summary 
judgment, Plaintiffs state that "[eJariy on, 
the parties agreed to bifurcate liability and 
damages, in order to postpone discovery or 
expert testimony with respect to the fair 
value of Maurice's partnership interest 
until the Court fust decides whether the 
$100,000 buyout provision is 
unenforceable." (Pls! Br. in Supp. of Mot. 
for Partial Summ. 3. 5.) Apparently, the 
agreement alluded to was not committed to 
writing. 
O 2006 Thomson~West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
00256 
LIL.II....:.-~ .-.-- -... . , ~ . I I  ....... 9 . '  ..w . * . - r . ~ . r . .  o c , - - T ~ T - X X T  r* e .s~~..:~...nnnccnnnnnns\nnc~nnnrr onnc Q / T  '7I'lnAL 
Slip Copy 
Page 6 of 20 
Page 5 
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 831 10 (D.N.J.) 
(Cite as: Slip Copy) 
FN13. On April 23, 2003, Mr. James 
Biggins, LJMs certified public accountant, 
advised Defendant in writing that there 
was a negative balance in Maurice's capital 
account of $261,321.00. (Certification of 
Saniel Laplace dated October 17, 2005 (" 
Saniel Cert."), at 7 15.) The letter from 
Mr. Biggins was forwarded to Plaintiffs' 
attorney on April 25, 2003. (Id.) This 
Court notes that the letter from Mr. 
Biggins was improperly attached to the 
back of Defendant's Exhibit B, instead of 
being attached separately (as indicated by 
7 15 of the Certification) as Exhibit C. 
LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Standard of Review 
A magistrate judge's recommended disposition of a 
dispositive motion is subject to de novo review. In 
re U.S. Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 145-46 (3d 
Cir.1998); Temptations, Inc. v. Wager, 26 
F.Snpp.2d 740, 743 (D.N.J.1998). See also Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 72(b). 
B. Standard for Summary Judgment Under Fed. R 
Civ. P. 56(c) 
Summary judgment is appropriate where the 
moving party establishes that "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c). A factual dispute between the parties will not 
defeat a motion for summary judgment unless it is 
both genuine and material. See Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct 2505, 
91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine 
if a reasonable jury could rehm a verdict for the 
non-movant and it is material if, under the 
substantive law, it would affect the outcome of the 
suit. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The moving 
party must show that, if the evidentiary material of 
record were reduced to admissible evidence in 
court, it would be insufficient to permit the 
non-moving party to carry its burden of proof. See 
Celotex v. Cutrett, 477 U.S. 317, 318, 106 S.Ct. 
*4 Once the moving party has camed its burden 
under Rule 56, "its opponent must do more than 
simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt 
as to the material facts in question." Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Carp., 475 U.S. 
574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed2d 538 (1986). 
The opposing party must set forth specific facts 
showing a genuine issue for trial and may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of its 
pleadings. See Sound Ship Bldg. Co. v. Bethlehem 
Steel Co., 533 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 860, 97 S.Ct 161, 50 L.Ed.2d 137 
(1976). At the summary judgment stage, the court's 
function is not to weigh the evidence and determine 
the truth of the matter, but rather to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. In doing so, the court 
must construe the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Wahl 
v. Rexnordlnc., 624 F.2d 1169, 1181 (3d Cir.1980). 
DISCUSSION 
Defendant asserts that he is entitled to summary 
judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, on the folloiving grounds: (1) 
Paragraph 11 of the Agreement is enforceable under 
the correct interpretation of RUPA; (2) the parties 
intended for a "party's interest in the partnership" to 
include the partnership's underlying real estate 
(Wilkinson Aff. 7 2, Ex. A at 6); (3) the parties did 
not modify or waive the Agreement by their course 
of conduct; and (4) in accordance with the 
Agreement, the parties' dispute must be submitted to 
arbitration. 
FN14. Defendant's arbitration demand is 
not part of the pleadings filed in response 
to the Amended Complaint. Defendant 
failed to include a counterclaim on this 
ground in his Answer to the Amended 
Complaint. (See DeE's Answer to Am. 
Compl. attached as Ex. L to Witkinson 
Aff. ("DeE's Answer") at 7 13.) 
Defendant cannot now assert a 
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counterclaim in his motion for summary 
judgment. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs have 
moved for partial summary judgment in 
response to Defendant's attempt to assert a 
counterclaim in his motion for summary 
judgment. Even if the pleadings had raised 
this claim, it would he denied, because in 
accordance with the language of Paragraph 
13 of the Agreement, this dispute cannot 
be submitted to arbitration. Paragraph 13 
of the Agreement states in relevant part: 
In the event any dispute shall arise 
between the parties hereto, in connection 
with the operation and conduct of the 
business of the partnership, or if any 
dispute arises with respect to any of the 
terms and conditions of this agreement, or 
with the interpretation thereof, or with 
respect to any other matter or thing 
effecting [sic] the interests of the parties in 
the partnership, or the partnership 
business, then such dispute shall be 
submitted to arbitration to the American 
Arbitration Association. 
It is understood and agreed, however, that 
the only matters that may not be submitted 
to arbitration, and which shall be 
arbitrarily and forever binding upon the 
parties hereto, shall he those matters 
contained in Article "ll.", [sic] and its 
various subdivisions thereof, and Article " 
12", and its various subdivisions thereof, 
except where reference is made therein for 
submission to arbitration, the 
understanding being that no submission to 
arbitration shall take place af fr  the death 
of any of theparties has occurred. 
(Wilkinsou Aff. 7 2, Ex. A at 12-13 
(emphasis added.)) 
Paragraph 13 of the Agreement clearly 
states that no dispute shall be submitted to 
arbitration after the death of any party. As 
Defendant is the only surviving party to the 
Agreement, this matter, by its own terms, 
cannot be submitted to arbitration. 
Although the arguments Plaintiffs present 
in their motion for partial summary 
judgment have apparent merit, Plaintiffs 
cannot be granted summary judgment on a 
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non-existent claim. Therefore, that part of 
Plaintiff?' motion for partial summary 
judgment focused on Defendant's 
arbitration demand is rendered moot. 
Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to partial 
summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the following 
grounds: (1) the buyout provision in Paragraph 
Il(a) is unenforceable under RUPA (Pls! Count 
One); (2) the buyout provision in Paragraph ll(a) 
does not encompass the partnership's underlying 
real estate as part of a "party's interest in the 
partnership" (Wilkinson Aff. 7 2, Ex. A at 6) (Pis.' 
Count Two); (3) the parties modified or waived 
Paragraph 11 by their course of conduct (Pls! Count 
Three); and (4) the Agreement specifically prohibits 
arbitration after the death of a party to the 
Agreement. FN1s 
EN15. This Court notes that in contrast to 
Plaintiffs' approach to Paragraph 11, here, 
Plaintiffs are more than willmg to abide by 
the Agreement. Nonetheless, this ground is 
moot. See supra note 14. 
Upon review of the parties' submissions, this Court 
grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment 
on Counts One, Two, and Three of Plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs' motion seeking 
partial summary judgment is denied. 
A. RUPA's Application to Paragraph I 1  of the 
Agreement 
The General Provisions of RUPA define " 
Partnership" as "an association of two or more 
persons to cany on as co-owners a business for 
profit formed under section 10 of this act, 
predecessor law, or comparable law of another 
jurisdiction." N.J. Stat. Ann.. 5 42:lA-2 (2005) 
(internal footnotes omitted). FN16 
FN16. Pursuant to RWA's defition, 
Plaintiffs contend, and Defendant does not 
dispute, that Maurice's estate remains a 
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partner in the Partnership by operation of 
law. (Pls.' Resp. to Def!s Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts 7 1; PIS! Br. in 
Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 21.) 
First, Plaintiffs argue, and Defendant does not 
contest, that RUPA could apply to LJM, as the 
partnership was formed under predecessor law, 
namely, the prior Uniform Partnership Act adopted 
in 1919. N.J. Stat. Ann.. 5 42:l-1 (1919) (repealed 
by N.J. Stat. Ann.. 5 42:lA-1 to 42:lA-56 (1996); 
Pls! Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 20.) 
Second, Plaintiffs argue that Article 7 of RUPA (" 
Partner's Dissociation When Business Not Wound 
Up") *I7 govern the rights and obligations of 
the partners in LJM and requires that Defendant pay 
Plaintiffs a buyout price equivalent to the fair value 
of Maurice's interest in the partnership, *I8 as of 
the date of his withdrawal, (in this case, his death), 
in accordance with sections 34(a), and @) of Article 
7, thereby invalidating Paragraph ll(a) of the 
Agreement. "I9 
FN17. Article 7, section 34, states in 
relevant part: 
a. If a partner is dissociated from a 
partnership without resulting in a 
dissolution and winding up of the 
partnership business under section 39 of 
this act, except as otherwise provided in 
the partnership agreement, the partnership 
shall cause the dissociated partner's 
interest in the partnership to be purchased 
for a buyout price as detennined pursuant 
to subsection b. of this section. 
b. As used in subsection a. of this section, " 
buyout price" means the fair value as of 
the date of withdrawal based upon the right 
to share in distributions from the 
partnership unless the partnership 
agreement provides for another fair value 
fnm~~la  
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entitles his estate to approximately $1.75 
million, based on an estimated value of the 
partnership's operating business of $3.5 
million. (Am.Compl.l[ 1.) 
FN19. Paragraph 11 of the Agreement 
states in relevant part: 
In the event of the death of any of the 
parties hereto, during the term of this 
agreement and the continuance of the 
partnership, the surviving parties shall 
purchase from the estate of such deceased 
party, and the estate of such deceased party 
shall sell to the surviving parties, the 
interest of snch deceased party in and to 
the partnership business, at a price and 
under terms and conditions as hereinafter 
provided for: 
a) Notwithstanding any value of the capital 
acconnt, or the value of the capital account 
plus accmed profits to the date of death of 
such deceased party, as same may be 
reflected by the books of the partnership, 
the surviving varties shall vav to the estate 
of the deceasdd party, and &e estate of th 
e[sic] deceased party shall accept as 
payment in full and as the purchase price 
for such deceased party's interest in the 
partnership, the sum of $100,000.00, 
subject to the adjustment hereinafter 
provided [as set forth in 1 l@) I.... 
b) The aforesaid purchase price may be 
adjusted upwards or downwards in the 
event that there have been overdrafts 
against the capital account, or against 
prospective profits made by any of the 
parties hereto and as will be reflected on 
the books of the partnership as of the date 
of death of such deceased party. In the 
event any such adjustments shall he 
necessary, same shall be certified to by the 
Certified Public Accountant then in the 
employ of the partnership and his 
. -.---. . 
N.J. Stat. Ann.. 5 42:lA-34 (2005) certification as to the amount and manner 
(internal footnote omitted). of such adjustments shall be binding on the parties hereto and their respective heirs, 
FN18. Regarding the "fair value" of the administrators and executors. 
Partnership, Plaintiffs allege that Maurice's (Wilkinson Aff. 7 2, Ex. A at 5-7.) 
fifty percent interest in the partnership 
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*5 Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have erred in 
their readmg of RUPA. Defendant asserts that 
Article 7 does not apply to Paragraph 11 of the 
Agreement, because in accordance with the 
language of Article 1, section 4(a), RUPA would 
only govern the relations between the partners and 
the partnership, where the partnership agreement 
does not otherwise provide. RUPA, Article 1, 
section 4(a), states: 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection b. of 
this section, relations among the partners 
and between the partners and the partnership are 
governed by the partnership agreement. To the 
extent the partnership agreement does not 
otherwise provide, this act governs relations among 
the partners and between the partners and the 
partnership. 
FN20. Subsection b. is not at issue in this 
matter. 
N.J. Stat. Ann.. $ 42:1A4(a) (2005) (emphasis 
added). 
Neither party disputes that the Agreement provides 
a buyout provision in the event of a partner's death. 
Rather, Defendant argues that because the 
Agreement provides a buyout provision and RUPA 
explicitly states that relations "between the partners 
and the partnership are governed by the partnership 
agreement," the buyout provision is enforceable. FN2' 
N.J. Stat. Ann.. 42:1A4(a) (2005). 
Plaintiffs argue that section 34(a) of Article 7 of 
RUPA, not section 4(a), governs Paragmph 11 of 
the Agreement, because a partner has died, but the 
business has not been "wound up." They argue that 
pursuant to section 34(a) of Article 7, the buyout 
provision is unenforceable. 
FN21. Apparently in reference to 
Paragraph ll(b), Defendant submits that 
Maurice bad a negative balance in his 
capital account of $261,321 at the time of 
his death, and states that "according to the 
agreement no payment is due to the Estate." 
(Saniel Cert. M[ 14-15; see supra note 
The parties' dispute is essentially a legal question 
regarding the correct interpretation of RUPA. The 
only fact that needs to be considered here, with 
respect to interpreting or applying the statute, is 
whether the parties to the Agreement contemplated, 
and provided for, the eventuality of a partner's 
death, in the Agreement. Paragraph 11 of the 
Agreement clearly demonstrates that they did. In 
accordance with section 4(a) of Article 1 of RUPA, 
RUPA does not govern Paragraph 11 of the 
Agreement because the Agreement has provided a 
provision in the event of a partners' death. The 
Agreement is clear and unequivocal. The parties are 
bound to abide by the buyout provision provided in 
Paragraph 1 l(a). 
Defendant has carried his burden as the moving 
party, and demonstrated that there is no genuine 
issue as to a material fact for the jury to resolve 
regarding the applicability of RUPA to the buyout 
provision in Paragraph 11 of the Agreement, nor 
does a dispute arise as to the correct interpretation 
of RUPA. Plaintiffs have failed to point to anything 
in the record that creates a genuine issue as to a 
material fact regarding whether the buyout 
provision is at odds with the application of RUPA. 
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law on Count One of Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 
B. General Principles of Contract Interpretation 
The primary function of the Court when interpreting 
an agreement is to ascertain the intention of the 
parties as it was at the time the agreement was 
executed. 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on 
Contracts $ 30:2 at 16-20 (4th ed. 1999) ("Williston 
on Contracts"); see also U.S. v. Moorman, 338 U.S. 
457, 70 S.Ct. 288, 94 L.Ed 256 (1950); Williams v. 
Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 947 (3d Cir.1997) ("In the 
process of interpreting a contract, the court seeks to 
ascertain the intent of the parties.") The Court 
should embody the perspective of the parties, 
looking forward from the date when they entered 
into the agreement, instead of viewing the 
agreement from a position of hindsight. 11 
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Williston on Contracts 31:9 at 340-41; Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co. ., 
769 F.Supp. 671, 706 (D.De1.1991), affd, 998 F.2d 
414 (3d Cir.1993). This perspective is especially 
important when interpreting perpetual agreements 
long after they were entered into. See Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., 769 F.Supp. at 706. In this context, 
the Court must resist the temptation to conform the 
agreement to modem circumstances by adding 
terms not assented to originally. Id. 
*6 The Court should place the greatest weight on 
the express terms of the agreement, Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts 8 203(b) (1981); see also 
United States v. Amour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 
678-79, 91 S.Ct 1752, 29 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971), as 
the language itself is the best and most important 
evidence of the intention of the parties. 11 Williston 
on Contracts 8 322 at 402 ("The parties' intentions 
are, first and foremost, determined by the language 
used in their agreement."). An agreement should be 
read and interpreted as a whole. 11 Williston on 
Contracts 5 32:5 at 420-21; Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts 5 202(2) (1981). 
Although a Court may look to course of 
performance or prior course of dealing, primary 
importance should be placed upon the express terms 
of the agreement. Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts $ 203@) (1981) ("express terms are given 
greater weight than course of performance [or] 
course of dealing"); see also E. Allan Famsworth, 
Contracts 8 7.13 at 469-73 (4th ed. 2004) (" 
Farnsworth"). FN22 Extrinsic evidence of the 
intent of the parties to the agreement is secondary to 
the actual language of the agreement. See 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 769 F.Supp. at 706; 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts $203(b) (1981). 
whenever reasonable, as consistent with 
each other. Id. at 474. "If such an 
interpretation is unreasonable, the Code 
establishes a hierarchy in which express 
terms prevail over ... course of performance 
.... Thus, evidence will only be admitted to 
show a ... course of performance that is ' 
consistent' with the express terms; 
otherwise the terms alone will control." Id. 
(internal footnotes omitted). 
It is a "well-established principle that it is not the 
h c t i o n  of the judiciary to change the obligations 
of an [agreement] which the parties have seen fit to 
make." 11 Williston on Contracts 5 31:5 at 298-99. 
A Court must not rewrite the agreement for the 
parties. Id. at 299. When applying the principles of 
contract interpretation, the Court "may not delete 
contractual provisions ... or limit the contract's 
effect by a strained construction, even if the 
resulting contract would be economically more 
efficient or advantageous to one or both parties, or 
more fair or equitable than the agreement the parties 
were satisfied to make." Id. at 303-05 (internal 
footnotes omitted); see also Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
769 F.Supp. at 706 ("[A] Court 'must guard 
against inadvertently reforming a contract under the 
guise of construction by looking too intently for 
means of bringing about some ultimate good, 
thwarting an apparent wrong, or preventing 
hardship ...." ' (quoting Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of 
Elizabethtown, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 654 F.Supp. 
1388, 1397 @.De1.1986), affd, 988 F.2d 386 (3d 
Cir.1993) (internal quotations omitted)). 
1. Modifcation, Waiver, and/or Equitable Estoppel 
ofParagraph I1 of the Agreement FN23 
FN22. Famsworth discusses the Uniform FN23. For the purposes of coherence, this 
Commercial Code's (the "Code") Court shall address Count Three' of 
important provision on course of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint prior to 
performance and states that its principles addressing Count Two. 
extend by analogy to all noncommercial 
contracts. Famsworth, Contracts 8 7.13 at a. Language of the Agreement 
469-70. Under the Code, the express terms 
of an agreement and any applicable course As outlined above, when the Court interprets an 
of performance must be construed agreement, the evidence entitled to the greatest 
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weight is the language of the agreement itself. Here, 
this Court shall address the relevant sections of the 
Agreement. 
The "WITNESSETH" section of the Agreement 
states, in pertinent part: 
WHEREAS, it is the desire of the parties hereto to 
enter into the within agreement so that the business 
and affairs of the partnership shall be managed and 
directed under a defmite and fuced policy and to 
secure a union of the interests of the parties hereto, 
in and to the said business of the partnership, and 
that the interests of the parties hereto may he best 
sewed; and 
"7 WHEREAS, it is the desire of the parties hereto 
to further provide for certain eventualities that may 
occur in the event of the death of any of the parties 
hereto. 
(Wilkinson Aff. 7 2, Ex. A at 1.) 
Paragraph 2 ("Term") of the Agreement states: 
The partnership shall continue for a period of ten 
(10) years from Fehmary lst, 1959, and shall 
continue thereafter, from year to year, unless at least 
three months before the end of any year either party 
shall deliver to the other a notice in writing by 
registered mail, of his intention to dissolve the 
partnemhip, at the end of that year. 
(Wilkinson Aff. 7 2, Ex. A at 2.) 
Paragraph 4 ("Profit and Loss") of the Agreement 
states "[tlhe net profits of the partnership shall be 
divided equally among the parties and the net losses 
shall he home equally by them." (Wilkinson Aff. 9 
2, Ex. A at 3.) 
Subsection (g) of Paragraph 11 of the Agreement 
provides the parties with a specific means for 
changing the purchase price of a party's interest in 
the partnership. Paragraph Il(g) states in relevant 
parties. Such amendment, or amendments, shall 
have the same force and effect as if originally 
contained in the main body of this paragraph at the 
time of the execution hereof and the purchase price 
so fixed in the last amendment preceding the death 
of any of the parties hereto shall he controlling and 
binding upon the parties hereto, their heirs, 
executors and administrators ..... 
(Wilkinson Aff. 7 2, Ex. A at 9.) IN" 
FN24. It appears that the language of 
Paragraph 1 l(g) provides a mechanism for 
changing the purchase price of any and all 
partners' partnership interest by mutual 
agreement from the date of any such 
amendment. However, in practice the 
parties utilized Paragraph 1 l(g) to modify 
the purchase price for individual partners, 
i.e., Paragraph ll(g) has been invoked 
several times for successive modifications. 
(See Wilkinson Aff. 77 4-7, Exs. C-F, 
respectively.) 
This Court notes that the document 
attached by Plaintiffs to Richard D. 
Wilkinson's affidavit as Exhibit C, is an 
unsigned copy of a 1967 amendment to the 
Agreement. A signed copy of this 
amendment (also labeled Exhibit C), is 
attached to Defendant's Response to 
Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed 
Material Facts at 7 9 (hereinafter "Def.'s 
Ex. C") and to Defendant's Reply Brief at 
9-10. 
h. Course of Conduct 
Plaintiffs argue that over the course of more than 
forty years, the partners modified or waived 
Paragraph 11 by their "course of conduct." FN25 
Namely, Plaintiffs cite the undisputed fact that three 
part: retired-or deceased partners received more than the 
The parties hereto may, from time to time, by alnn.000 fixed-sum hi~vni~t amnunt i~nnn 
- - - -, - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, . -. . -. . -r . ..
mutual agreement, adjust the purchase price, as dissociation from the partnership, as evidence of a " 
hereinabove provided in this paragraph, subdivision course of conduct," modifying or waiving 
"a)" thereof, by affixing to this agreement an Paragraph Il(a). M26 (PIS! Br. in Supp. of Mot. instrument in writing, in a form as indicated at the for Partial S m .  J. 11.) Plaintiffs argue that the 
end of this subdivision, which shall he signed by all fact that none of the partners who died or retired 
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prior to Maurice's death received only the $100,000 
buyout, demonstrates a "complete disregard for the 
$100,000 fixed-sum buyout provision" resulting in 
modification or waiver of the buyout provision. 
(Pls! Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 11.) 
Plaintiffs claim that the end result of the parties' 
modification of Paragraph 1 l(a) of the Agreement " 
is a partnership agreement with no fixed-sum 
buyout provision." (Pls.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for 
Partial Summ. J. 12.) 
FN25. The essence of Plaintiffs' "course of 
conduct" argument is that Paragraph 11 
was modified by the conduct of the parties 
over the course of more than 40 years 
because the parties "disregarded" 
Paragraph 1 l(a)'s buyout provision, which 
has resulted in an unenforceable buyout 
provision. However, Plaintiffs fail to 
acknowledge that the parties' "course of 
conduct" was actually in accordance with 
the very terms of Paragraph 11. Plaintiffs' 
argument is circuitous. If the partners' " 
course of conduct" was in accordance with 
Paragraph 11's mechanism for modifying 
the buyout provision, then such 
modifications cannot then constitute a " 
course of conduct" rendering Paragraph 11 
permanently modified, and therefore, 
unenforceable. 
FN26. Although Plaintiffs submitted no 
actual proof of how much money any 
departing partner or his estate actually 
received, Defendant does not dispute that 
the partners who retired or died before 
Maurice, received more than the $100,000 
fued-sum buyout amount. It is undisputed 
that when Louis Laplace died in 1960 his 
estate received at least $100,000, and 
potentially more than $100,000, although 
there is no written evidence of this fact. 
(Saniel Dep. Ex. B at 61:17-25; 62:l-25; 
63:l-11.) The parties also do not dispute 
that Oscar Laplace received at least 
$139,000 upon his retirement in 1967. 
(Saniel Dep. Ex. B at 6510-19;66:6-17; 
see also Wilkinson Aff. 7 4, Ex. C (the " 
1967 Amendment.")) Although Defendant 
does not dispute that Oscar B. Laplace's 
estate may have ultimately received a 
payment totaling approximately $230,000 
after his death in 1986, Defendant was not 
able to confim the actual payment amount 
to Oscar B. Laplace's estate. (Saniel Dep. 
Ex. B at 101:2-6; 10216-21; 117:25; 
1 8 : - 1  1223-1 1.) Plaintiffs have 
submitted a written agreement which 
indicates that Oscar B. Laplace's estate 
received a payment in excess of $100,000 
at the time of the agreement, and 
additionally, would receive a payment of 
$500 per week beginning September 15, 
1990, and continuing for a period of 260 
weeks, up to and including September 9, 
1995. (Willcinson Aff. 9 7, Ex. F (the " 
1990 Amendment.")) By Plaintiffs' 
calculations, this agreement suggests that 
Oscar B. Laplace's estate ultimately 
received a payment of more than 
$230,000. (Saniel Dep. Ex. B at 1185-9; 
120:18-25; 121:l-21.) The parties do not 
dispute the existence of two other written 
agreements providing buyouts in the 
amount of $225,000 with 45 day time 
limits: (1) executed in 1982 when Saniel 
was hospitalized for bypass surgery; and 
(2) executed in 1984 when Oscar B. was 
suffering from heart trouble. (Saniel Dep. 
Ex. B at 69:23-25; 70:l-2; 71:4-21; 
91:2-22; 93:16-25; 94:l-12; Wilkinson 
Aff. 77 5-6, Exs. D-E.) For the purposes 
of this Opinion, the various individual 
agreements will be collectively termed the 
"Amendments." 
Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that the parties 
waived their right to enforce the buyout provision 
because they "lmowingly departed from the terms of 
the buyout provision" and "never abided by the 
buyout provision and, thus, never intended to be 
bound by it." (Pls.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial 
Summ. J. 15.) Plaintiffs insist that the parties' 
repeated "waiver" of the buyout provision is further 
evidenced by their decision to ignore the 
Agreement's life insurance requirement. FN27 (Pis! 
Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 16.) In 
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sum, Plaintiffs argue that the fact that all deceased 
or retiring partners received more than $100,000, 
coupled with the fact that all of the partners ignored 
the life insurance requirement, M28 demonstrates 
that the partners knowingly and intentionally 
waived the buyout provision of the Agreement. 
(Pls.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 17.) 
Plaintiffs urge this Court not to permit Defendant " 
to now enforce the very provision that he and all the 
other Partners chose to ignore for over 40 years 
merely because he stands to gain a mu1timillion 
dollar windfall by its enforcement as the last 
surviving Partner." (Pls! Br. in Supp. of Mot. for 
Partial Summ. J. 17.) 
FN27. Paragraph ll(k) of the Agreement 
states: 
As soon after the execution of this 
agreement as practical, the partnership will 
make application for life insurance on the 
lives of the partners who are insurable. 
Each such insurable partner will be insured 
for the sum of One Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($100,000.00), and the policies so 
issued shall indicate the owner and 
beneficiary to be the partnership. It is 
understood and agreed that in the event of 
the death of any of the insured partners the 
proceeds of such insurance shall be 
received by the parlnership and held in 
trust for the purpose of applying and 
paying same as payment on account of the 
purchase price of such deceased partner's 
interest in lieu of the provision for an 
initial payment of 20% as provided for in 
Paragraph ll(a)(l) hereof. In such case, 
the balance (if any) of the purchase price 
in excess of the amount of the insurance 
proceeds, shall be paid in the same manner 
and at the same rate as provided in 
Paragraph ll(a)(l) for the payment of the 
balance after the initial payment. 
In the event the amount of the insurance 
proceeds received by the partnership shall 
be in excess of the then established 
purchase price, the partnership shall 
nevertheless pay the full amount of such 
insurance proceeds to the representatives 
of such deceased partner, as if the amount 
of such insurance proceeds had been the 
amount fmed as the purchase price of such 
deceased partner's interest. 
(WiUrinson Aff. 7 2, Ex. A at 1 lfa.)) 
FN28. The only evidence Plaintiffs cite for 
this proposition is Saniel's deposition 
testimony that none of the partners ever 
satisfied the life insurance requirement. 
(Pis! Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial 
Summ. J. 17; Saniel Dep. Ex. B at 
43: 16-18; 49:16-19; SO: 16-22.) 
*8 Defendant contends that the Amendments to the 
Agreement cannot constitute modification or waiver 
of Paragraph 11 because in their construction the 
Amendments: (1) honored and recognized the terns 
of the Agreement; (2) referenced the Agreement 
and specifically its "buy out [sic1 terms;" m29 and 
(3) were in writing. M30 (Def.'~ Br. in Opp'n to 
Pls! Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 11.) In light of these 
facts, Defendant argues that the only reasonable 
conclusion from the Amendments is "that the 
parties were fully aware of the 1959 Agreement and 
intended to be controlled by said Agreement except 
as to their modifications which were in writing and 
signed by all partners." (Def!s Br. in Opp'n to Pls.' 
Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 11.) Specifically, 
Defendant argues that Maurice "knew the 1959 
buyout provisions were always invoked and always 
governed unless the parties agreed otherwise" 
because he signed all of the Amendments. (Def.'s 
Br. in Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Partial Swnm. J. 12.) 
FN29. The 1967 Amendment specifically 
referenced the Agreement, and Article 12 
of the Agreement. The 1990 Amendment 
specifically referenced Paragraph 1 l(a). 
Both of the 45 day time l i i t e d  
Amendments (1982 and 1984), referenced 
the Agreement. (See Wilkinson Aff. 79 
4-7, Exs. C-F.) 
FN30. Louis Laplace's "Amendment1' 
excepted, as previously noted. See supra 
note 26. In response to Defendant's 
arguments, Plaintiffs contend that the fact 
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that the majority of the Amendments were 
in writing is not relevant, because none of 
the written Amendments were executed in 
accordance with Paragraph 11, and 
therefore, the Amendments actually 
constitute "an abandonment or disregard" 
of the Agreement, resulting in its 
modification. (Pis! Reply Br. 5,7.) 
Defendant contends that there is no evidence that 
Maurice wanted or expected anything other than for 
the terms of the Agreement to be enforced. (Def!s 
Br. in Opp'n to Pls! Mot. for Partial S m  J. 12 .) 
Furthermore, Defendant asserts that Maurice knew 
that the Agreement provides that the surviving 
partner will be liable "for all of the debts, 
obligations or liabilities incurred by the partnership. 
" (Def.'s Br. in Opp'n to Pls! Mot. for Partial 
Summ. J. 13.) In sum, Defendant argues that there 
is no evidence that Maurice wanted to do anything 
other than "leave the good and the bad of the 
partnership to his brother with whom he had been a 
partner without incident for over 40 years." (Def.'s 
Br. in Opp'n to Pls! Mot. for Partial Snmm. J. 13.) 
In support of these arguments, Defendant states, " 
[a]t no time during his life did either Maurice or I 
take any steps to invalidate the Agreement. On the 
contrary, we were both fully aware of its terms and 
obligations and were in full agreement with the 
same." (Saniel Cert. 7 11 .) m31 
FN31. Defendant also argues that as 
Maurice was diagnosed with cancer over a 
year before he died that if he was unhappy 
with the provision he could have requested 
a change from Defendant. (Def!s Br. in 
Opp'n to Pls! Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 
12.) In response, Plaintiffs insist that "the 
fundamental fact that no Partner who died 
or retired before Maurice was ever held to 
the $100,000 buyout price in n 11 or 12, 
" strongly supports a waiver of the buyout 
provision because there "was no reason for 
Maurice to think he would be saddled with 
[the buyout provision] either." (Pls! Reply 
Br. 6-7.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that 
Saniel's concession that he and Maurice " 
never talked about anything to the contrary 
" resulted in "no 'red flag' to put Maurice 
on notice that things would be different" 
when he passed away. (Pls! Reply Br. 7.) 
As stated in the Agreement, it is within the power of 
the parties to the Agreement to agree to different 
buyout terms. (Wilkinson Aff. 7 2, Ex. A at 9.) 
Defendant astutely noted that all but one of the 
Amendments were "written," as permitted by 
section (g) of Paragraph 11. Plaintiffs did not 
produce evidence of any other modifications, in 
writing and agreed to by the parties, to Paragraph 
1 l(a). At a minimum, the evidence Plaintiffs cite to 
in support of their theories of modification, and 
waiver, actually demonstrates that the parties 
adhered to the Agreement, by executing 
Amendments pursuant to the terms of Paragraph 
ll(g) of the Agreement. FN32 More important, 
each individual Amendment or modification did not 
trigger, by language or reasonable inference, any 
different treatment of subsequent dissociating 
partners. Indeed, here, when a partner (or their 
estate) wanted to change Paragraph 1 l(a)'s buyout 
provision, the parties executed a written amendment 
and all signed the amendment. Thus, the parties 
acted in accordance with Paragraph 1 l(g) and their " 
course of conduct" affumed rather than modified, 
Paragraph 11 of the Agreement. As Plaintiffs have 
failed to demonstrate a "course of conduct" that 
would lead this Court to conclude that Paragraph 
ll(a) of the Agreement was modified or waived, 
Plaintiffs cannot successfully rebut Defendant's 
motion. Paragraph 1 l(a) is not unenforceable on the 
grounds Plaintiffs propose. m33 
FN32. Plaintiffs argue that the fact that the 
1967 Amendment provided Oscar with 
$139,000 instead of $100,000, combined 
with the fact that the Amendment was not 
written in exact accordance with Paragraph 
ll(g), demonstrates the Amendment's lack 
of conformity with Paragraph 11, and the 
partners' abandonment of the Agreement. 
(Pls! Reply Br. 5-6.) Plaintiffs make a 
similar argument with respect to the 1990 
Amendment, namely, that the fact that it 
provided Oscar B!s estate with an mount 
in excess of $230,000, more than four 
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years after Oscar B!s death, is fiuther 
evidence of the partners' abandonment of 
the Agreement. (Pls.' Reply Br. 6.) 
Regarding the 1982, and 1984,45 day time 
limited Amendments, Plaintiffs argue that 
they were not in keeping with Paragraph 
11 because the Paragraph says nothing 
about temporary changes in value. (Pls.' 
Reply Br. 6.) Although Plaintiffs direct 
this Court's attention to the undisputed fact 
that the 1990 Amendment was made after 
Oscar B!s death with the executrix of his 
estate, Lillian Laplace, nonetheless, the 
Amendment does state: 
WHEREAS, the partnership has made 
payment in excess of $100,000.00 to the 
Estate of Oscar B. Laplace by payments to 
said estate; and WHEREAS, the surviving 
partners do wish to pay to the Estate of 
Oscar B. Laplace, additional sums of 
money notwithstanding the original 
agreement dated August 4, 1959. 
(Wilkinson Aff. Ij 7, Ex. F.) 
Yet the Amendment provides no indication 
regarding when such payment was made. 
This section of the Amendment's language 
is followed by the partners' agreement to 
pay Oscar B!s estate $500.00 per week for 
approximately five years from the signing 
of the Amendment. (Wilkinson Aff. Ij 7, 
Ex. F.) Despite Plaintiffs' contention that 
an Amendment made after a partner's death 
and for a total amount exceeding the 
$100,000 buyout provision in Paragraph 
11 is without question evidence of the 
partners' abandonment or modification of 
the Agreement, the Amendments as a 
whole are sufficiently in accord with 
Paragraph ll(g) to conclude otherwise. 
Thus, the Amendments alone do not create 
a snflicient basis for this Court to 
determine that Paragraph 11 of the 
Agreement has been modified or waived 
by the partners' conduct. Finally, there is 
no evidence to suggest that Oscar B. owed 
the partnership any amount of money due 
to an overdraft in his capital account, 
whereas here, according to Defendant, 
Maurice has an overdraft of $261,321 (see 
O 2006 Thomson~West. No 
supra note 13). 
FN33. This Court need not address 
Plaintiffs' equitable estoppel argument as 
Plaintiffs have failed to establish a "course 
of conduct" modifying or waiving 
Paragraph 11 of the Agreement. 
Nonetheless, this Court directs the parties' 
attention to Paragraph 2 of the Agreement, 
which nullifies Plaintiffs' equitable 
estoppel argument. In accordance with the 
language of Paragraph 2 of the Agreement, 
Maurice was hlly capable of dissolving 
the Partnership during his lifetime, but 
chose not to do so. (Wilkinson Aff. 7 2, 
Ex. A at 2.) 
Similarly, this Court need not address 
Plaintiffs' argument that the partners' 
failure to purchase $100,000 life insurance 
policies, as required by the Agreement, 
demonstmtes that the partners chose to 
ignore (i.e., "modify") the fixed-price 
buyout provision from the inception of the 
partnership. 
*9 The parties' arguments aside, the language of the 
Agreement is clear-at the time the parties entered 
the Agreement, they intended for the partnership to 
continue in the event of the death or retirement of a 
party, and constructed Paragmph 11 with this 
intention. 
Maurice signed each separate and specific 
Amendment to Paragraph 11, allocating a different 
buyout amount to that specific partner, in 
accordance with section (g). Therefore, Maurice 
was well aware of the provision, and there is no 
evidence that he ever wished to alter it for himself. 
As noted by Defendant, Maurice was diagnosed 
with terminal cancer more than a year before his 
death. The lack of evidence indicating a desire on 
his part to change the buyout provision in the face 
of impending death is telling. There is no evidence 
supporting Plaintiffs' assertion. 
In contrast, Plaintiffs' (Maurice's wife and daughter) 
dissatisfaction with Paragraph 11's buyout provision 
is apparent but the Agreement provides no solace. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Maurice willingly 
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agreed to, and followed, the tenets of the 
Agreement, including Paragraph 11, for over 40 
years. Yet, in seeking a monetary gain that was 
never contemplated by the parties to the Agreement, 
Plaintiffs would have this Court controvert the 
intention of the parties. FN34 The clear intention of 
the parties to the Agreement was for the partnership 
business to continue, regardless of the inevitable 
changes to the status of the parties to the 
Agreement. As Defendant notes, "[alt no time 
during his life did either Maurice or I take any steps 
to invalidate the Agreement. On the contrary, we 
were both fully aware of its terms and obligations 
and were in full agreement with the same." (Saniel 
Cert. 7 11.) 
FN34. Plaintiffs allege that the other 
partners received "fair value" for their 
partnership interests, but present no 
evidence to support these allegations. 
(Am.Comp1.f 15.) For example, Plaintiffs 
allege that Oscar was paid "his 
proportional share of what was then 
perceived as the fair value of LJM and 
which was greater than the $100,000 set 
foah in the Agreement." (Am.Compl.7 
15.) Plaintiffs also allege that Oscar B.'s 
estate "did receive a payout that was 
estimated to be consistent with the 
perceived fair value of the business at that 
point in time, which was substantially 
more than the $100,000 set forth in the 
Agreement." (Am.Compl.7 15.) 
For the reasons discussed above, this Court fmds 
that Defendant has carried his burden, as the 
moving party, and demonstrated that there is no 
genuine issue as to a material fact for the jury to 
resolve with respect to whether the parties modified 
or waived Paragraph 11 by their "course of conduct. 
" Plaintiffs have failed to point to anything in the 
factual record that creates a genuine, issue of 
material fact as to the existence of a "course of 
conduct" modifying or waiving Paragraph 11. 
Additionally, as a matter of law, "course of conduct" 
is not the critical factor for this Court's 
consideration in this instance. Defendant is entitled 
to summary judgment as a matter of law on Count 
Three of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56. 
2. Scope of the Buyout Provision 
LJM's principal place of business is located on 
Leliart's Lane in Elmwood Park, New Jersey, on 
property owned by the partnership. The LJM office 
and warehouse facility is located on one parcel, and 
the vacant parcel adjacent to the ofice is used as 
parking facilities for the business' trucks. (Pls.' 
Statement 21; Wilkinson Aff. 77 19-21, Ex. R; 
Def.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 8.) 
*10 Count Two of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
alleges that "the $100,000 purchase price set forth 
in Paragraph 11 applies by its terms only to a 
deceased partner's interest in the 'partnership 
business,' and not to the underlying real estate 
holdings of LJM." (Am.Compl.7 30.) Plaintiffs 
further allege that historically, the partners have 
treated the partnership business as a separate and 
distinct asset from the underlying real estate, 
because they sought to sell the business separate 
from the real estate before Maurice's death. 
(Am.Compl.7 30.) Finally, Plaintiffs allege that 
even if the Court fmds that the $100,000 buyout 
provision is enforceable with respect to the 
partnership business, they "are entitled to recover 
one-half of the fair value of the ipartnership's] 
underlying real estate as of February 13, 2003." 
(Am.Compl.7 3 1 .) 
a. Language of the Agreement 
In accordance with the general principles of 
contract interpretation, the express language of the 
Agreement must be examined. The "WITNESSETH 
" section of the Agreement states, in pertinent part: 
WHEREAS, it is the desire of the parties hereto to 
enter into the within agreement so that the business 
and affairs of the partnership shall be managed and 
directed under a definite and fixed policy and to 
secure a union of the interests of the parties hereto, 
in and to the said business of the partnership, and 
that the interests of the parties hereto may be best 
sewed; and 
O 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Slip Copy 
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 831 10 (D.N.J.) 
(Cite as: Slip Copy) 
WHEREAS, it is the desire of the parties hereto to 
M e r  provide for certain eventualities that may 
occur in the event of the death of any of the parties 
hereto. 
(Wilkinson Aff. 7 2, Ex. A at I.) 
Paragraph 7 of the Agreement ("Management 
Duties and Restrictions") states in relevant part: 
None of the parties shall, except with the consent of 
the other parties, assign, mortgage or sell his share 
in the partnership, or in its capital assets, or 
property, or enter into any agreement as a result of 
which any person shall become interested with him 
in the partnership, or do any act detrimental to the 
best interests of the partnership, or which would 
make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business 
of the partnership. 
(Wilkinson Aff. 7 2, Ex. A at 4.) 
Page 17 of 20 
Page 16 
In the 1967 written Amendment (created for Oscar's 
retirement from the partnership), Oscar specifically 
agreed "to execute simnltaneously with this 
Agreement, an Assignment or Assignments of any 
and all assets of the Partnership which shall require 
a separate assignment for transfer and this 
Agreement shall likewise amount to a transfer of 
these assets." (Wilkinson Aff. 7 4, Ex. C at 2; see 
also Def!s Ex. C.) Oscar M e r  agreed that: 
p ] e  will, from time to time, execute, if necessaty, 
any assignment for such item or items which may 
have inadvertently been excluded from this 
Agreement and from the separate assignments 
executed at this time-namely: 
... 
4. Property on Leliart's Lane, East Paterson, New 
Jersey, as described in Deed dated April 5th, 1967, 
from James Culee and Dorothy Curlee, his wife, 
and recorded on April 6th, 1967 in Book 5029, 
page 430, in the Office of the Bergen County Clerk. 
.... 
Paragraph 11 of the Agreement states in relevant 
part: (Wilkinson Aff. 7 4, Ex. C at 2-3; see also Def.'s 
In the event of the death of any of the parties hereto, Ex. C.) 
during the term of this agreement and the 
continuance of the partnership, the surviving parties Similarly, Oscar B!s 1990 written Amendment to 
shall purchase from the estate of such deceased the Agreement transferred "any interest [his estate] 
party, and the estate of such deceased party shall might have in the partnership and the partnership 
sell to the surviving parties, the interest of such assets to Maurice L. Laplace and Saniel Laplace," 
deceased party in and to the partnership business, at and released any interest or claims of his estate. 
a price and under terms and conditions as (Wilkinson Aff. 77, Ex. Fat 7 I.) 
hereinafter provided for: 
a) Notwithstanding any value of the capital account, 
or the value of the capital account plus accrued 2. RUPA's Defnition of Partnership Interest 
profits to the date of death of such deceased paxty, 
as same may be reflected by the hooks of the RUPA defmes "lplartnership interest" or "partner's 
partnership, the surviving parties shall pay to the interest in the partnership" to mean "all of a 
estate of the deceased party, and the estate of the partner's interests in the partnership, including the 
[sic] deceased party shall accept as payment in fdl partner's transferable interest and all management 
and as the purchase price for such deceased party's and other rights." N.J. Stat. Ann.. 5 42:lA-2 (2005). 
interest in the partnership, the sum of $100,000.00, Under the statute, "[plroperty" means "all property, 
subject to the adjustment hereinafter provided [as real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or 
set forth in 1 l(h) I.... any interest therein." Id. RUPA specifically states 
that "lplroperty is partnership property if acquired 
*I1 (Wilkinson Aff. 7 2, Ex. A at 5-6.) in the name of ... the partnership ...? N.J. Stat. Ann.. 
5 42:lA-12(a)(l) (2005). It is undisputed that the 
1967 deed transferred to the partnership real estate 
1. Amendments to the Agreement from James and Dorothy Curlee to Oscar, Maurice, 
Oscar B., and Saniel Laplace as a, "Partnership 
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trading under the name of L.J. & M. Laplace" (e.g., 
the deed was executed in the name of the 
partnership). ( W i h s o n  Aff. 7 19, Ex. R.) 
b. The Partnership's Underlying Real Estate 
The parties do not dispute that the partnership's 
underlying real estate at Leliart's Lane houses the 
partnership warehouse, offices, and parking 
facilities for its trucks. (Def!s Br. in Supp. of Mot. 
for Summ. J. 8.) They also do not dispute that the 
property is, and was, actually used in the operation 
of the business. (Def!s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for 
Summ. J. 8.) Defendaut argues that the property is 
partnership property because: (1) it was acquired in 
the name of the partnership; and (2) property 
acquired in the name of a partnership is considered 
partnership property under RUPA. In addition, 
Defendant argues that if the parties had intended for 
the underlying real estate to be excluded from a " 
party's interest in the partnership," they would have 
memorialized their intention in the Agreement. 
(Def!s Br. in Opp'n to Pls! Mot. for Partial Summ. 
J. 16.) 
*12 Plaintiffs do not dispute that the partnership's 
underlying real estate would likely be considered " 
partnership property" under RUPA. (Pis! Br. in 
Supp. of Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 33; Pls.' Reply 
Br. 9.) Instead, Plaintiffs argue that this fact is 
irrelevant because the partners were still free to 
decide to separate the value of the property from the 
value of the operating business, for the purposes of 
the buyout provision (e.g., "defme the buyout 
however they wished"). (Pls! Br. in Supp. of Mot. 
for Partial Summ. J. 33-34; Pls! Reply Br. 9.) In 
addition, Plaintiffs argue that RUPA sheds no light 
on this issue because the statute does not defme the 
term "partnership business," and the term " 
partnership interest" was not defmed by the statute 
when the Agreement was signed. (Pls! Br. in Supp. 
of Mot. for Partial S m  J. 31, n. 8.) 
Plaintiffs further argue that even if the buyout 
provision is held enforceable, it would apply only to 
LJM's operating business and not its underlying real 
estate because the buyout provision refers to the " 
partnership business," not to all of the "partnership 
property." (Pls.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial 
Summ. J. 30-31.) In sum, Plaintiffs argue that 
because the term "partnership business" is not 
specifically defined in the Agreement, the 
contractual language of the Agreement limits the 
$100,000 buyout price to a deceased partner's 
interest in the operating business of LJM, as distinct 
from the underlying real estate. (Pls! Br. in Supp. of 
Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 31; Pls.' Reply Br. 9.) 
At the very least, Plaintiffs argue that this Court 
should consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' " 
course of conduct" in determining the Agreement's 
true meaning and intention. (Pls! Br. in Supp. of 
Mot. for Partial S m .  J. 32.) Specifically, 
Plaintiffs assert that the parties' "course of conduct" 
conclusively demonstrates that they regarded the 
operating business of LJM as an asset separate from 
the underlying real estate, because prior to 
Maurice's death, Saniel and Maurice took steps to 
market the operating business separate from the real 
estate (e.g., the property was listed with a real estate 
broker). (Pls.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial 
Summ. J. 32-33.) Plaintiffs argue that the parties' 
treatment of the operating business and the real 
estate as separate assets prior to Maurice's death, 
and Defendant's continued separate treatment of 
those assets after Maurice's death, conclusively 
show that the "partnership business" in Paragraph 
11 of the Agreement was intended to encompass 
only the operating business, and not the underlying 
real estate. (Pls! Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial 
Summ. J. 33.) 
In response, Defendant argues that real estate in the 
name of a partnership is generally regarded as 
personal property of the partnership, and 
furthermore, that if the real estate was intended to 
be excluded from the buyout purchase price, there 
would have been a clear indication in the 
Agreement. (Def!s Br. in Opp'n to Pis.' Mot. for 
Partial Summ. J. 16.) Defendant also argues that 
there is nothing in the law or the Agreement which 
prevented the partners from selling an asset of the 
partnership independent of the partnership as a 
whole, at any time, and that this proposition does 
not amount to proof that the partners did not intend 
for the Agreement to govern all of the partnership's 
assets. (Def!s Br. in Opp'n to Pls! Mot., for Partial 
I Claim to Ori~ .  U.S. Govt Works. 
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Summ. J. 18.) Defendant further argues that 
RUPA's definition of partnership interest would 
include the underlying real estate of the partnership. 
@ef.'s Br. in Opph to Pls! Mot. for Partial Summ. 
J. 17.) 
*13 Finally, Defendant points to the buyout 
agreements made with Oscar and Oscar B., which 
both clearly reference Paragraph 11 or 12 of the 
Agreement, and discuss the buyout of the entire 
partnership interest with no distinction for the 
partnership's underlying real estate. (Def!s Br. in 
Opp'n to Pls.' Mot. for Partial Summ. J. 17.) 
Defendant notes that Oscar's retirement agreement 
specifically assigned all of the property listed. 
@ef!s Br. in Opp'n to Pls! Mot. for Partial Summ. 
J. 17; Wilkinson Aff. 1[ 4, Ex. C; see also Dcf!s 
Ex. C.) 
The express language of the Agreement as outlined 
above, demonstrates the parties' intention to create a 
partnership that would: (1) survive the eventual 
death of the parties to the Agreement; and (2) serve 
the best interests of the partnership. In light of the 
parties' specific intentions, a plain reading of the 
Agreement results in a "party's interest in the 
partnership," as including the partnership's 
underlying real estate. Therefore, the term " 
partnership business," as used in the buyout 
provision in Paragraph Il(a), incorporates both 
LJM's operating business and underlying real estate. 
M35 
FN35. The parties are correct in stating 
that the Agreement does not defme " 
partnership business" or "party's interest in 
the partnership." In light of section 4(a) of 
RUPA, to the extent that the Agreement 
does not otherwise provide, RUPA 
govems the relations of the partners. Here, 
the Agreement did not define the meaning 
of a partner's interest in the partnership. 
Thus, RUPA's d e f ~ t i o n  of "partnership 
interest" or "partner's interest in the 
partnership" would apply to the 
Agreement. In accordance with the statute, 
Paragraph 11's buyout provision would 
encompass "all of a paxtner's interests in 
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the partnership, including the partner's 
transferable interest and all management 
and other rights." N.J. Stat. Ann.. 8 
42:lA-2 (2005). Thus, the statute affirms 
Defendant's argument that there should be 
no distinction between the partnership's 
operating business and underlying real 
estate. 
In addition, the 1967 and 1990 Amendments lend 
further support to Defendant's argument that the 
parties' intention was to include the partnership's 
operating business and underlying real estate withim 
a "party's interest in the partnership." Both 
Amendments transferred any interest the departing 
partners or their estates may have had, to the 
remaining partners. The 1967 Amendment 
specifically assigned the rights to the property at 
Leilart's Lane to Maurice, Saniel, and Oscar B. 
Laplace "as the Continuing Partners." (WiEnson 
Aff. 1[ 4, Ex. C; see also Def!s Ex. C.) 
For the reasons discussed above, this Court fmds 
that Defendant has carried his burden as the moving 
party and demonstrated that there is no genuine 
issue as to a material fact for the jury to resolve 
with respect to the scope of the buyout provision. 
Plaintiffs have failed to point to anything in the 
factual record that creates a genuine issue as to a 
material fact regarding whether the terms " 
partnership business," as used in Paragraph I l(a) or 
a "party's interest in the partnership" distinguish 
between the partnership's operating business and 
underlying real estate. Defendant is entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law on Count 
Two of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment is appropriate where the 
moving party establishes that "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c). On August 26, 2005, Magistrate Judge 
Haneke issued a R & R, pusuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
72(b) and L. Civ. R. 72.1(a)(2). A magistrate 
judge's recommended disposition of a dispositive 
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motion is subject to de novo review. In re U.S. 
Healthcare, 159 F.3d 142, 145-46 (3d Cir.1998); 
Temptations, Inc. v. Wager, 26 F.Supp.2d 740, 743 
(D.N.J.1998). After de novo review of Magistrate 
Judge Haneke's R & R, the subsequent objections of 
the parties, and their submissions, this Court fmds: 
*14 (1) Defendant has carried his burden as the 
moving party and demonstrated that there is no 
genuine issue as to a material fact for the jury to 
resolve with respect to the applicability of RUPA to 
the buyout provision in Paragraph 11 of the 
Agreement. Thus, this Court grants Defendant 
summary judgment on Count One of Plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint; 
(2) Defendant has carried his burden as the moving 
party and demonstrated that there is no genuine 
issue as to a material fact for the jury to resolve 
with respect to whether the parties modified or 
waived Paragraph 11 by their "course of conduct." 
Thus, this Court grants Defendant summary 
judgment on Count Three of Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint; and 
(3) Defendant has carried his burden as the moving 
party and demonstrated that there is no genuine 
issue as to a material fact for the jury to resolve 
with respect to the scope of the buyout provision. 
Thus, this Court grants Defendant summary 
judgment on Count Two of Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint. 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment is granted, and Plaintiffs' 
motion for partial summary judgment is denied. 
Laplace v. Laplace 
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Attorneys for PlaintifWCounterDefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED 
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Defendant. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM - 1 
$4 
Case No. CV OC 040821913 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED 
CARE, INC.'S AND SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, INC.'S ANSWER TO 
AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM 
VS. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; 
SAINTALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
CounterDefendants. I 
MRI . ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third-Party Plaintiff I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
PlaintiWCounterDefendants Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. ("Diversified Care") 
and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. ("Saint Alphonsus"), through their counsel, 
and in answer to MRI Associates LLP's ("MRIA") Amended Counterclaim hereby admit, deny 
and affirmatively allege as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1 .  MRIA's claim, and each and every separate cause of action and count therein, 
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against either Saint Alphonsus or 
Diversified Care. 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM - 2 
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SECOND DEFENSE 
2. Each and every allegation contained in MRIA's Amended Counterclaim not 
herein specifically and expressly admitted is hereby denied. 
3. In answer to paragraph 1 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care state only that Diversified Care is the same entity as Saint Alphonsus Magnetic 
Resonance, Inc. Saint Alphonsus Magnetic Resonance, Inc. changed its name to Saint 
Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. in July of 1987. All other allegations contained in paragraph 1 
are denied. 
4. In Answer to paragraph 2 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care state that Diversified Care is an Idaho non-profit corporation. Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center is the sole member of Diversified Care. Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations of paragraph 2. 
5. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care admit the allegations contained in 
paragraph 3 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
6 .  In answer to paragraph 4 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that Gem State Radiology, LLP is an Idaho limited liability partnership 
which is engaged in the business of providing professional medical services. Saint Alphonsus 
and Diversified Care are without sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the 
allegations contained therein and, therefore, deny the same. 
7. In answer to paragraph 5 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP is an Idaho limited liability 
partnership but is without sufficient information to admit or deny the remainder of the allegations 
contained therein and, therefore, denies the same. 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM - 3 
8. In answer to paragraph 6 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained 
therein and, therefore, deny the same. 
9. In answer to paragraph 7 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that MRI Associates LLP is now an Idaho limited liability partnership. 
MRI Associates LLP is the general partner of MRI Limited Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited 
Partnership. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations of 
paragraph 7. 
10. In answer to paragraph 8 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care note that MRI Associates alleged in its original Counterclaim that the initial 
vision of the partnership was to provide magnetic resonance technology in a "non-competitive 
approach" and MRI Associates now alleges the vision was to provide MRJ services in a 
"collaborative approach." The fact that MRI Associates wanted to provide MRI services in a 
non-competitive approach is material to the fact that MRI Associates is not a proper antitrust 
plaintiff and does not have legal standing to raise antitrust allegations. Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that its goal, in the interest of patient care, has been to integrate the 
provision of the technical and professional components of MRI technology to advance the 
quality of patient care. 
In further answer to paragraph 8 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care state that Saint Alphonsus became interested in MRI technology as early as 
1982. In the Spring of 1984, Saint Alphonsus unquestionably wanted MRI technology on its 
campus. At the time, MRI technology's principal proven application related to neurosciences. 
Saint Alphonsus' goal in bring the technology to Boise, Idaho was to maintain saint Alphonsus' 
role as the regional diagnostic center of choice, to maintain its leadership position in 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM - 4 
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neurosciences and to meet the needs of the community for high quality state of the art care. In 
the year 1984, Saint Alphonsus worked to find the best model for making the technology 
available to its patients. Options included owning the technology outright without partners, 
having hospital only partners, having outside investors who were not physicians and having 
outside investors who were physicians. Saint Alphonsus had little doubt that the technology was 
going to be successful. At the same time, Saint Alphonsus was investigating becoming involved 
in the technology, St. Luke's Regional Medical Center was also actively trying to bring the 
technology to Boise, Idaho. For-profit investors were also considering establishing freestanding 
centers. Saint Alphonsus discussed jointly bringing the technology to Boise with St. Luke's. St. 
Luke's, however, would not agree to participate on terms proposed and chose to establish its own 
MRI services. Early indications at Saint Alphonsus indicated that the MRI technology would be 
quite profitable. There was, in the year 1984, a high level of interest among members of the 
Saint Alphonsus medical community regarding participation in such a venture. Saint Alphonsus 
ultimately decided to joint venture the technology with neuroscience physicians (who would 
have specific knowledge regarding the applications of the technology and would be using the 
technology for their patients) and with other hospitals. Except as stated herein, Saint Alphonsus 
and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations of paragraph 8 of the Amended 
Counterclaim. 
11. In answer to paragraph 9 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus 
incorporates its response to paragraph 8 above and except as specifically admitted therein, denies 
the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
12. In answer to paragraph 10 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit the Articles of Partnership were signed effective April 26, 1985. Saint 
Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny that the only purpose of MRIA was to operate a magnetic 
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resonance scanning facility on Saint Alphonsus' campus. Saint Alphonsus, in fact, wanted to 
limit the purpose of the partnership to form a single limited partnership to operate an MRI 
service and proposed language to this effect. Attorneys representing the physicians rejected this 
request and insisted on having a more broad statement of purposes. The result was that the 
purpose of the partnership remained broad and included being able to own and operate any kind 
of diagnostic device (not just MRI) and own and operate any kind of therapeutic device. Saint 
Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny that the purpose or term of MRIA cah be inferred from 
language in a separate building lease agreement. The building lease agreement was between 
Saint Alphonsus Building Company, Inc. and M N  Limited Partnership, two non-parties to this 
litigation and nonparties to the MNA Articles of Partnership. The lease related to only one of a 
broad range of permitted activities. The fact that MRIA had a broad purpose is evidenced by 
MRIA's creation of M N  Mobile and expansion to multiple hospitals throughout the 
Intermountain West. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care further deny the remainder of the 
allegations of paragraph 10. 
13. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care admit the language of the Ground Lease but 
deny the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 11 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
14. In answer to paragraph 12 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that the term of the Ground Lease ran from October 1, 1985 to December 
31, 2015. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny that the operation of MRI Center was the 
only operational project contemplated by the original partners of MRIA as Saint Alphonsus 
attempted to specifically limit the purpose of MRIA to such purpose and the physicians who 
made up DMR rejected Saint Alphonsus' request. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care 
specifically deny the lease term was later extended by "Saint Alphonsus and the MRI Board." 
Neither Saint Alphonsus nor MRIA were parties to the Ground Lease and, therefore, would not 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM - 6 
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have the power to modify the Ground Lease. Further, the Ground Lease specifically provided 
that it could be amended only by a written document signed by the parties to the Ground Lease 
and no such extension was entered. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of 
the allegations of paragraph 12. 
15. In answer to paragraph 13 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit the terms of Article 6.1 of the Articles of Partnership of MRIA. Saint 
Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny that Article 6.1 acted as a limitation of Diversified Care's 
statutory right to cause a liquidation or to dissociate from the partnership. Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations of paragraph 13. 
16. In answer to paragraph 14 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care deny the allegations contained therein. 
17. In answer to paragraph 15 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit the two limited partnerships of which MRIA was general partner 
flourished financially. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care note that MRIA has dropped from 
the Amended Counterclaim the factual statement that MRI Mobile was formed to expand the 
delivery of MRI services to hospitals throughout rural Idaho and the Intermountain West and that 
MRI Mobile now serves 34 hospitals and runs mobile units through the Intermountain West. 
MRIA presumably dropped this allegation because they now seek to define a narrow market for 
MRI services for antitrust purposes and seek to argue MRIA existed for a specific limited 
purpose. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations of 
paragraph 15 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
18. In answer to paragraph 16 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that SARGJGSR provided the "professional" component of the medical 
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imaging services provided by MRI Center. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the 
reminder of the allegations of paragraph 16. 
19. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
20. In answer to paragraph 19 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that SARGIGSR earned fees for the professional services for reading 
MRI scans obtained at MRI Center. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care admit that 
SARGIGSR did establish its own independent medical imaging center and that center began 
operations in 1999. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations 
of paragraph 19. 
21. In answer to paragraph 20 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that Sandra Bruce became the CEO of Saint Alphonsus in January of 
1997. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations contained in 
paragraph 20. 
22. In answer to paragraph 21 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that in the summer of 1998, Dave Giles and one or more other 
representatives of SARGIGSR visited Sandra Bruce's office and told her that SARGIGSR was 
going to build an independent freestanding medical imaging center in downtown Boise and had 
already acquired the real estate to do so. Saint Alphonsus thereafter requested that if 
SARGIGSR was going to go ahead with the downtown center, that Saint Alphonsus be allowed 
to be a participant in that center. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care also admit that the 
formation of "Integrated Delivery Networks" was a frequent topic of discussion in the health 
care industry as a whole during this time frame and at Saint Alphonsus as well. Saint Alphonsus 
denies, however, that the motivation for the creation of the downtown imaging center was related 
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to Saint Alphonsus' desire to be a part of Integrated Delivery Networks. Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 21 of the 
Amended Counterclaim. 
23. In answer to paragraph 22 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that Dr. David Giles was an owner of DMR and a member of the Board 
of Partners of MRIA. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care further admit that at the same time 
Dr. Giles was an owner of DMR and a member of the Board of Partners of MRIA, he was also 
sewing as president of SARG/GSR and he was participating in SARG/GSR's planning of the 
downtown imaging center. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care were not involved in the 
planning of the downtown center. Dr. Giles later told Saint Alphonsus that he did not want his 
participation in planning the downtown imaging center known to MRIA. After being told by Dr. 
Giles in August of 1998 that SARG/GSR had already planned to open the downtown imaging 
center, Saint Alphonsus indicated that it would like to participate with SARG/GSR in the 
downtown imaging center. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the 
allegations of paragraph 22 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
24. In answer to paragraph 23 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that at the October 22, 1998 meeting of the Board of Partners of MRIA, 
representatives of SARG/GSR were present and announced that SARG/GSR planned to open a 
downtown imaging center. At that board meeting, Sandra Bruce disclosed that Saint Alphonsus 
planned to negotiate with SARG/GSR to allow Saint Alphonsus to be a part of that center. 
Sandra Bruce also stated that Saint Alphonsus supported MRIA negotiating with SARG/GSR to 
allow MRI Center to provide magnetic resonance imaging coverage for the downtown imaging 
center. A motion was made and approved to establish a committee to conduct MRIA's 
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negotiations. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations 
contained in paragraph 23. 
25. In answer to paragraphs 24 through 26 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint 
Alphonsus and Diversified Care admit that Saint Alphonsus actively and in good faith supported 
SARGIGSR and MRIA in reaching an agreement as to how MRI services would be provided by 
the two entities. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of allegations of said 
paragraphs. 
26. In answer to paragraph 27 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that in late 1999, MRIA asked Sandra Bruce to meet with SARWGSR as 
MRIA had not been able to reach an agreement with SARGIGSR regarding the provision of MRI 
services at the downtown site. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care admit that MRIA wanted 
Saint Alphonsus to threaten SARGIGSR with its exclusive contract to read radiology reports 
generated on the Saint Alphonsus campus in order to force SARGIGSR to agree to MRIA's 
demands. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations in 
paragraph 27 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
27. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph 
28 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
28. In answer to paragraph 29 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that as of July 1,2001, Diversified Care became a member of IMI's non- 
MRI operations. As of this time, IMI had been operating since late 1999. As a part of the IMI 
Operating Agreement by which Diversified Care became a member of the non-MRI portion of 
IMI's outpatient imaging business, Diversified Care and ICR agreed on a method by which 
Diversified Care could also participate in IMI's MRI operations in the event Saint Alphonsus 
was able to be a participant in an MRI business. At the time, Saint Alphonsus and Diversified 
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Care were in on-going and longstanding discussions with MRI Center to allow Saint Alphonsus 
to be involved in MRI operations. The remainder of the allegations of paragraph 29 are denied. 
29. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 30 and 3 1. 
30. In answer to paragraph 32, Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care are without 
sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained therein and, therefore, deny the 
same. 
31. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph 
33 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
32. In answer to paragraph 34, Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care admit that it 
executed an Operating Agreement effective July 1,2001 by which it became a member of IMI's 
non-MRI operations. Saint Alphonsus denies the remainder of the allegations contained therein. 
33. In answer to paragraphs 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39 of the Amended Counterclaim, 
Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care state that Saint Alphonsus entered into a relationship with 
IMI in July of 2001 for non-MRI portions of IMI's business. At this time, Saint Alphonsus still 
had the expectation that the on-going discussions between and amongst SARGIGSRIICR, MRIA 
and Saint Alphonsus would result in an amicable solution for all parties regarding the provision 
of MRI services. The remaining allegations in paragraphs 35,36,37,38 and 39 of the Amended 
Counterclaim are denied. 
34. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph 
40,41,42,43 and 44 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
35. In answer to paragraph 45 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Aiphonsus and 
Diversified Care admit that they made good faith efforts to purchase the assets of MRI Center. 
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Discussions were not successful due to no fault of Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care. Saint 
Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations contained in paragraph 45. 
36. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 46,47 and 48 of  the Amended Counterclaim. 
37. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care admit the allegations contained in 
paragraph 49 of  the Amended Complaint. 
38. In answer to paragraph SO of  the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care are without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained in 
paragraph 50 and, therefore, deny the same. 
39. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60,61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 and 71 o f  
the Amended Counterclaim. 
40. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph 
72,73,74,75,76 and 77 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
41. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 78 and 79 of  the Amended Counterclaim. 
42. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 80,81 and 82 of  the Amended Counterclaim. 
43. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 83,84 and 85 of  the Amended Counterclaim. 
44. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 86, 87,88,89,90 and 91 of  the Amended Counterclaim. 
45. In answer to paragraphs 92 through 97 of  the Amended Counterclaim, Saint 
Alphonsus and Diversified Care admit that Saint Alphonsus told MRI Center that it wanted MRI 
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Center to make plans not to use Saint Alphonsus' PACS system in the future and said it would 
give MRI Center a reasonable amount of time to make such plans. Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations in said paragraphs. 
46. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegation contained in paragraphs 
99 through 110 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
47. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 11 1 
through 1 15 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
48. Saint Alphonsus denies the allegations contained in paragraph 116 through 120 of 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
49. In answer to paragraphs 121 through 126 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint 
Alphonsus and Diversified Care admit MRI Center has requested Saint Alphonsus to allow MRI 
Center to use Saint Alphonsus' PACS system, but deny that this request was made in good faith. 
Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the allegations contained in said 
paragraphs. 
50. In answer to paragraphs 127 through 130 of the Amended Counterclaim, Saint 
Alphonsus and Diversified Care are without sufficient information to admit or deny the 
allegations contained therein and, therefore, deny the same. 
51. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in paragraph 
13 1 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
52. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care admit that Saint Alphonsus had a 
contractual partnership and relationship with MRIA and this relationship was known to 
SARGIGSR, ICR and IMI. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the remainder of the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 13 1 through 134 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
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53. In answer to paragraphs 135 through 140, Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care 
state the allegations are made with reference to other parties in this litigation and on that basis is 
without sufficient information to admit or deny the allegations contained therein and, therefore, 
deny the same. 
54. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 141 through 143 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
55. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 144 through 147 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
56. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 150 through 153 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
57. Saint Alphonsus aid Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 154 through 156 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
58. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care deny the allegations contained in 
paragraphs 157 through 160 of the Amended Counterclaim. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
59. MRIA by its own actions and statements is estopped to seek the relief claimed in 
the Amended Counterclaim. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
60. MRIA by its actions and statements has waived any right it had to seek the relief 
claimed in the Amended Counterclaim. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
61. MRIA is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands fiom seeking the relief claimed 
in the Amended Counterclaim. 
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FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
62. One or more partners of MRIA breached their fiduciary obligations of the 
partnership which MRIA refused to enforce and MRIA is thereby estopped to assert relief 
against Saint Alphonsus or Diversified Care. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
63. MRIA's Amended Counterclaim, or portions thereof, are barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
64. MRIA's Amended Counterclaim, or portions thereof, are barred by the doctrine of 
laches. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
65. MRIA breached duties owed to the partnership and otherwise violated the MRIA 
Articles of the Partnership. MRIA's breaches excuse any alleged breach by Diversified Care of 
the Articles of Partnership. In asserting this defense, any alleged breach of Diversified Care is 
specifically denied. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
66. MRIA's claims are barred because MRIA has not suffered an antitrust injury. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
67. MRIA's claims are barred because MRIA lacks standing to bring or maintain this 
action for reasons including, but not limited to, the fact that the alleged injuries are not the type 
addressed by the laws under which MRIA attempts to state their claims. 
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TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
68. MRIA's claims for damages are barred because their alleged damages are 
speculative and because of the impossibility of ascertaining and allocating those alleged 
damages. This is not an admission that MRIA has any damages. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
69. MRIA is barred from recovery of damages because of its failure to mitigate 
damages. 
TWELTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
70. MRIA's claims are barred because there is no causal relationship between 
MRIA's claimed injuries and damages and the alleged acts or omission of Saint Alphonsus and 
Diversified Care. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
71. MRIA's claims are barred in whole or in part because the Amended Counterclaim 
does not adequately define the relevant market or markets. 
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
72. MRIA's claims are barred in whole or in part because the alleged conduct has not 
unreasonably restrained trade. 
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
73. MRIA's claims are barred in whole or in part because the alleged conduct did not 
lessen competition in a relevant market. 
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
74. MRIA's claims are barred in whole or in part because any action or omission 
undertaken by Saint Alphonsus or Diversified Care alleged in the Amended Counterclaim 
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constituted bona fide business competition and was undertaken in pursuit of business interest and 
is therefore privileged. 
SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
75. MRIA's claims for defamation are barred by the qualified privilege for 
communication amongst parties with a common interest. 
EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
'76. MRIA's claims for defamation are barred because all statements attributed to 
Saint Alphonsus were made in good faith and reasonable belief of the truth of such statements. 
NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
77. Any claims regarding monopolization are barred because any party having an 
alleged monopoly was lawfully obtained. MRIA's claims are barred because all of Saint 
Alphonsus' alleged actions are within the scope of the common interest privilege. 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
In order to defend the Amended Counterclaim, Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care 
have been required to obtain the services of attorneys to represent them and in connection 
therewith, and have agreed to pay such attorney costs and attorney fees in defending the 
Counterclaim. Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to 
Idaho Code $12-120,$12-121 and I.R.C.P. Rule 54. 
PRAYER 
Therefore, CounterDefendants Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care pray for judgment 
on the Amended Counterclaim against MRIA as follows: 
1. That MRIA's Amended Counterclaim be dismissed with prejudice and that 
Defendant/CounterClaimant MRIA take nothing thereby. 
ANSWER TO AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM - 17 
2. That Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care be dismissed from the Amended 
Counterclaim with prejudice and that Saint Alphonsus and Diversified Care be awarded their 
costs and attorneys fees incurred in defending this action as plead above. 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper in the 
premises. 
of April, 2006. 
GJORDING & FOUSER. PLLC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
& 
I hereby certify that on the !& day of April, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated: 
Thomas A. Banducci - U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. e ress mail 
8 15 West Washington Street and delivery 
Boise, ID 83702 
-J
- facsimile 
Warren E. Jones - U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
Joseph H. Uberuaga e ress mail 
EBERLE BERLIN KADING TURNBOW - and delivery 
McKLVEEN & JONES 
2 
- facsimile 
300 N. 6" Street, 2nd Floor 
Boise, ID 83702 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, Case No. CVOC 0408219D 
INC., an ldaho nonprofit corporation, 
II Plaintiff, I 
VS. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an ldaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Defendant. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an ldaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Counterclaimant, 
VS. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
MOTIONS TO COMPEL, MOTION TO 
QUASH SUBPOENAS AND MOTION 
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE 
INC., an ldaho nonprofit corporation; 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER, 
II CounterDefendants, I 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an ldaho limited 
liability partnership, 
II Third Party Plaintiff, I 
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-LC, and ldaho limited liability company; 
3EM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an ldaho 
imited liability partnership; and IMAGING 
:ENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an ldaho 
imited liability partnership, 
Third Party Defendants. 
APPEARANCES 
Plaintiffs: Jack S. Gjording and Trudy Hanson Fouser of Gjording & Fouser 
and Patrick J. Miller of Givens Pursley LLP for Saint Alphonsus 
Diversified Care, Inc. and Counterdefendant Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center 
Defendants: Thomas A. Banducci and G. Rey Reinhardt, IV of Greener, 
Banducci, Shoemaker, P.A. for Defendantlcounterclaimant MRI 
Associates, LLP 
PROCEEDINGS 
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Compel 
3O(b)(6) Deposition of SARMC; Motion to Compel Production of Discovery After April 1, 
!004; Motion to Compel Deposition Responses by Sandra Bruce, Motion to Compel 
:ontinuation of Deposition of Sandra Bruce; and the Third-Party Defendants' Motion to 
h a s h  Subpoenas issued to ICR, GSR, and IMI or for a Protective Order. 
BACKGROUND 
This litigation originally stemmed from Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care's 
"SADC) dissociation from an ldaho limited liability partnership, MRI Associates, LLP 
"MRIA). SADC filed an action against MRIA to determine the buyout terms of its 
lissociation under ldaho law. In turn, MRIA filed a counterclaim against SADC and 
jADC's parent, Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center ("SARMC") (collectively 
Saint Alphonsus") alleging breach of contract and wrongful dissociation, breach of 
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fiduciary duty, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Both 
the Plaintiffs Complaint and the Defendant's Counterclaim sought declaratory relief and 
money damages. 
The Defendant filed its First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint 
on March 7, 2006, which significantly expanded this litigation. To accommodate the 
new parties and claims, the Court issued an Amended Scheduling Order on March 20, 
2006. Discovery is ongoing under this Scheduling Order. The Defendants have filed 
four (4) motions to compel seeking more comprehensive deposition answers from 
SARMC; documents from Saint Alphonsus created, sent, or received after April 1, 2004 
(the date of SADC's dissociation from MRIA); and a continued deposition with more 
comprehensive answers from Ms. Sandra Bruce, the CEO of SARMC. The new Third- 
Party Defendants Gem State Radiology, LLP ("GSR"), Imaging Center Radiology, LLP 
("ICR"), and Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC ("IMI") seek a protective order from 
this Court limiting the discovery sought from these entities and delaying noticed 
depositions. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Generally, any relevant, non-privileged information that is reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is discoverable. I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l). 
Whether to grant a motion to compel is within the sound discretion of this Court. See 
generally Merrifield v. Arave, 128 Idaho 306,912 P.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1996). A trial court 
acts within its discretion if: ( I )  the court correctly perceives that the issue was one of 
discretion; (2) the court acts within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; 
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and (3) it reaches its decision by an exercise of reason. Clark v. Klein, 137 ldaho 154, 
DISCUSSION 
A. MRIA's Motion to Compel 30(b)(6) Deposition of SARMC 
The Defendant, as alleged in its spoliation claim, believes that Saint Alphonsus 
intentionally did not keep records of or destroyed certain records pertaining to this 
litigation. The Defendant has sought e-mail correspondence and other electronic 
records pertaining to the subject matter of this suit from 2004 through 2005 and it 
alleges that there are unexplained gaps in the discovery produced. To support its 
spoliation claim, MRlA filed a notice of deposition seeking a deposition of SARMC 
under ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) on the following topics: 
1. Any records retention policy, procedure andlor practice at SARMC 
from January 1995 to present regarding the retention, storage 
andlor destruction of electronic and paper documents; 
2. The process followed by SARMC in order to gather and produce 
both hard-copy and electronic documents responsive to the 
requests for production sewed on SARMC in this litigation; 
3. Any efforts to place a litigation hold on documents associated with 
this litigation including when such a hold was put into effect, how 
the hold was implemented by SARMC, and the breadth of the 
litigation hold; and 
4. SARMC's destruction, whether intentional or inadvertent, of any 
hard copy or electronic documents responsive to the requests for 
production sewed on SARMC in this litigation. 
See Memorandum in Support of MRI Associates' Motion to Compel 30(b)(6) Deposition 
>f SARMC. 
SARMC's representative at the deposition was Ms. Leslie Kelly Hall, the former 
illEMORANDUM DECISION - CASE NO. CVOC0408219D - PAGE 4 
chief information officer of SARMC, who was employed during the period from which 
the above information is sought. Ms. Hall handled the information technology 
department of SARMC. At the deposition, counsel for SARMC advised opposing 
counsel that Ms. Hall was prepared to testiv as to the first topic, but not the second or 
third, and only as to her personal knowledge or her acts regarding the fourth topic. 
Affidavit of G.Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRI Associates' Motion to Compel 30(b)(6) 
Deposition of SARMC ("30(b)(6) Aff."), Exhibit C at 6:18 - 25. As explained more fully 
below, Ms. Hall was not available questioning on the second and third topics because 
she had no personal knowledge of either topic. 
Generally, Ms. Hall testified that: 1) SARMC had no written policy regarding 
retention of non-medical electronic documents for the time frame requested1; 2) there 
was no written policy regarding archiving, deleting, or backing up e-mails, although 
instructions were available on how to retain e-mail records if the employee chose to do 
so; 3) retention of e-mails for the time period sought were at the individual employee's 
discretion; and 4) although individual drives are backed up, the information on each 
individual's drive was automatically deleted every 90 days. Ms. Hall also stated that the 
policy of automatically deleting individual drives was discontinued after in-house 
:ounsel asked them in September 2005 to retain all documents related to the present 
itigation. Finally, she testified that she had no knowledge of SARMC's retention policy 
lor hard-copy documents. 
At the conclusion of Ms. Hall's deposition, counsel for MRlA stated that the 
I Ms. Hall explained that the only documents-medical or otherwise-for which SARMC had a written 
storage policy were those that were subject to federal, state, or local regulation (i.e. financial records, 
?mployment records, etc.). 
iOEMORANDUM DECISION -CASE NO. CVOC0408219D - PAGE 5 
deposition should be left open due to information sought by MRlA but not addressed in 
Ms. Hall's deposition. The Defendant later filed for a continuance of that deposition 
seeking information on all four (4) prior topics, plus: 
I. Past advice given to, andlor the knowledge of, SARMC regarding the 
need to preserve documents relevant to any potential or ongoing litigation; 
2. The actual preservation of documents by SARMC in past cases for 
purposes of potential or actual litigation; and 
3. The content of any destroyed documents relevant to this litigation. 
Notice of Continuation of Taking 30(b)(6) Deposition of Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center Duces Tecum at 3. In response to the notice of continuation, SARMC 
stated: 
p]here isn't any person at SARMC that was in charge of gathering 
documents pertaining to this case. That process was undertaken 
by counsel. While SARMC has people who can explain how 
financial documents and medical records are kept, maintained and 
retrieved, there is no person who is in charge of maintaining the 
type of documents that pertain to this case. Thus, we do not have 
anyone who can respond to your 30(b)(6) notice other than what 
was provided to [defense counsel] by Leslie Kelly Hall." 
30(b)(6) Aff., Exhibit E. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allow parties to bring a motion to compel 
discovery if a deponent fails to answer a question or a corporation fails to designate a 
representative to be deposed under Rule 30(b)(6). I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). Rule 37 further 
provides that "an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer." 
I.R.C.P. 37(a)(3). The Defendant also presents federal case law supporting its 
contention that when a corporate deponent fails to provide either documents or 
testimony of a representative in response to the stated purpose of the deposition, the 
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response should be treated as a failure to appear altogether. See Black Horse Lane 
Assoc., L.P. v. Dow Chemical Corp., 228 F.3d 275,304 (3d Cir. 2000). 
The Defendant argues that they are entitled to the requested information 
because it is well within the scope of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26, being 
particularly relevant to its spoliation claim, and is not protected by the work-product 
privilege of rule 26(b)(3). Thus, MRlA asks this court to compel SARMC to provide a 
representative prepared to discuss the listed topics and compel answers to those 
questions SARMC instructed Ms. Hall not to answer (i.e. regarding steps taken by 
counsel or SARMC to gather documents responsive to discovery and about an alleged 
"litigation hold"). 
SARMC simply responds there are no statutes or policies governing the 
maintenance of its hard-copy documents "pertaining to general business activities or to 
interactions Saint Alphonsus employees may have had relative to the parties or issues 
in this case." Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's Memorandum in Opposition to MRI 
Associates' Motion to Compel 30(b)(6) Deposition of SARMC at 3; see also Affidavit of 
Stephanie C. Westermeier at 73. Ms. Westermeier also states that, upon service of the 
Complaint on the Defendant on April 1, 2005, she directed all Saint Alphonsus 
2mployees "who were reasonably believed to have documents pertaining to this matter 
:o collect and maintain all documents in their possession which may in any way relate to 
:his action." Affidavit of Stephanie C. Westermeier at 75. 
Although defense counsel may not agree with SARMC's record retention policies 
xior to April 1, 2005 (or lack thereof), the record demonstrates that there is no single 
.epresentative of SARMC that could testify as to what was done with or contained in 
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every document, whether hard-copy or e-mail, relating to this litigation. The case law 
cited by the Defendant reflected situations where the corporate deponent could have 
supplied a deponent with adequate information but did not. Here, SARMC asserts that 
there is no representative, former or current, who can competently testify on the 
remaining information sought by MRIA. By providing Ms. Hall for the initial 30(b)(6) 
deposition and the affidavit of Ms. Westermeier, it appears to the Court that SARMC 
has provided whatever information in its possession on these topics to MRIA. 
Ms. Hall was also not able to testify regarding two (2) other topics: the process 
followed by SARMC to gather and produce documents responsive to discovery and any 
efforts to place a "litigation hold" on documents associated with this litigation. Counsel 
for SARMC represented to the Court at oral argument that the process of gathering and 
producing documents was undertaken by counsel, not SARMC and stated that SARMC 
was not aware of any "litigation hold" on relevant documents. Therefore, SARMC could 
not produce a representative prepared to discuss the topics of interest to the 
Defendant. 
The Court will find that SARMC has met its burden of producing a witness 
prepared to testify on any matter as to which she or the organization has any 
knowledge and deny the Defendant's motion to compel.' 
B. MRIA's Motion to Compel Discovery after April 1,2004 
During the discovery process, any party may request that any other party 
2 The Court will note that because both electronic and hard-copy document retention was admittedly left to 
the discretion of each individual employee unless the hospital was required to keep the document by 
some state or federal law. MRIA would have to depose each person individually and ask each employee 
 hat he or she did with documents in his or her possession that relate to MRIA or this litigation. 
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produce documents or other tangible evidence in the other party's possession or 
control. I.R.C.P. 34(a). If a party does not respond to such a request within thirty (30) 
days of service, the discovering party may file a motion to compel production of the 
sought documents with the Court. I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). 
The Defendant served their first set of discovery requests on Saint Alphonsus on 
May 20, 2005. Many of the requests for production sought documents regarding 
SARMC's involvement with IMI both before and after Saint Alphonsus's dissociation 
from MRIA, including the partnership agreement and SARMC's correspondence with 
other members of IMI. Saint Alphonsus objected to the requests that sought 
documents after April 1, 2004 on the basis that these documents were irrelevant to the 
pending litigation. At that time, the only claims pending were a declaratory action filed 
by SADC and a counterclaim for breach of the MRIA partnership agreement against 
SADC and SARMC. Saint Alphonsus asserted that its activities regarding IMI after its 
dissociation from MRlA were not relevant to those pending claims. 
The landscape for this case has dramatically changed since the Defendant filed 
its amended complaint. Saint Alphonsus agrees that many of the documents sought 
that it previously claimed were not relevant are now very relevant to many of the new 
claims. While it does not concede that all of the discovery requests seek relevant 
information, Saint Alphonsus has agreed "to re-evaluate its answers to all prior 
discovery, based upon the new complaints, and submit its answers to discovery within 
the next twenty days." PlaintiffICounterdefendant's Memorandum in Opposition to MRI 
Associates' Motion to Compel Production of Discovery after April 1, 2004 at 4. Thus, 
the Court will compel production of all documents previously withheld on relevance 
MEMORANDUM DECISION -CASE NO. CVOC0408219D -PAGE 9 
objections with the exception of any documents that Saint Alphonsus claims are 
privileged.3 As agreed to by Saint Alphonsus, such documents must be produced to 
the Defendant within 20 days from entry of this Memorandum Decision. 
C. MRIA's Motion to Compel Testimony from Ms. Bruce 
MRlA has broken down the dispute over Ms. Bruce's answers to three (3) 
general categories of information. First, Ms. Bruce refused to answer questions (on the 
basis of attorney-client privilege) regarding why or how Saint Alphonsus determined that 
it had a "right" to dissociate from MRIA. Second, Ms. Bruce deferred to counsel and 
refused to answer questions seeking her interpretation of certain portions of letters she 
authored and sent to the other MRlA partners and portions of the MRlA partnership 
agreement. Finally, MRIA seeks production of a document that Ms. Bruce reviewed 
between the first and second days of her deposition. 
1. Questions Reaardina Saint Al~honsus's Dissociation 
Ms. Bruce claimed attorney-client privilege with regard to two (2) lines of 
questioning by defense counsel. First, based on Ms. Bruce's statement that she was 
charged with ensuring compliance with the partnership agreement as CEO of SARMC, 
defense counsel inquired as to Ms. Bruce's understanding of Saint Alphonsus's right to 
dissociate under the MRlA partnership agreement. Ms. Bruce testified that her 
understanding of Saint Alphonsus's rights was based on discussions with legal counsel. 
Once this was stated Mr. Gjording voiced an objection at the deposition on the basis of 
attorney-client privilege. Second, defense counsel inquired as to the basis for a 
statement in a letter authored and signed by Ms. Bruce on behalf of Saint Alphonsus; 
1 The Court also notes that an amended privilege log should be produced to include any additional 
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that letter informed the other partners of MRlA that SADC, for various reasons, was 
exercising its right under ldaho law to dissociate from the partnership. 
The Defendant asserts that this information is extremely relevant to this litigation 
because this information goes to material elements of SADC's original claim and 
MRIA's counterclaims for wrongful dissociation. MRlA further asserts that this 
information is not privileged because it does not call for disclosure of a confidential 
communication under ldaho Rule of Evidence 501. MRlA argues that Saint 
Alphonsus's position would "render virtually all business decisions privileged and allow 
all corporations to avoid any inquiry into ... those decisions." Memorandum in Support 
of MRI Associates' Motion to Compel Deposition Responses of Sandra Bruce at 17. 
Finally, the Defendant asserts that they are entitled to inquire as to Ms. Bruce's 
understanding of Saint Alphonsus's rights "even if those reasons are supported by, or 
based in part on, advice from her lawyers." Id. at 18. 
Counsel for Saint Alphonsus responds that Ms. Bruce only declined to answer 
questions directed to her regarding her understanding of SADCs legal right to 
withdraw, not its reasons for wanting to withdraw based on facts or circumstances. 
Both during Ms. Bruce's deposition and again at hearing on this motion, counsel for 
Saint Alphonsus agreed that defense counsel may inquire into the factual, business 
reasons why SADC wanted to withdraw from the partnership, but points out that 
questions directed at obtaining the legal rationale behind whether SADC could lawfully 
~ithdraw directly require Ms. Bruce to disclose the substance of legal advice 
~ommunicated by counsel to Ms. Bruce and Saint Alphonsus. 
iocurnents for which a privilege is claimed. 
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After reviewing the submitted portions of the transcript of Ms. Bruce's deposition. 
the Court agrees with counsel for Saint Alphonsus. Defense counsel repeatedly asked 
Ms. Bruce what "right" Saint Alphonsus had to dissociate from the partnership and why 
Saint Alphonsus did so under Idaho's default provisions and not the MRlA partnership 
agreement. These questions clearly call for legal conclusions, not business or financial 
decisions. As maintained by counsel for Saint Alphonsus, defense counsel is entitled to 
question Ms. Bruce on the circumstances surrounding Saint Alphonus's dissociation or 
motivation for dissociating from MRIA; these questions are highly relevant to MRIA's 
claims and do not necessarily call for legal analysis. Although the distinction may on its 
face seem merely semantic, these questions call for entirely different answers based on 
different types of information. If Ms. Bruce determined that Saint Alphonsus had a legal 
right to dissociate from MRlA under ldaho law based solely on the legal analysis and 
advice of her counsel, that reasoning and advice is protected by the attorney-client 
privilege.4 
MRlA also claims that any asserted privilege has been waived because this 
information was disclosed to third parties and therefore not intended to remain 
confidential. One letter from Ms. Bruce, sent on behalf of Saint Alphonsus, announced 
SADC's intent to dissociate from MRlA for "numerous reasons" and stated that SADC 
ivould be withdrawing under ldaho Code § 53-3-601 and seeking a buyout under ldaho 
:ode § 53-3-701. A second letter reiterated that SADC was not dissociating pursuant 
:o section 6.1 of the partnership agreement, but that it was dissociating under the 
I Cross-motions for summary judgment are currently scheduled to be heard by the Court on June 6,2006. 
f the Defendant is seeking Saint Alphonsus's legal rationale behind its dissociation, it should be fully 
?xplained through the briefing submitted and oral argument on these motions. 
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default provisions provided by statute. Neither of these letters expressed the reason(s) 
Saint Alphonsus decided it was entitled to dissociate and pursue its remedies under the 
aforementioned code sections. A final letter stated that Saint Alphonsus determined 
that it was not bound by the noncompete language in the partnership agreement, but 
did not explain why. 
The Defendant asserts that by sending these letters to counsel, there was no 
reasonable expectation that the rationale behind the decisions would remain private. 
However, none of these letters gave any insight into the legal rationale for deciding to 
dissociate under the Idaho partnership statutes, as opposed to the partnership 
agreement, or how Saint Alphonsus concluded that the noncompete provision did not 
apply to it. Although the final decision to dissociate under Idaho's default statutes was 
clearly not intended to remain private, these three (3) letters do not disclose the legal 
reasoning behind those decisions, and thus do not act as a wavier of the applicable 
attorney-client privilege in this case. 
2. Ms. Bruce's Interpretation of the Partnership Aareement 
Defense counsel also inquired as to Ms. Bruce's understanding of certain 
3ortions of the MRlA partnership agreement. Ms. Bruce explained that she felt "wholly 
Jnqualified" to interpret terms in the partnership agreement and stated that her 
~nderstanding of the relevant terms of the partnership agreement was entirely based 
lpon conversations with counsel. Counsel for Saint Alphonsus objected on the 
grounds that Mr. Banducci's question called for a legal conclusion from the witness and 
)n attorney-client privilege. Affidavit of G.Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRI Associates' 
vlotion to Compel Deposition Responses by Sandra Bruce ("Reinhardt Aff."), Exhibit A 
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186 - 198. 
Again, defense counsel was clearly asking for a legal conclusion by asking Ms. 
Bruce to interpret multiple terms of a contract that pertain directly to the parties' rights 
under the partnership agreement. Although she is charged with ensuring compliance 
with the partnership agreement as CEO of SARMC, her position does not necessarily 
require that she have the capability to interpret contractual provisions. It is entirely 
plausible that she would rely on counsel to interpret the terms of the MRlA partnership 
agreement and advise her of SARMC's legal rights in any given situation. 
In this case, Ms. Bruce did state that she in fact relied upon counsel to interpret 
those terms, so her understanding was based entirely upon the legal advice of her 
zounsel. Therefore, questions seeking her understanding of the meaning and 
nterpretation of terms in the partnership agreement do require her to divulge the 
jubstance of communications between attorney and client. These communications are 
also protected by the attorney-client privilege in Idaho Rule of Evidence 502. 
The Court will further note that some questions specifically asked Ms. Bruce to 
jefine terms in the partnership agreement, determine whether certain entities were 
:overed by specific definitions in the MRlA partnership agreement, and would have 
.equired Ms. Bruce to determine the application of certain provisions under hypothetical 
:ircumstances. The Court agrees with counsel for Saint Alphonsus that while these 
questions may not have sought privileged information, the questions clearly called for 
egal conclusions that were beyond the personal knowledge of the deponent. Thus, the 
Zourt will not compel Ms. Bruce to answer questions as to her understanding of the 
~artnership agreement. 
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3. Documents Reviewed bv Ms. Bruce before Her Deposition 
At the beginning of the second day of her deposition, defense counsel asked the 
witness if she had reviewed any documents since the deposition had ended the prior 
jay. Reinhardt Aff., Exhibit A at 206 - 208. Ms. Bruce responded that she had 
eviewed a document prior to her testimony that morning that may have "possibly" 
.efreshed her memory. Id. Ms. Bruce testified that this document was not prepared by 
:ounsel and it admittedly did not involve a communication or advice from counsel, thus 
t is not privileged. The document was not provided for defense counsel to review 
lased upon the work product protection in ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). 
ldaho Rule of Evidence 612 provides: 
If, before testifying, a witness uses a writing or object, not privileged 
under these rules or not protected from disclosure under Rule 26 of 
the ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure ..., to refresh the memory of the 
witness for the purpose of testifying and the court in its discretion 
determines that the interests of just ice so require, an adverse party 
is entitled to have the writing or object produced, if practicable, at 
the trial, hearing, or deposition in with the witness is testifying. 
.R.E. 612(b). Counsel for Saint Alphonsus contends that disclosing the documents 
;elected for review by a client is akin to requiring an attorney to disclose mental 
mpressions or legal theories to opposing counsel, which are absolutely protected under 
he "work-product privilege." I.R.C.P. 26(b)(3); see also Spork v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d 
3. 1985). On the other hand, defense counsel argues that the while the work product 
~rivilege protects compilations or organization of documents (i.e. a "binder" of 
locuments), the risk of exposure of an attorney's mental impressions by the disclosure 
~f one document is minimal and opposing counsel's need to review the document for 
!ffective examination of the witness clearly outweighs this risk. See In re Atlantic Fin. 
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Mgmt Sec. Litig., 121 F.R.D. 141,144-45(D. Mass. 1988). 
The Court agrees that the risk of disclosure of any mental impressions or work 
product is very small in this case. Also, the deponent did state that her review of the 
document did, at least, refresh her memory as to the contents of that document, which 
could have impacted her testimony. Further, production is indeed practicable because 
the dispute is over only one document. For the foregoing reasons, the Court will order 
that the document be produced to defense counsel pursuant to Rule 612(b). 
4. Continuation of Ms. Bruce's Deposition 
MRlA seeks to continue its deposition of Ms. Bruce. Saint Alphonsus 
emphasizes that the prior two (2)-day deposition produced over ten (10) hours of 
testimony from Ms. Bruce, exclusive of breaks and disagreements between counsel. 
After reviewing the portions of the deposition transcript submitted to the Court, it is 
apparent that the questioning of Ms. Bruce was, at times, unnecessarily argumentative; 
in fact, the general tone of the entire deposition was markedly contentious. Thus, the 
Court understands Saint Alphonsus's desire to limit the time available for a second 
deposition of Ms. Bruce. 
Saint Alphonsus does recognize that MRlA has a right to depose Ms. Bruce as to 
the new issues arising from the Defendant's amended counterclaims. Also, the new 
Third-Party Defendants have asked the Court to postpone a continued deposition of 
Ms. Bruce for ninety (90) days to allow the new parties to conduct discovery and 
generally be brought up to speed. Given the necessity of further questioning on the 
newly alleged claims, the Court will require Ms. Bruce to be presented for another 
deposition; however, the Court will limit that deposition to one (I) day and will grant the 
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Third-Party Defendant's request that the deposition be postponed for ninety (90) days. 
D. Saint Alphonsus's Motion for a Protective Order 
In early January 2006, subpoenas were issued to GSR, ICR, and IMI. All three 
(3) entities filed a motion to quash the subpoenas under ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
45(b) or, alternatively, for a protective order pursuant to ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(c) on January 23, 2006. They objected to the subpoenas on the grounds that the 
Defendant sought depositions and documents of non-parties; the requested document 
production was overbroad, burdensome, and sought personal, confidential, or 
proprietary information; the sought information was not relevant to the issues in the 
litigation; the timeline was too short (the depositions were to take place at the end of 
January); and the common interest privilege in ldaho Rule of Evidence 502(b)(3) 
applied to much of the sought material. 
After the motion was filed, MRlA amended its Answer and Counterclaim, which 
significantly expanded the scope of this litigation and named GSR, ICR, and IMI as 
Third-Party Defendants. The addition of approximately fifteen (15) new claims against 
the existing and new parties also expanded what discovery is "relevant" to the litigation. 
Also, the depositions of GSR, ICR, and IMI and the date documents were to be 
produced have been delayed, alleviating concerns about the short time allowed for 
production of documents. However, the Third-Party Defendants still assert that the 
sought discovery is extremely overbroad and seek to have the scope of many of the 
-equests limited under Rule 26(c). This rule allows the court to issue a protective order, 
Apon a showing of good cause, to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, 
~ppression, or undue burden or expense. I.R.C.P. 26(c). 
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Although incredibly broad, the discovery requests at issue in this motion appear 
o be reasonably likely to lead to discoverable information, especially given the current 
~readth of this litigation. Also, a confidentiality stipulation was agreed to by all parties 
nvolved in this litigation. This agreement includes provisions for subpoenaing and 
xoducing documents under an "attorney's eyes only" condition and includes a provision 
or seeking in camera review, if necessary. While the Court recognizes the Third-Party 
Iefendants' concerns, the aforementioned provisions of the confidentiality agreement 
;hould adequately protect GSR, ICR, and IMl's interests in any personal, confidential, 
)r proprietary information produced to opposing counsel or the Court. 
Finally, the Third-Party Defendants claim that much of the sought information is 
rotected by the common interest privilege of Rule 502(b)(3). This doctrine protects all 
:ommunications between co-parties and their attorneys concerning a matter of 
:ommon interest. I.R.E. 502(b)(3). However, it is not intended to protect 
:ommunications that either: 1) do not involve the rendition of professional legal 
iervices, or 2) are communications solely between clients or co-parties where no 
lttorney is present. See I.R.E. 502(b); I.R.E. 502(b)(3) comment. MRlA states that it is 
lot seeking any documents or testimony regarding communications where an attorney 
das present and made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal 
ervices concerning a matter of common interest to the parties. Under the clear 
mguage of I.R.E. 502(b), GSR, ICR, and IMI are required to turn over any 
ommunications or documents that were made solely between clients or co-parties or 
o not in any way involve the rendition of legal services. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court will find that SARMC complied with its duty to provide a representative 
or a 30(b)(6) deposition and will DENY the Defendant's motion to compel another. 
3ecause of the current scope of this litigation, the Court will GRANT the Defendant's 
notion to compel production of documents created or exchanged after April 1, 2004 
within twenty (20) days from this decision. The Court will DENY the Defendant's motion 
o compel deposition answers from Ms. Bruce, but will GRANT the motion for a 
:ontinued deposition for inquiry into facts surrounding the Defendant's amended 
:ounterclaims. The deposition of Ms. Bruce will be postponed for ninety (90) days after 
tntry of this decision and will be limited to one (1) day, unless otherwise agreed by the 
)arties. Finally, the Court will DENY the Third-Party Defendants' motion for a protective 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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Attorneys for Intermountain Medieal Imaging, LLC, 
Gem State Radiology, LLP, and Imaging Center Radiologists, LLP 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DNERSIFIED CARE, ) 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, 1 
) Case No. CV OC 0408219D 
Plaintiff, 1 
) THIRD PARTY DEPENDANTS' 
VS. ) ANSWER TO THIRD PARTY 
) COMPLAINT 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership, ) 
) 
Defendant. 1 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership, ) 
) 
Counterclaimant, ) 
VS. 1 
) 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, ) 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT ) 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL, MEDICAL ) 
CENTER, ) 
Counterdefendants. ) 
THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS' ANSWER 
TO THIRI) PARTY COMPLAINT - 1 00131737 005 DOC 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, ) 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; 
GEM STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership; and IMAGING 
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho 
limited liability partnership, 
Third Party Defendants. 
COME NOW the Third Party Defendants, Intermountain Medical Imaging, LLC ("IMI"), 
Gem State Radiology, LLP ("GSR"), and Imaging Center Radiologists ("ICR"), by and through 
their attorneys o f  record, Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow, McKlveen & Jones, Chartered, and in 
answer to MRI Associates, LLP's ("MRIA") Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint, 
hereby admit, deny, and affirmatively allege as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
MRIA's Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint, and each and every separate 
cause o f  action and count therein, fails to state a claim against the Third Party Defendants upon 
which relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1.  Each and every allegation contained in MRIA's Amended Counterclaim and Third 
Party Complaint not herein specifically and expressly admitted is hereby denied. 
THIRD PAHI'Y DEFENDAN'I'S' ANSWER 
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2. In answer to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, these paragraphs appear to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these 
Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party 
Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 1 and 2. 
3. Third Party Defendants admit the allegations in paragraphs 3 and 4. 
4. In answer to paragraph 5 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit that ICR is a limited liability partnership and that 
certain owners of ICR also have an ownership interest in GSR. They deny the remaining 
allegations contained in paragraph 5. 
5. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 6. 
6 .  In answer to paragraph 7 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit that MRIA is an Idaho limited liability partnership and 
upon information and belief admit that MRIA acted as a general partner of MRI Limited 
Partnership and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership, but deny all other allegations in paragraph 7. 
7. In answer to paragraph 8 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these Third 
Pany Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants 
deny all allegations in paragraph 8, other than admitting that magnetic resonance imaging was an 
expensive technology when developed. 
8. In answer to paragraph 9 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these Third 
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Party Defendants appears necessary. I f  such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants 
deny the allegations in paragraph 9. 
9. In answer to paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 o f  the Amended Counterclaim 
and Third Party Complaint, Third Party Defendants state that these paragraphs deal with the 
relationship between MRIA and the Counterdefendant and they are without knowledge as to the 
truth o f  these allegations and therefore deny the same. 
10. In answer to paragraph 16 o f  the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit that GSR is a professional group o f  radiologists that at 
some periods o f  time had an exclusive contract with SARMC to read radiological images, and 
that GSR read radiological images at the MRI Center until MRIA terminated the arrangement, 
and deny all other allegations in paragraph 16. 
11. In answer to paragraph 17 o f  the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit that at some times MRI Center provided the technical 
component and GSR provided the professional component o f  magnetic resonance imaging, and 
that a GSR radiologist participated as a medical director at MRI Center during some times. Third 
Party Defendants deny the remaining allegations contained in this paragraph 17. 
12. In answer to paragraph 18 o f  the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these Third 
Party Defendants appears necessary. I f  such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants 
deny the allegations in paragraph 18. 
13. In answer to paragraph 19 o f  the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit that GSR began to make plans to establish an 
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independent medical imaging center in the late 1990s but deny all other allegations in 
paragraph 19. 
14. In answer to paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, these paragraphs appear to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these 
Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party 
Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 20 and 21. 
15. In answer to paragraph 22 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit that at some periods of time Dr. David Giles served as 
president of GSR, as well as a partner in GSR, while at the same time he had a conflict of interest 
in that he was an owner of Doctors' Magnetic Resonance, Inc., a partner in MRIA. They deny 
the remainder of the allegations in paragraph 22. 
16. In answer to paragraph 23 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit that ICR planned to open and operate a freestanding 
medical imaging center by the name of Intermountain Medical Imaging located on Myrtle Street 
in Boise, which would offer a full spectrum of imaging modalities, including MRI, CT, x-ray, 
ultrasound, and special procedures, and deny all other allegations in paragraph 23. 
17. In answer to paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, these paragraphs appear to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these 
Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party 
Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 24. 
18. In answer to paragraph 26 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit that during 1998-1999 numerous discussions occucred 
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to explore possible arrangements between MRIA and GSR, and that during this time Dr. Giles 
worked diligently on behalf of MRIA and DMR, and admit that GSR and MRIA were unable to 
reach an agreement because of MRIA's unreasonable negotiating position. They deny the 
remaining allegations in paragraph 26. 
19. In answer to paragraph 27 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants are without knowledge as to MRIA's actions and knowledge, 
and therefore deny the allegations in paragraph 27. 
20. In answer to paragraph 28 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, several of the allegations of this paragraph relate to another party and no answer by 
the Third Party Defendants appears to be necessary. If one is necessary, Third Party Defendants 
deny these allegations. As to any allegations that relate to Third Party Defendants, Third Party 
Defendants deny such allegations. 
21. In answer to paragraph 29 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants cannot answer, as the allegation dealing with "these 
negotiations" is unclear as to the timing and no response is possible; therefore, the Third Party 
Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 29. 
22. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 30 of the Amended 
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. 
23. In answer to paragraph 31 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these Third 
Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants 
deny the allegations in paragraph 3 1. 
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24. In answer to paragraph 32 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit that Dr. Giles was asked to resolve his conflict of 
interest, and assert that he decided to leave GSR because he thought the financial opportunities 
were greater at MRIA. Third Party Defendants deny all other allegations in paragraph 32. 
25. In answer to paragraph 33 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these Third 
Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants 
deny the allegations in paragraph 33. 
26. In answer to paragraph 34 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit that on July 1, 2001, St. Alphonsus executed the 
Operating Agreement of M I  but affirmatively state that the Operating Agreement speaks for 
itself and deny all other allegations and interpretations contained in paragraph 34. 
27. In answer to paragraph 35 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants state that the Operating Agreement speaks for itself and 
therefore deny all allegations and interpretations contained in paragraph 35. 
28. Third Party Defendants admit that St. Alphonsus was only involved in the 
ownership, operation and management of the "non-MRI" portion of IMI's business under the 
Operating Agreement and deny all remaining allegations in paragraph 36 of the Amended 
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. 
29. In answer to paragraph 37 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants state that the Operating Agreement speaks for itself and 
therefore deny all allegations in paragraph 37. 
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30. In answer to paragraph 38 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these Third 
Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants 
deny the allegations in paragraph 38. 
31. In answer to paragraph 39 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, most of the allegations of this paragraph appear to relate solely to other parties and no 
answer from these Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then 
Third Party Defendants deny the allegations in paragraph 39, and specifically deny the allegation 
in the last sentence of this paragraph 39. 
32. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 40. 
33. In answer to paragraph 41 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these Third 
Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants 
deny the allegations in paragraph 41. 
34. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 42. 
35. In answer to paragraphs 43 and 44 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, these paragraphs appear to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these 
Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, Third Party Defendants 
deny the allegations in paragraphs 43 and 44. 
36. In answer to paragraph 45 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate to other parties and no answer from these Third Party 
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Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants deny the 
allegations in paragraph 45. Any allegations that relate to Third Party Defendants are denied. 
37. In answer to paragraph 46 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these Third 
Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants 
deny the allegations in paragraph 46. 
38. In answer to paragraph 47 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate to other parties and no answer frorn these parties 
appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants deny the allegations 
in paragraph 47. Any allegations in paragraph 47 that relate to the Third Party Defendants are 
denied. 
39. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 48. 
40. Third Party Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 49. 
41. In answer to paragraph 50 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit that GSR sent out a letter to a number of physicians 
informing them that GSR had been terminated by MRIA from interpreting outpatient images 
frorn the MRI Center and that only St. Alphonsus inpatient and ER patient examinations would 
be available on DRIWeb Ambassador. Third Party Defendants deny all other allegations in 
paragraph 50. 
42. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 5 1 and 52. 
43. In answer to paragraph 53 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate solely to other parties and no answer frorn these Third 
THIRD PARTY DEPENDANTS' ANSWER 
TO THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT - 9 oor3i737.oos.ooc 
Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants 
deny the allegations in paragraph 53. 
44. In answer to paragraphs 54, 55 and 56 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third 
Party Complaint, these paragraphs appear to relate solely to other parties and no answer from 
these Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party 
Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 54,55 and 56. 
45. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 57, 58, 59, 
and 60. 
46. In answer to paragraph 61 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit that generally the refening physician selects a technical 
component provider ("TCP"). Third Party Defendants are without knowledge as to whether there 
is a general practice of referring physicians to refer out-patients to TCP's associated with the 
hospital where they practice. All other allegations in paragraph 61 relate to another party, and no 
answer from these Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, Third 
Party Defendants deny such allegations. 
47. In answer to paragraph 62 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph refers to the beliefs of non-parties and Third Party Defendants are 
without knowledge as to the truth of this allegation and therefore deny the same. 
48. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 63, 64,65,66, 
and 67. 
49. In answer to paragraph 68 of the Amended Counterclai~n and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these Third 
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Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants 
deny the allegations in paragraph 68. 
50. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 69,70, and 71. 
51. In answer to paragraph 72 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-71. 
52. In answer to paragraphs 73, 74, 75, 76, and 77 of the Amended Counterclaim and 
Third Party Complaint, these paragraphs appear to relate solely to other parties and no answer 
from these Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third 
Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 73,74,75,76, and 77. 
53. In answer to paragraph 78 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-77. 
54. In answer to paragraph 79 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these Third 
Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants 
deny the allegations in paragraph 79. 
55. In answer to paragraph 80 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-79. 
56. In answer to paragraphs 81 and 82 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these Third 
Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants 
deny the allegations in paragraphs 81 and 82. 
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57. In answer to paragraph 83 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-82. 
58. In answer to paragraphs 84 and 85 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, these paragraphs appear to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these 
Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party 
Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 84 and 85. 
59. In answer to paragraph 86 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-85. 
60. In answer to paragraphs 87, 88, 89, 90, and 91 of the Amended Cow~terclaim and 
Third Party Complaint, these paragraphs appear to relate solely to other parties and no answer 
from these Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third 
Party Defendants deny the allegatiolls in paragraphs 87,88, 89,90, and 91. 
61. In answer to paragraph 92 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-91. 
62. In answer to paragraphs 93, 94, 95, 96, and 97 of the Amended Counterclaim and 
Third Party Complaint, these paragraphs appear to relate solely to other parties and no answer 
from these Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third 
Party Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 93,94,95,96, and 97. 
63. In answer to paragraph 98 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-97. 
64. In answer to paragraphs 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, and 105 of the Amended 
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint, these paragraphs appear to relate solely to other parties 
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and no answer from these Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, 
then Third Party Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 
and 105, 
65. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 106. 
66. In answer to paragraph 107 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-106. 
67. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 108, 109 
and 110. 
68. In answer to paragraph 111 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-1 10. 
69. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 112, 1 13, 1 14, 
and 115. 
70. In answer to paragraph 116 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-1 15. 
71. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 17, 11 8, 1 19, 
and 120. 
72. In answer to paragraph 121 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-120. 
73. In answer to paragraph 122, 123, 124, 125, and 126 of the Amended Counterclaim 
and Third Party Complaint, these paragraphs appear to relate solely to other parties and no 
answer from these Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then 
Third Party Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 122, 123, 124, 125, and 126. 
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74. In answer to paragraph 127 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-126. 
75. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 128, 129 
and 130. 
76. In answer to paragraph 131 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-130. 
77. In answer to paragraph 132 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit they were aware that at some times St. Alphonsus had 
some type of a partnership relationship with MRIA. As for other allegations in this paragraph, 
they appear to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these Third Party Defendants 
appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants deny the remaining 
allegations in paragraph 132. 
78. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 133 and 134. 
79. In answer to paragraph 135 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-134. 
80. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 136, 137, 138, 
139, and 140. 
81. In answer to paragraph 141 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-140. 
82. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 142 and 143. 
83. In answer to paragraph 144 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-143. 
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84. In answer to paragraph 145 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants admit that St. Alphonsus appointed certain persons to the M I  
Management Committee dealing only with the non-MRI division. Other allegations in the 
paragraph appear to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these parties appears 
necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants deny the other allegations in 
paragraph 145. 
85. In answer to paragraphs 146, 147 and 148 of the Amended Counterclaim and 
Third Party Complaint, these paragraphs appear to relate solely to other parties and no answer 
from these Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third 
Party Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 146, 147 and 148. 
86. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 149. 
87. In answer to paragraph 150 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses lo paragraphs 1-149. 
88. In answer to paragraph 151 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, this paragraph appears to relate solely to other parties and no answer from these Third 
Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third Party Defendants 
deny the allegations in paragraph 15 1. 
89. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 152 and 153. 
90. In answer to paragraph 154 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-153. 
91. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 155 and 156. 
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92. In answer to paragraph 157 of the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party 
Complaint, Third Party Defendants reassert their responses to paragraphs 1-156. 
93. In answer to paragraphs 158, 159 and 160 of the Amended Counterclaim and 
Third Party Complaint, these paragraphs appear to relate solely to other parties and no answer 
from these Third Party Defendants appears necessary. If such answer is necessary, then Third 
Party Defendants deny the allegations in paragraphs 158, 159 and 160. 
94. Third Party Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph 161. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
M U  is estopped to seek relief for the claims in the Amended Counterclaim and Third 
Party Complaint. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
MRIA has waived its right to seek the relief claimed in the Amended Counterclaim and 
Third Party Complaint. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
MRIA is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands from asserting any claim. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
MRIA's Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint is barred by the applicable 
statutes of limitations found in, among other provisions, Idaho Code §§ 5-218, 5-219 and 5-224, 
and $5 4(b) and 5(h) of the Clayton Act. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEE%NSE 
MRIA's Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint is barred by the doctrine of 
laches. 
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SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
MRIA's claims are barred because MRIA lacks standing to bring or maintain this action 
for reasons including, but not limited to, the fact that the alleged injuries are not the type 
addressed by the laws under which MIUA attempts to state its claims. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Third Party Defendants' actions are privileged under the qualified business privilege. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Third Party Defendants are entitled to the qualified common interest privilege to defeat 
any claim for libel. 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Third Party Defendants are entitled to the qualified protection of third persons' privilege 
to defeat any claim for libel. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
No publications or communications by Third Party Defendants constitute defamatory 
communications. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Any communications by Third Party Defendants were made in good faith and upon 
reasonable reliance as to the truth of the matter. 
TWELJKCH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Third Party Defendants made no knowingly false statements and made no statements with 
malice. 
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THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
MRIA suffered no ascertainable loss and therefore has no claim under the Consumer 
Protection Act. 
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
MRIA's Consumer Protection Act claim is barred by the provisions of Idaho Code 
5 48-605(1). 
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
MRIA's claims are barred because MRIA has not suffered an antitrust injury. 
SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
MRIA's claims are barred in whole or in part because the Amended Counterclaim and 
Third Party Complaint does not adequately define the relevant market or markets. 
SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
MRIA's claims are barred in whole or in part because the alleged conduct by Third Party 
Defendants has not unreasonably restrained trade. 
EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
MRIA's claims are barred in whole or in part because the alleged conduct by Third Party 
Defendants did not lessen competition in a relevant market. 
NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
MRIA's claims are barred in while or in part because any action or omission undertaken 
by Third Party Defendants alleged in the Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint 
constituted bona fide business competition and was undertaken in pursuit of business interest and 
is therefore privileged. 
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TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
If Third Party Defendants have any monopoly power, which they deny, such power was 
lawfully acquired. 
TWENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
MRIA's claims for damages are barred because its alleged damages are speculative and 
because of the impossibility of ascertaining and allocating those alleged damages. This is not an 
admission that MRIA has any damages. 
TWENTY-SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Under Idaho Law, MRIA has an obligation to mitigate its damages and Third Party 
Defendants are not liable for any damages that might have been mitigated or which were caused 
by MRIA's own conduct. 
TWENTY-THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The actions or inactions by Third Party Defendants do not constitute the proximate cause 
of any damages suffered by MRIA, if any such damages have been suffered. 
TWENTY-FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The damages of which MRIA complains, if any, were proximately caused or contributed 
to by its own negligence or other legal fault, or the negligence or other legal fault of third persons 
for which Third Party Defendants are not responsible. 
TENTY-FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Damages, if any, that may have been sustained by MRIA were caused by MRIA's own 
actions or inactions. 
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ATTORNEYS FEES 
In order to defend this Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint, Third Party 
Defendants have been required to retain the services of Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Tumhow, 
McKlveen & Jones, Chartered, and are entitled to recover attorneys fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
$5 12-120, 12-121, and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, having answered all allegations in the Amended Counterclaim and Third 
Party Complaint, Third Party Defendants pray for judgment as follows: 
1. That MRIA's Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint he dismissed 
with prejudice and that Third Party MRIA take nothing thereby. 
2. That Third Party Defendants be dismissed with prejudice from the Amended 
Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. 
3. That Third Party Defendants he awarded their costs and attorneys fees for 
defending this action. 
4. For such rather and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
DATED this &8day of April, 2006. 
EBERLE, BERLIN, KADING, TURNBOW, 
MCKLVEEN & JONES, CHTD 
BY: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Bday of April, 2006, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the following individual(s)/entity(ies), by the 
method indicated, and addressed as follows: / 
Thomas A. Banducci [ /j U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
G. Rey Reinhardt, IV [ ] Hand Delivery 
Greener, Banducci, Shoemaker, PA [ ] Facsimile to (208) 3 19-2601 
815 West Washington Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Jack S. Gjording 
Trudy Hanson Fouser 
Bobbi K. Dominick 
Gjording & Fouser, PLLC 
509 West Hays Street 
Post Office Box 2837 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Patrick J. Miller 
Givens Pursley, LLP 
601 West Bannock Street 
Post Office Box 2720 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Facsimile to (208) 336-9177 
[ /( U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] HandDelivery 
[ ] Facsimile to (208) 388-1300 
Rodney R. Saetrnm [ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
David W. Lloyd 
4' 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Saetrum Law Offices [ ] Facsimile to (208) 336-0448 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 7425 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Warren E. Jones 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE 
INC., an ldaho nonprofit corporation, 
I1 Plaintiff, I1 VS. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an ldaho limited 
liability partnership, 
I I Defendant. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an ldaho limited 
liability partnership, 
I I Counterclaimant, I I vs. I 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE 
INC., an ldaho nonprofit corporation; 
SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER, 
CounterDefendants. 
I I MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an ldaho limited liability partnership, I I Third Party Plaintiff, 
Case No. CVOC 0408219D 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
I I INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, an ldaho limited liability company; I I MEMORANDUM DECISION -CASE NO. CVOC0408219D -PAGE 1 00332 
GEN STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an ldaho 
limited liability partnership; and IMAGING 
CENTER RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an ldaho 
limited liability partnership, 
I I Third Party Defendants. I 
APPEARANCES 
Plaintiffs: Jack Gjording of Gjording & Fouser, PLLC and Patrick Miller of 
Givens Pursley, LLC for the Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. 
and Counterdefendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center 
Defendants: G. Rey Reinhardt of Greener, Banducci, Shoemaker, P.A. for 
Defendantlcounterclaimant MRI Associates, LLP 
Third Party Defendants: Warren Jones, Eberle Berlin and Kading 
PROCEEDINGS 
I I This matter came on before the Court on the Defendantlcounterclaimant MRI II Associates, LLP's Motion to Compel answers to the Third Set of Interrogatories, I /  specifically lnterrogatory No. 15. The Plaintiffs objected to answering the lnterrogatory 
I I on the basis that the lnterrogatory seeks to discover attorney work product and legal II theories of counsel and therefore seeks information which is not discoverable. The 
Court took this matter under advisement. 
The Court has issued an earlier decision in this case and set forth the 
11 fundamental facts and disputes of this case. 
I /  The principle purpose of interrogatories is to afford parties information in the II possession of the other party regarding the issues in the lawsuit to enable the 
//propounding party to prepare for trial and reduce the possibility of surprise in the trial. 
11 See Lester v. Salvino. 141 ldaho 937 (Idaho App. 2005). The ldaho Supreme Court 
II has interpreted I.R.C.P. 26(b)(l) to allow for the broadest possible discovery. The I I MEMORANDUM DECISION -CASE NO. CVOC0408219D -PAGE 2 00333 
burden of showing that information is exempt from discovery is on the party attempting 
to withhold the requested information. See Kirk v. Ford Motor Company, 141 ldaho 
697. 
Pursuant to the ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the scope of discovery allows 
parties to obtain discovery regarding any matter not privileged which is relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense 
of the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party. 
The ldaho Supreme Court has clarified that written discovery may delve into 
theories of liability by the opposing party and is not strictly limited to factual inquires. 
See Radmer v. Ford Motor Company, 120 ldaho 86. 
This Court finds the reasoning in Holland v. GMAC Mortg., 2005 WL 1285678 as 
persuasive. In this case, the critical issue pertains to a partnership agreement entered 
into between the parties to this litigation. Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care has taken 
action to terminate this partnership agreement. If in fact there are ambiguities in the 
partnership agreement that allow Saint Alphonsus to, as a matter of law, terminate this 
partnership agreement, clearly that is relevant and critical information that the rules call 
for unless attorney work product is involved. 
The Defendant/Counterclaimants in this case are not asking the Plaintiffs to 
disclose their attorney work product as to purely legal theories. The Interrogatory 
focuses upon what terms or language of the partnership agreement the Plaintiff 
contends are ambiguous or vague if any. Ambiguities can be either patent or latent. If 
for example, parties are identified by different terms within the partnership agreement 
that could result in confusion or ambiguous language, clearly the Defendants1 
Counterclaimants have a right to know if that is a fact issue as it pertains to the 
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11 language contained with the partnership agreement. 
1 
* I /  cannot find that by answering this lnterrogatory, that attorney work product, particularly 
2 
5 between the attorney and client, would be in any way disclosed or violated. If in fact I I 
This is a classic example of an interrogatory that involves an opinion or 
contention that relates to a fact, or the application of law to a fact. Further, the Court 
Saint Alphonsus has a belief that this contract contains ambiguities that merit as a I I 11 matter of law that the contrSct be terminated or voided as to certain provisions, clearly 
/ I  that is the type of information that an opposing party has a right to seek out and receive 
11 case. The lnterrogatory is well focused on the issue and it certainly does not create any 
11 
9 
10 
in the course of discovery. Clearly these legal issues are related to the facts of this 
l4 IIthe Plaintiff Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. 
12 
13 
15 11 The Court will decline to grant attorneys fees and costs in this case. This is an 
type of hardship for the Plaintiffs to answer the lnterrogatory. 
For these reasons the Court will order that Interrogatory No. 15 be answered by 
/ I  issue that certainly merits review by the Court and the objection submitted by the 
j7 I/ Plaintiffs was not argued in bad faith. There is a line of authority that exists for the 
l8 IlPlaintiffs to take the position that they have taken regarding the answer to this 
interrogatory. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care 
answer lnterrogatory No. 15 on or before Frida 
DATED this 3 day of May 2006. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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I CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the - ay of May 2006, 1 mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
G. REY REINHARDT 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER 
815 W. WASHINGTON ST. 
BOISE, ID 83702 
VIA FACSIMILE: 319-2601 
JACK S. GJORDING 
GJORDING & FOUSER 
P.O. BOX 2837 
BOISE, ID 83701 
VIA FACSIMILE: 336-9177 
PATRICK J. MILLER 
GIVENS PURSLEY 
P.O. BOX 2720 
BOISE, ID 83701 
VIA FACSIMILE: 388-1300 
WARRAN JONES 
EBERLE BERLIN KADING 
TURNBOW MCKLVEEN & JONES 
P.O. BOX 1368 
BOISE, ID 83701 
VIA FACSIMILE: 344-8542 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
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Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105 
Trudy Hanson Fouser, ISB No. 2794 
Bobbi K. Dominick, of Counsel, ISB No. 2895 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
509 W. Hays Street 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208)336-9777 
Facsimile: (208)336-9177 
Patrick J. Miller, ISB No. 3221 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
Attorneys for PlaintiffICounterDefendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED 
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Defendant. I 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Counterclaimant, I 
Case No. CV OC 04082 19D 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED 
CARE, INC.'S AND SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTERS INC.'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
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VS. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; 
SAINTALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
CounterDefendants. I 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited / 
liability partnership, I 
Third-Party Plaintiff I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
COMES NOW PlaintiffiCounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, 
Inc. and CounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively "Saint 
Alphonsus") and move this Court pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) for an 
Order striking: 
1) Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson, M.D. In Support MRI 
Associates' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2 )  All portions of MRI Associates' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment that refer to an alleged "internal" documents of Saint 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC. AND SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER'S MOTION TO STRIKE - 2 - 
Alphonsus, including, the first full paragraph of page 13 of MRI Associates' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
3) Paragraph 4 and Exhibit C to the Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt In Support 
of MRI Associates' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This Motion is made on the grounds that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) 
requires affidavits filed in opposition to summary judgment to "set forth such facts as 
would be admissible in evidence." The Affidavits of Dr. Henson and G. Rey Reinhardt 
contain "facts" which would not be admissible at trial because they lack apparent 
foundation and because they are not relevant to the issue of whether the Articles of 
Partnership are ambiguous. 
This Motion is supported by the pleadings and Court's file in this matter and Saint 
Alphonsus' Memorandum in Support of Motion To Strike filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this &day of May, 2006. 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
.Y~JACK S. GJORDING 
:Attorneys for PlaintiffiCounterDefendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the - &ay of May, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated: 
Thomas A. Banducci - U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. express mail 
8 15 West Washington Street >and delivery 
Boise, ID 83702 - facsimile 
Warren E. Jones - U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
Joseph H. Uberuaga express mail 
EBERLE BERLN KADING TURNBOW h a n d  delivery 
McKLVEEN &JONES - facsimile 
300 N. 6th Street, 2nd Floor 
Boise, ID 83702 
Jack S. Gjording t' - 
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Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105 
Trudy Hanson Fouser, ISB No. 2794 
Bobbi K. Dominick, of Counsel, ISB No. 2895 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
509 W. Hays Street 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208)336-9777 
Facsimile: (208)336-9177 
Patrick J. Miller, ISB No. 3221 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
Attorneys for PlaintiffICounterDefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Counterclaimant, I 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED 
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Defendant. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
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SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED 
CARE, INC.'S AND SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER, INC.'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; 
SAINTALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, I 
Third-Party Plaintiff I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
COMES NOW PlaintiffICounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, 
Inc. and CounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively "Saint 
Alphonsus") and move this Court pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 for an 
Order granting them partial summary judgment and finding that, as a matter of law, Saint 
Alphonsus' dissociation from MRI Associates, LLP was not in breach of an express 
provision of its Article Partnership and that the MRI Associates, LLP was neither for a 
specific term nor a specific undertaking. 
00342 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, INC.'S AND SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER, INC.'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 - 
The grounds for this Motion are that the undisputed facts establish there is no 
genuine issue of material fact regarding Saint Alphonsus' dissociation from MRIA 
Associates, LLP. 
This motion is based on the records and pleadings in this case, together with the 
Affidavit of Patrick J. Miller and a Memorandum filed contemporaneously herewith and 
in support of this motion. 
Oral argument is requested. 
day of May, 2006. 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
#-- JACK S. GJORDING Attorneys for PlaintiffICounterDefendant 
SAINT .AI.PIlONSUS UIVEHSIFIEl) CAKE, INC.'S AND SAINT ,\L.PHOYSUS REGIONAL 
.\IEI)ICAL CENTER, INC.'S .\10T10N FOR PAR'I'IAI. SU3lhlAKY JUDGXIEST - 3 - 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of May, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was sewed upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated: 
Thomas A. Banducci .-' 
- U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. - express mail 
8 15 West Washington Street &hand delivery 
Boise, ID 83702 - facsimile 
Warren E. Jones - U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
Joseph H. Uberuaga express mail 
EBERLE BERLIN KADING TURNBOW >hand delivery 
McKLVEEN & JONES - facsimile 
300 N. 6'" Street, 2nd Floor 
Boise, ID 83702 
Jack S. Gjording 4f  
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Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105 
Trudy Hanson Fouser, ISB No. 2794 
Bobbi K. Dominick, ISB No. 2895 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
509 W. Hays Street 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208)336-9777 
Facsimile: (208)336-9177 
4 
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Patrick J. Miller, ISB No. 3221 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701 -2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
James R. Wade, D.C. Bar No. 412538 
HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP 
161 5 L Street, NW, Suite 800 
Washington, D.C. 20036-5610 
Telephone: (202) 654-4543 
Facsimile: (202) 654-4273 
Attorneys for PlaintiffiCounterDefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Plaintiff, 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED 
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, 
VS. 
Case No. CV OC 04082 19D 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED 
CARE, INC. AND SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE 
A CLAIM 
Defendant. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, XNC. AND SAINT ALPHONSUS REGION 
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Counterclaimant, I 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; 
SAINTALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
I 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third-Party Plaintiff I 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 1 
COMES NOW PlaintiffICounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, 
Inc. and CounterDefendant Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (collectively "Saint 
Alphonsus") and move this Court pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for 
an Order dismissing Counts 8-1 1 of MRI Associates, LLP First Amended Counterclaim 
and Third Party Complaint because MRI Associates, LLP has failed to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted in these Counts. 
SAINT ALPI-IONSLIS DI\'ERSIFIED CARE, II\'C. AND SAIN1. ALPHONSL'S REGIONAL 00346 
IIEDLCAL CENTER'S hlO'rION 1'0 DISIIISS FOR FAII.IJRE TO STATE ,\ C L A l l l  - 2 - 
This motion is based on the records and pleadings in this case and supported by a 
Memorandum filed contemporaneously herewith and in support of this motion. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this g k f M a y ,  2 0 0 ,  
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLU: 
HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP f l  
b.@ym$~ for PlnintiWCounterDefendant 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DlVERSlFlED CARE, MC. AND SAINT ALPHONSUS REGIONAL 
MEDICAL CENTER'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM - 3 - 00347 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on day of May, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated: 
Thomas A. Banducci - U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. - express mail 
815 West Washington Street h a n d  - delivery 
Boise, ID 83702 - facsimile 
Warren E. Jones - U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
Joseph 13. Uberuaga express mail 
EBERLE BERLIN KADING TURNBOW h a n d  delivery 
McKLVEEN & JONES - facsimile 
300 N. 61h Street, 2" Floor 
Boise, ID 83702 
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Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105 
Trudy Hanson Fouser, ISB No. 2794 
Bobbi K. Dominick, of Counsel, ISB No. 2895 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
509 W. Hays Street 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208)336-9777 
Facsimile: (208)336-9177 
Patrick J. Miller, ISB No. 3221 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
Attorneys for PlaintifKounterDefendants 
lh' THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED 
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Defendant. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Case No. CV OC 0408219D 
SAINT ALPHONSUS' NOTICE OF 
ERRATA RE: MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Counterclaimant, I 
\ 00349 SAINT ALPHONSUS' NOTICE OF ERRATA RE. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 4 FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 i? ., 
VS. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; 
SAINTALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
CounterDefendants. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third-Party Plaintiff ! 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
On May 5, 2006, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, Inc. (collectively referred to herein as "Saint Alphonsus") filed their 
Memorandum in Support of Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc.'s and Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center, Znc. 's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Memorandum"). This 
notice shall serve to correct a typographical error in the Memorandum. 
1. Page 13, Footnote number 5 - Third Sentence. The proper tense of the word 
"parties" was not used. It should read "party's" rather than "parties." 
SAINT ALPHONSUS' NOTICE OF ERRATA RE: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
2. Page 13, Footnote Number 5 -The citation for intermountain Eye v. Miller 
was incorrect. The correct citation should read: Intermountain Eye v. Miller, 
142 Idaho 218,127 P.3d 121 (2005). 
A copy of the corrected page is attached. 
Respectfully submitted this *day of May, 2006. 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
SAINT ALPHONSUS' NOTICE OF ERRATA RE: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certiEy that on the e d a y  of May, 2006, a true and correct copy ofthe 
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated: 
Thomas A. Banducci 5 U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. - express mail 
81 5 West Washington Street hand delivery 
Boise, ID ,83702 - facsimile 
Warren E. Jones - x U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
Joseph H. Uberuaga - express mail 
EBERLE BERLIN KADING TURNBOW - hand delivery 
McKLVEEN &JONES - facsimile 
300 N. 6' Street, 2nd Floor 
Boise, ID 83702 
SAINT ALPHONSUS' NOTICE OF ERRATA RE: MEMORANDUM n*r SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
the express provision requirement of the s t a t ~ t e . ~  
4. RUPA Did Not Change, and in Fact Reinforces Saint Alphonsus' 
Right to Dissociate Without Liability. 
The conclusion that MRIA cannot prove Saint Alphonsus breached an express provision 
of the Partnership Agreement is supported by the logic of Idaho partnership law. As mentioned 
previously, the Partnership Agreement was drafted at a time when the Uniform Partnership Act 
applied in Idaho. Under the applicable provision of the Uniform Partnership Act, partners had 
the right, except when the partnership was for a specific term or a specific undertaking, to cause 
a dissolution of a pmership by express will. See Idaho Code section 53-331 [ ~ e ~ e d e d  
effective July, 1 20011. 
In 1998, the Idaho legislature adopted the Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA"). 
See Idaho Code $53-3-101. The purpose of the changes in RUPA was to eliminate the 
"aggregate" theory of partnership in favor of an "entity" theory of partnership. See, e.g. 
Weidner, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporter's Overview, 49 Bus.Law. 1, 4-8 
(1993); Wensinger, The Revised Uniform Partnership Act Breakup Provisions: Stability of 
Headache? 50 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 905, 908 (1993); Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate 
Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. Law. 427,436-438 (1991). These are important 
In a case to be tried to a jury, on summary judgment, all inferences generally must be drawn against the moving 
party. See Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 436, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991). On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, each party's motion must be evaluated on its own merits. Intermountain Eye v. Miller, 142 Idaho 218, 
127 P.3d 121 (2005). Generally, therefore, on cross-motions in a case to be tried to a jury, each party must have all 
inferences drawn against them when considering their motion. Because any restriction on dissociation cannot be 
inferred, Saint Alphonsus will be entitled to summary judgment if "inferred" facts are the only impediments to 
granting Saint Alphonsus' motion. 
The legislature, in passing these changes, recognized that the statute may affect existing agreements and 
relationships, and thus allowed for a period of time for existing agreements to be modified, if the parties felt that it 
was necessary. Idaho Code section 53-3-1204. The legislature specified that after July 1, 2001, R W A  would 
retroactively govern all partnerships. Id. The parties chose not to amend the partne~ship language applicable to this 
motion. Thus, RUPA applies, and governs the interpretation of this Partnership Agreement. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAIWTITF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT -13 
00353 
Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453) 
G. Rey Reinhardt, IV (ISB No. 6209) 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
Counselors and Attorneys at Law 
The Carnegie Building 
81 5 West Washington Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone (208) 3 19-2600 
Facsimile (208) 3 19-2601 
Attomeys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Defendant. i 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Counterclaimant, I 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
Case No. CV OC 04082191) 
MRIA'S NOTICE OF ERRATA RE: 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MRIA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
MRIA'S NOTICE OF ERRATA RE: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MRIA'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1 
i i' 1 (l653GGda) 00354 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, I 
Third-Party Plaintiff, I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; GEM 
STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
On March 21,2006, MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA") filed its Memorandum in Support 
of MRIA's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Memorandum"). This notice shall serve to correct 
the following: 
All references to "Reinhardt Aff., Ex C" should be to the Supplemental Affidavit of G. 
Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRIA's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. A." 
DATED this Ufl day of May, 2006. 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
Thomas A. Banducci 
G. Rey Reinhardt, N 
Attorneys for Defendant 
MRIA'S NOTICE OF ERRATA RE: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MRIA'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 2 
f 165366.doc) 08355 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ay of May, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing instrument was s 
Warren E. Jones 
EBERLE BEmIN [7 Facsimile (208) 344-8542 
300 N. 6th Street, 2nd Floor [7 Hand Delivery 
Post Office Box 1368 [7 Overnight Delivery 
Boise, ID 83701 
[Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants] 
Rodney R. Saetrum .S. Mail 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES (208) 336-0448 
300 E. Mallard Drive, Suite 370 C] Hand Delivery 
Boise, ID 83706 [7 Overnight Delivery 
[Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants] 
Jack S. Gjording ~ u . s .   ail 
GJORDING & FOUSER [7 Facs~mile (208) 336-9177 
509 West Hayes 1 Hand Delivery 
Post Office Box 2837 C] Overnight Delivery 
Boise, ID 83701 
[Attorneys for PlaintifffCounter-Defendants] 
Givens Pursley, LLP ~ u . s .  Mail 
Patrick J. Miller C] Facsimile (208) 388-1300 
250 S. 5th Street, Suite 700 [7 Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2720 [7 Overnight Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720 
[Attorneys for PlaintifKounter-Defendants] 
MRIA'S NOTICE OF ERRATA RE: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MRIA'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 3 
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Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105 
Trudy Hanson Fouser, ISB No. 2794 
Bobbi K. Dominick, ISB No. 2895 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
509 W. Hays Street 
P.0. Box 2837 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208)336-9777 
Facsimile: (208)336-9177 
NO. 
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MAY 3 3 20C6 
Patrick J. Miller, ISB No. 3221 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
601 W. Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1 300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff;/CounterDefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED 
CARE, INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Defendant. I 
liability partnership, 
CounterClaimant, 
Case No. CV OC 0408219D 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED 
CARE, INC.'S AND SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, INC.'S SECOND MOTION 
TO STRIKE IN CONNECTION WITH 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PROCEEDINGS 
SAINT ALPHONSUS' SECOND MOTION TO STRIKE - 1 
VS. 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; 
SAINTALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third-Party Plaintiff 
vs. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability company; GEM STATE 
RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited liability 
partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Plaintiff, Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. and Counterdefendant Saint 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. (collectively "Saint Alphonsus") hereby move 
this Court for an Order striking certain testimony submitted by the way of affidavit by 
Defendant/Counterclaimant MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA") as follows: 
1. Saint Alphonsus moves to strike the March 23, 2006 affidavit of Thomas 
E. Henson, M.D. on the grounds and the basis that the affidavit submits extrinsic/parol 
evidence purportedly relating to MRIA's proffered interpretation of the Articles of 
Partnership. Because the Articles of Partnership are unambiguous, consideration of 
SAINT ALPHONSUS' SECOND MOTION TO STRIKE - 2 
extrinsic evidence is not permissible. See Lewis v. CEDUEducational Services, Inc., 135 
Idaho 139,144,15 P.3d 1147,1152 (2000). 
2. Saint Alphonsus moves to strike the affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt filed on 
May 23, 2006. The purpose of the affidavit again appears to be to submit extrinsic 
evidence relative to MRIA's proffered interpretation of the Partnership Agreement. 
Again, the Partnership Agreement is unambiguous and resort to extrinsic evidence is not 
permitted. 
3. Saint Alphonsus renews its motion to strike all references to what is now 
attached as Exhibit A to the Supplemental Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt dated May 26, 
2006. As previously noted, MRIA has established no foundation that this was a 
statement attributable to Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc. Further, Saint 
Alphonsus has further investigated the source of this document and learned that it came 
from PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Inc., an accounting firm. As such, the document is 
protected by the accountant-client privilege. 
Oral Argument is requested. 
cC 
DATED this -36 day of May, 2006. 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
SAINT ALPHONSUS' SECOND MOTION TO STRIKE - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-h, 
I hereby certify that on the ?&day of May, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated: 
Thomas A. Banducci - U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. express mail 
815 West Washington Street G - hand delivery 
Boise, ID 83702 - facsimile 
Warren E. Jones L - U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
Joseph H. Uberuaga - express mail 
EBERLE BERLIN KADING TURNBOW - hand delivery 
McKLVEEN &JONES - facsimile 
300 N. 6" Street, 2nd Floor 
Boise, ID 83702 
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453) 
G. Rey Reinhardt, IV (ISB No. 6209) 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
Counselors and Attomeys at Law 
The Carnegie Building 
8 15 West Washington Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone (208) 3 19-2600 
Facsimile (208) 3 19-2601 
Attomeys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Case No. CV OC 0408219D 
NON-IDAHO CASES CITED IN 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
SADC AND SARMC MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE 
Defendant. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
CounterClaimant, 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
CounterDefendants. 
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& 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; GEM 
STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Defendantlcounterclaimant, MRI Associates, LLP ("MRIA"), by and through its counsel 
of record, Greener Banducci Shoemaker P.A., lodges herewith copies of the non-Idaho cases 
cited in its Memorandum in Opposition to SADC and SARMC Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Strike, and requests that the Court take judicial notice of said cases and statutes 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 44(d). 
1. Stephens v. Donobi, Inc., 2006 W L  1277127, *1 (W.D. Wash. 2006) 
DATED this -* day of May, 2006. 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
G. Rey Reinhardt, IV 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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Rodney R. Saetrurn 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
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[Attorneys for Third-Party Defendants] 
Jack S. Gjording 
GJORDING & FOUSER 
509 West Hayes 
Post Office Box 2837 
Boise, ID 83701 
[Attorneys for PlaintifffCounter-Defendants] 
Givens Pursley, LLP 
Patrick J. Miller 
250 S. 5th Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 2720 
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Briefs and Other Related Documents 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, W.D. Washington, 
at Tacoma. 
Christine STEPHENS, Plaintiff, 
V. 
DONOBI, INC., a Washington Corporation, 
Defendant. 
No. C05-5608RBL. 
May 4,2006. 
Gordon C. Webb, James Bowne Parsons, Bonnell 
Webb & Ginster, Bellevue, WA, for Plaintiff. 
Richard Burt Shattuck, Silverdale, WA, for 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION UNDER FRCP 56(f) AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE 
RONALD B. LEIGHTON, District Judge. 
*I This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff 
Christine Stephens's Motion for Partial Snmmary 
Judgment [Dkt. # 181. Stephens argues that this 
Court should grant summary judgment in her favor 
by concluding that $170,500.00 remains due under 
the disputed Promissory Note. According to 
Stephens, the Note is clear and complete, and not 
ambiguous as to its terms. Defendant Donobi, Inc., 
argues that the Note is not a complete agreement 
and that it must be unde~stopd..ia the context of a 
series of agreements. Donobi moves under FRCP 
56(0 for time to depose Stephens and to complete 
discovery. Accordingly, Donobi requests this Court 
to deny Stephens's Motion for Partial Snmmary 
Judgment without prejudice until completion of 
discovery [Dkt. # 201. 
DISCUSSION 
O 2006 Thomson~West. No Claim 
FRCP 56 sets standards relating to summary 
judgment and wben courts should grant or refrain 
from granting a party's summary judgment motion. 
FRCP 56(f) specifically provides the following: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for 
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to 
justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse 
the application for judgment or may order a 
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or 
may make such other order as is just. 
Donobi's motion under FRCP 56(f) poses the 
question of whether Donobi can present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify the party's opposition. 
Donobi argues that it cannot present facts 
surrounding the parties' intent wben they drafted the 
Note until Donobi has bad an opportunity to depose 
Stephens and complete discovery. 
Donobi correctly argues that the Washington State 
Supreme Court has adopted the context approach to 
contract interpretation. Berg v. Hudesman, 11 5 
Wn.2d 657, 801 P.2d 222 (1990). The context 
approach applies even if the contract is 
unambiguous. Id. at 665. Under the context 
approach, the Conrt may admit extrinsic evidence 
(or parol evidence) relating to the entire 
circumstances under which the contract was made 
for the purpose of ascertaining parties' intent. Id. at 
667. However, the context approach does not apply 
for the purpose of adding to, modifying, or 
contradicting the tenns of a written contract, in the 
absence of fraud, accident, or mistake. Id. at 669. 
The Berg Court explained that it did not apply the 
plain meaning rule because "meaning can almost 
never be plain except in context." Id. at 668. 
Stephens asserts that a court may look to extrinsic 
evidence (or parol evidence) only to explain an 
ambiguity in the contract. She cites State v. Nason, 
96 Wn.App. 686, 691, 981 P.2d 866 (1999) in 
support of her argument. The problem is that 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works, 
Slip Copy 
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 1277127 (W.D.Wash.) 
(Cite as: Slip Copy) 
nowhere in Nason does the court limit admissible 
extrinsic evidence to evidence that helps resolve 
ambiguity. Rather, the Nason court explains that 
because the contract at issue, a plea agreement, was 
ambiguous, the court would allow extrinsic 
evidence to try to help clarify disputed terms. Id. at 
691-92. 
CONCLUSION 
*2 In light of the Berg Court holding establishing 
the context mle for e x h s i c  evidence, this Court 
GRANTS Donobi's motion under FRCP 56(f) [Dkt. 
# 201. The Court also DENIES WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE Plaintiff Stephens's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment until completion of discovery 
on June 19, 2006 [Dkt. # 181. Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment will be RENOTED for 
June 23,2006. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, 
Stephens v. Donobi, Inc. 
Slip Copy, 2006 WL 1277127 (W.D.Wash.) 
Briefs and Other Related Documents (Back to top) 
.3:05cv05608 (Docket) (Sep. 15,2005) 
2005 WL 2889703 (Trial Pleading) Complaint for 
Monies Due (Sep. 7,2005) 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453) 
G. Rey Reinhardt, IV (ISB No. 6209) 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
Counselors and Attorneys at Law 
The Carnegie Building 
815 West Washington Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone (208) 3 19-2600 
Facsimile (208) 319-2601 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Defendant. 
MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
SAINT ALPHONSUS DIVERSIFIED CARE, 
INC., an Idaho nonprofit corporation; SAINT 
ALPHONSUS REGIONAL MEDICAL 
CENTER, 
Case No. CV OC 0408219D 
NON-IDAHO CASES CITED IN REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MRIA'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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MRI ASSOCIATES, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, I 
Third-Party Plaintiff, I 
VS. 
INTERMOUNTAIN MEDICAL IMAGING, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; GEM 
STATE RADIOLOGY, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; and IMAGING CENTER 
RADIOLOGISTS, LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Defendant/Counterclaimant, MRI Associates, LLP ("MIUA"), by and through its counsel 
of record, Greener Banducci Shoemaker P.A., lodges herewith copies of the non-Idaho cases 
cited in its Reply Memorandum in Support of MRIA's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
and requests that the Court take judicial notice of said cases and statutes pursuant to Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 44(d). 
1. Hunter v. Straube, 543 P.2d 278, (Or. 1975 
2. Quimby v. Myers, --- A.2d ----, 2005 WL 3078185 (Vt. 2005) 
DATED this day of May, 2006, 
GREENER BANDUCCI SHOEMAKER P.A. 
\\ 
Thomas A. Banducci 
G. Rey Reinhardt, IV 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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C By filing suit to dissolve three-man medical 
Supreme Court of Oregon. partnership, two partners were not entitled to 
Arthur F. HUNTER and 0. D. Haugen, dissolution in accordance with Uniform Partnership 
Respondents, Cross-Appellants, Law, in view of provision of partnership agreement 
v. limiting dissolution to withdrawing partners and 
Kurt R. STRAUBE, Appellant, Cross-Respondent. expressly providing that retirement of any partner 
should not dissolve partnership as to the other 
Argued and Submitted Oct. 9, 1975. partners. ORS 68.310, 68.420, 68.440, 68.530, 
Decided Dec. 12, 1975. 68.590,68.600,68.620. 
Suit to dissolve threeman medical partnership was 
filed by two members against the third member. 
The Circuit Court, Multnomah County, William M. 
Dale, J., held that it had no jurisdiction to wind up 
affairs of partnership and plaintiffs appealed. The 
Supreme Court, McAllister, J., held that plaintiffs 
by merely calling their withdrawal from partnership 
a dissolution could not avoid requirement of giving 
six months' notice of withdrawal or provisions 
governing rights to partnership property upon 
withdrawal of a partner; that filing of the suit was an 
election to withdraw from partnership in 
contravention of partnership agreement; and that 
defendant partner was entitled to continue 
partnership business, to settle affairs of partnership 
in accordance with terms of partnership agreement 
and to recover from plaintiffs for any damage he 
might have suffered from breach. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
(11 Partnership -259.5 
289k259.5 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 289k2591/2,289k259) 
Partners expressed their wills to dissolve medical 
partnership by filing suit 
to dissolve. ORS 68.310, 68.420, 68.440, 68.530, 
67.590,68.600,68.620. 
[Z] Partnership -261 
289k261 Most Cited Cases 
13) Partnership *261 
289k261 Most Cited Cases 
If partnership agreement provides for distribution of 
partnership property, rights of partners are governed 
by partnership agreement rather than by Uniform 
Partnership Law. ORS 68.310, 68.420, 68.440, 
68.530,68.590,68.600,68.620. 
141 Partnership -261 
289k261 Most Cited Cases 
141 Partnership -263 
289k263 Most Cited Cases 
Two partnels had the power to dissolve 
three-member partnership by electing to withdraw 
as partners hut they did not have the right to do so 
without complying with terms of partnership 
agreement. ORS 68.310,68.420,68.530, 
68.590,68.600, 68.620. 
151 Partnership -261 
289k261 Most Cited Cases 
Any partner may have power to dissolve partnership 
at any time, even though dissolution is in 
contravention of partnership agreement, but, if 
partner who exercises power does not have right to 
do so, he must suffer the penalties. ORS 68.310, 
68.420, 68.440,68.530, 68.590,68.600,68.620. 
161 Partnership -99 
289k99 Most Cited Cases 
Noncompetition clauses in partnership agreement 
are lawful if freely entered into by partners and 
O 2006 Thomson~West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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reasonable in effect. 
[7] Partnership e 2 2 5  
289k225 Most Cited Cases 
171 Partnership -231.1 
289k231.1 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 289k231) 
Two members of three-member medical partnership 
could not, by merely calling their withdrawal from 
partnership a dissolution, escape from liabilities 
which they assumed when they executed partnership 
agreement, they could not avoid requirement of six 
months' notice of withdrawal and they must comply 
with provisions governing rights to partnership 
property upon withdrawal of a partner. ORS 68.310 
,68.420,68.440, 68.530,68.590,68.600,68.620. 
[8] Partnership -225 
289k225 Most Cited Cases 
Filing of suit by two members of three-member 
medical partnership against third member was an 
election by plaintiffs to withdraw from partnership 
in contravention of partnership agreement requiring 
six months' notice of withdrawal, defendant partner 
was entitled to continue partnership business and to 
settle affairs of partnership in accordance with 
terms of partnership agreement and he had right to 
recover for any damage he might have suffered on 
account of breach of notice provision. ORS 68.310, 
68.420, 68.440, 68.530,68.590,68.600,68.620. 
*721 **279 Richard E. Alexander of Williams, 
Montague, Stark, Hiefield & Norville, P.C., 
Portland, argued the cause and filed briefs for 
appellant, cross-respondent. 
John R. Faust, Jr., Portland, argued the cause and 
filed a brief for respondents, cross-appellants. With 
him on the brief were Hardy, Buttler, McEwen, 
Weiss *722 & Newman, Paul N. Wonacott, Wood, 
Wood, T a m ,  Mosser & Brooke, Portland. 
Before O'CONNELL, C.J., and McALLISTER, 
DENECKE, TONGUE, HOWELL and BRYSON, 
JJ. 
McALLISTER, Justice 
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This suit was filed by the plaintiffs, Dr. Arthur F. 
Hunter and Dr. 0. D. Haugen, to dissolve a 
three-man medical partnership in which the 
defendant, Dr. Kurt R. Skaube, was the third 
member. The three doctors were radiologists 
practicing in Portland under the firm name of Lloyd 
Center X-Ray. The partnership was created by a 
partnership agreement dated July 26, 1969 and a 
written addendum dated November 24, 1971 which 
added the plaintiff Haugen to the partnership. 
On September 11, 1974 the plaintiffs filed this suit 
in Multnomah County to dissolve the partnership 
and prayed for the appointment of a receiver and 
the winding up of the partnership. The defendant 
counterclaimed, alleging that he was entitled to 
continue the partnership business, to recover 
damages from plaintiffs for the breach of the 
partnership agreement, and to settle with the 
plaintiffs as withdrawing partners as provided by 
the partnership agreement. 
The only regular pleading filed was the plaintiffs' 
complaint. Thereafter, the parties, at the request of 
the kial court, prepared a pretrial order stating the 
admitted facts and the contentions of the parties, 
which order was approved by the court on 
November 29, 1974. The case was kied on the 
facts admitted in the pretrial order and the issues 
framed by that order. 
The prekial order states the nature of the 
proceedings as follows: 
'This is a suit of equity in which plaintiffs *723 
seek judicial supervision over the winding up of 
the affairs of a partnership they claim is dissolved 
and a liquidation of respective partnership 
interests **280 in accordance with Oregon's 
Uniform Partnership Law and defendant seeks 
continuation of the partnership business, damages 
for breach of the partnership contract, and a 
distribution to plaintiffs in accordance with the 
partnership agreement.' 
The trial court found that by the filing of this suit 
the plaintiffs 'did not cause by express will a 
dissolution of their partnership with defendant.' 
The court further found that since 'the partnership 
I Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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continues as an entity,' the court had no jurisdiction 
to wind up the affairs of the partnership. The court 
also dismissed the counterclaims of defendant 
because 'no dissolution had occurred.' 
The pertinent portions of the partnership agreement 
read as follows: 
'3. TERM: The partnership shall continue until 
the partnership is dissolved as herein provided. 
* * * 
'16. TERMINATION: In the event of the death 
of retirement of any Partner or the voluntary 
liquidation of the partnership, the following 
procedure shall be observed: 
'A. Death: 
'(1) The death of any Partner Shall not dissolve 
the partnership as to the other Partners, * * *.' 
(Emphasis added.) 
'B. Retirement: 
'The retirement of any Partner Shall not dissolve 
the partnership as to the other Partners, and each 
Partner hereby does bind his estate, heirs or 
personal representatives *724 to receive the sums 
as in this paragraph computed as full acquittance 
and payment of his interest in this partnership and 
all undistributed or uncollected earnings therein 
and does hereby agree to execute such receipts 
and bills of sale, deeds, or other instruments of 
conveyance or satisfaction as may be.required to 
carry out the terms, conditions and stipnlations 
herein set forth. (Emphasis added.) 
'(1) Upon the voluntary or involuntary retirement 
of a Partner from the partnership, Or upon the 
withdrawal of a Partner from the partnership, the 
books of the partnership shall be closed as of the 
fust day of the month in which the retirement or 
withdrawal becomes effective, and such Partner 
shall be entitled to receive the following sums and 
no more, all subject to Paragraph 16B(2) hereoE 
'(a) An amount equal to the capital account of the 
withdrawing or retiring Partner as of the close of 
the last fiscal year of the partnership, adjusted for 
additional capital investment subsequent thereto 
and reduced by any distributions dnring the 
current fiscal year of net profits in excess of said 
O 2006 Thomson~West. No 
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net profits. The capital amount, as so determined, 
shall be paid in forty-eight (48) equal monthly 
installments, with the fust installment payable on 
the fifth (5th) day of the fourth (4th) month 
following the closing date and remaining 
installments on the fifth (5th) day of the ensuing 
months, all without interest. 
'@) An amount equal to the retiring or 
withdrawing Partner's share in the undistributed 
net profits, if any, of the partnership as of the 
closing date *725 determined as provided in said 
Partnership Agreement reduced by any accounts 
payable relating to the collection of accounts 
receivable. The amount of such undistributed 
profits shall be paid as soon as reasonably 
practical. 
'(c) A share in future income of the partnership, 
as evidenced by the accounts receivable for 
services of the partnership as of the closing date, 
computed as provided in this subparagraph. 
Accounts receivable shall be valued at 75%, 
except that accounts ""281 which were fust 
billed more than one year prior to the closing date 
shall be valued at zero. The amount to which the 
retiring or withdrawing partner shall be entitled 
shall be computed on the basis of the following 
formula: 
b Claim to O*. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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( Percentage 1 ( Value 1 ( Number of f u l l  years  as 1 
( of ) ( of ) ( Par tner  of par tnership ,  o r  ) 
( par t i c ipa t ion  I ( ACCOUntS 1 ( predecessor par tnerships ,  1 
( i n  l X (  a s  ) X ( a s  of t h e  f i r s t  day of the  ) 
( n e t p r o f i t s  I ( computed ) ( cur ren t  par tnership  year  I 
( Of ) ( ) ( ---...-------------------- ) 
( Par tner  ) ( ) ( 20 I 
'For example, if the total value of such accounts 
receivable is $40,000, and the retiring or 
withdrawing Partner is entitled to 25% Of the net 
profits on the closing date, such Partner would 
receive $500 for each of such full years as a 
Partner. The amount thus determined shall he 
paid as a distribution of income in forty-eight 
(48) equal installments, without interest, at the 
same times as provided for under subparagraph 
(a) above. (Emphasis added.) 
(2) Non-Competition: 
'If a Partner shall voluntarily withdraw *726 or 
retire and shall engage in the practice of medicine 
or participate in any association, group or clinic 
so engaged within a forty-mile radius of the City 
of Portland, Oregon, during a period of three 
years from the effective date of withdrawal or 
retirement, such Partner shall have no right to 
receive any distributions under Paragraph B(1) 
above, from the date he so engages in the practice 
of medicine. (Emphasis added.) 
'(3) Procedure re Retirement: 
'(a) Any Partner voluntarily resigning from the 
Partnership shall give six months' written notice 
to each of the other Partners of his desire to 
retire, and such retirement shall take effect six 
months from the date of delivery of such notice to 
the other Partners.' 
contention of the plaintiffs that by the filing of this 
suit they are entitled to a dissolution in accordance 
with the Uniform Partnership Law. The plaintiffs 
ignore the provision of the partnaship agreement 
that limits the dissolution to the withdrawing 
partners and expressly provides that 'the retirement 
of any Partner shall not dissolve the partnership as 
to the other Partners'. 
[3] The power to dissolve a partnership is governed 
by ORS 68.530 and provides for dissolution both 
without violation of the partnership agreement and 
in contravention of the partnership agreement. In 
either case, it is clear that If the partnership 
agreement provides *727 for the distribution of the 
partnership property the rights of the partners are 
governed by the partnership agreement rather than 
by the Uniform Partnership Law. See provisions in 
ORS 68.310, 68.420, 68.440, 68.590, 68.600 and 
68.62O.wll 
FNI. All the provisions cited, relating to 
the rights and duties of the partners, make 
clear that they are subject to any agreement 
between the parties to the contrary. For 
example, ORS 68.620 provides: 
'Rules for distribution. In settling accounts 
between the partners after dissolution, the 
following rules shall be observed, subject 
to any agreement to the contrary: * * *.' 
[1][2] Plaintiffs contend that they expressed their **282 [4][5] In the case at bar the plaintiffs had the 
will to dissolve the partnership by the filing of this power to dissolve the partnership by electing to 
suit, citing Carrey v. Haun et al, 111 Or. 586, 592, withdraw as partners, a choice which they made by 
227 P. 315 (1924). We agree with this contention. filing this suit. Plaintiffs, however, did not have the 
See Clark v. Allen et al, 215 Or. 403, 410, 333 right to dissolve the partnership without complying 
P.2d 1100 (1959).- However, we disagree with the with the terms of the partnership agreement. As 
O 2006 ThomsouNv'est. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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was succinctly stated in Straus v. Straus, 254 Minn. 
234,94 N.W.2d 679,686 (1959): 
'A distinction must be recognized between the 
power to dissolve a partnership and the right to 
dissolve a partnership. Any partner may have the 
power to dissolve a ~artnership at any time * * * 
and this is true even though such dissolution is in 
contravention of the partnership agreement. * * * 
If a partner exercises his power to dissolve a 
partnership, but does not have the right to do so, 
be must suffer the penalties * * *! 
[6] The pertinent provisions of this partnership 
agieement have been set out earlier verbatim in the 
opinion. In brief, the agreemeut required the 
plaintiffs to give defendant, the remaining partner, 
six months' notice of their desire to withdraw and 
provided that the 'retirement shall take effect six 
months from the date of delivety of such notice to 
the other Partners.' The agreement also provided a 
specific plan of distribution to a withdrawing 
partner and contained *728 a restriction on 
competition. It should be noted that Oregon law 
does uphold non-competition clauses if freely 
entered into by the partners and reasonable in 
effect. Such clauses are typical of professional 
partnerships. McCallum v. Asbury, 238 Or. 257, 
263--264,393 P.2d 774 (1964). 
[7] The plaintiffs attempted by filing this suit to 
divest the defendant from his right to continue the 
partnership business, which he clearly had the right 
to do. They attempted to avoid the requirement of 
giving six months' notice. They also attempted to 
render nugatory the provisions of the partnership 
agreement governing the rights to the partnership 
property upon the withdrawal of a partner. We 
think the plaintiffs cannot, by merely calling their 
withdrawal a dissolution, escape from the liabilities 
which they assumed when they executed the 
partnership agreement. The plaintiffs have not cited 
a single authority in support of their contention. 
A recent case from our sister state of Washington is 
in accord with our decision today. Ashley v. Lance, 
75 Wash.2d 471, 451 P.2d 916, 920 (1969) and 80 
Wash2d 274, 493 P.2d 1242, 1245 (1972), in a 
very similar fact situation, held that the restrictive 
Page 6 of 7 
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covenant in the partnership agreement would be 
enforced for the benefit of the remaining partner. 
The withdrawing partners could not avoid the 
covenant by devising 'the legalistic theory that they 
would dissolve their partnership * * * and not 
withdraw therefrom.' 45 1 P.2d at 91 8. 
In Devlin v. Rockey, 295 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1961), 
the partnership agreement provided for termination 
upon a two-thirds majority vote of all the partners 
or upon the unanimous consent of all the partners. 
Two of the ten partners sought a decree declaring 
they had effected a dissolution of the partnership, 
alleging *729 that the partnership was one at will 
and therefore subject to dissolution by any partner 
at any time. The court held that, despite use of the 
word dissolution by the plaintiffs, it was clear that 
they were to be treated as withdrawing partners 
under the agreemeut, the partnership was not 
dissolved, and distribution to the plaintiffs was to be 
controlled by the partnership agreement provisions 
pertaining to withdrawal of a partner. 295 F.2d at 
269. 
Similarly, in Adams v. Jarvis, 23 Wis.2d 453, 127 
N.W.2d 400 (1964), the partnership agreement 
specifically provided that the partnership would not 
terminate upon the withdrawal of a partner. The 
plaintiff withdrew but contended this effected a 
dissolution **283 under a Wisconsin statute 
identical to ORS 68.510.[FN2] The court refused 
to construe the statute so as to invalidate an 
otherwise enforceable contract. In one sense 
plaintiffs withdrawal constituted a dissolution, the 
court said, hut the partnership was not wholly 
dissolved so as to require complete winding up. 
The partnership continued to exist under the terms 
of the agreement. 127 N.W.2d at 403-404. 
FN2. ORS 68.510 provides: 
'Dissolution defmed. The dissolution of a 
partnership is the change in the relation of 
the partners caused by any partner ceasing 
to be associated in the canying on as 
distinguished from the winding up of the 
business! 
Gibson v. Augros, 30 Colo.App. 95, 491 P.2d 87 
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(1971), involved a covenant not to compete upon 
withdrawal of a partner from the partnership. 
Plaintiff argued that his notice to resign from the 
partnership operated as a dissolution and he was 
therefore no longer bound by the restrictive 
covenant. The court held that plaintiffs actions 
constituted a voluntary retirement under the terms 
of the partnership agreement, and the terms of the 
agreement which became operative upon such 
retirement were not rendered *730 nugatory by the 
dissolntion of the partnership. 491 P.2d at 91. 
[8] We hold that the filing of this suit by the 
plaintiffs was an election by each of them to 
withdraw from the partnership in contravention of 
the partnership agreement. Under those 
circumstances the withdrawal entitles the defendant 
to continue the partnership business and to settle the 
affairs of the partnership in accordance with the 
terms of the partnership agreement. The defendant 
also has the right to any damages he may have 
suffered on account of the plaintiffs' breach of the 
provision for six months' notice of withdrawal. 
This snit is reversed and remanded to the court 
below for fiirther proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Reversed and remanded 
273 Or. 720,543 P.2d 278 
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Background: Plaintiff brought action for 
dissolution of alleged partnership for horse farm 
business, and sought an accounting and enforcement 
of oral agreement to sell the horse farm property 
and divide the proceeds equally if the parties ended 
their personal relationship. The Lamoille Superior 
Court, John P. Meaker, J., denied plaintiffs motion 
for writ of attachment and granted summary 
judgment to defendant as to oral agreement. 
Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court reversed. 
Plaintiff filed amended complaint, seeking 
dissolution of partnership, adding unjust enrichment 
claim, adding fraudulent conveyance claim relating 
to defendant's conveyance of property to herself and 
to her new husband as tenants by the entirety, and 
adding husband as a defendant. Defendant-wife 
counterclaimed for unjust enrichment. The Superior 
Court, John P. Meaker, J., dismissed the fraudulent 
conveyance claim, the jury returned a special 
verdict fmding oral agreement for equal partnership, 
fmding that plaintiff had not been unjustly enriched, 
and identifying, as partnership property, land worth 
$36,600, house worth $40,900, and horses worth 
$42,000, the trial court granted plaintiffs motion for 
nonpossessory writ of attachment or constructive 
trust on partnership property, but the trial court did 
not award prejudgment interest to plaintiff, and it 
denied plaintiffs motion for attorney fees. 
Cross-appeals were taken. 
2Holding: The Supreme Court held that alleged 
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oral agreement to convey real property to 
partnership was subject to Statute of Frauds. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
185 Frauds, Statute Of 
185VI Real Property and Estates and Interests 
. . 
Therein 
185k71 Contracts for Sale 
185k76 k. Partnership Contracts and 
Lands. Most Cited Cases 
Under the Statute of Frauds, a writing is required to 
transfer real property, already owned by one 
partner, to another partner or to the partnership. 12 
V.S.A. $ 181(5). 
[2] Frauds, Statute Of 185 -76 
185 Frauds, Statute Of 
l85VI Real Property and Estates and Interests 
Therein 
185k71 Contracts for Sale 
185k76 k. Partnership Contracts and 
Lands. Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's alleged oral agreement with plaintiff, to 
convey to plaintiff, or to the alleged partnership 
between plaintiff and defendant, a half interest in 
her land and the improvements thereon, was subject 
to Statute of Frauds. 12 V.S.A. $ 181(5). 
[3] Partnership 289 -261 
289 Partnership 
289VII Dissolution, Settlement, and Accounting 
289W(A) Causes of Dissolution 
289k261 k. Provisions for Dissolution in 
Partnership Agreements. Most Cited Cases 
Where a partnership agreement provides for 
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distribution of the partnership property upon 
dissolution of the partnership, the agreement 
controls over the dissolution statute. 11 V.S.A. $5 
3203(a), 3277. 
[4] Interest 219 6;539(2.15) 
2 19 Interest 
219111 Time and Computation 
219k39 Time from Which Interest Runs in 
General 
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in 
General 
219k39(2.15) k. Liquidated or 
Unliquidated Claims in General. Most Cited Cases 
The prevailing party is entitled to prejudgment 
interest when the principal sum recovered is 
liquidated or capable of ready ascertainment. 
Present: REIBER, C.J., DOOLEY, JOHNSON, 
SKOGLUND, JJ. and BURGESS, District Judge, 
Specially Assigned. 
ENTRY ORDER 
7 1. This case-before us for a second time-involves 
a protracted dispute between*129 a former couple 
over the assets of their alleged partnership in a 
horse farm b u s i u e ~ s . ~ '  In this second appeal, 
defendant Gaye Schaufus Myers contends the trial 
court erred in: (1) denying her motion for summary 
judgment, which was based on the Statute of 
Frauds, and later permitting the jury to determine 
that real property to which she held exclusive title 
was a partnership asset despite the absence of a 
writing transferring title to the partnership; (2) 
failing to conduct an accounting and judicial 
dissolution of the partnership taking into account 
the partners' capital contributions; and (3) 
dismissing her counterclaim for unjust enrichment. 
In a cross-appeal, plaintiff Michael Quimby 
contends the court erred in: (1) dismissing a 
fraudulent conveyance claim; (2) failing to award 
pre-judgment interest; and (3) denying his motion 
for attorney's fees. We affirm in part, reverse in 
part, and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with the views set forth below. 
FN1. The original appeal in this matter 
was entitled Quimby v. Schaufw: 
No.2001-528, 2002 WL 32813805 (Vt. 
June 27, 2002) (unreported mem.). In 
May 2001, Gaye Schaufus married Joseph 
T. Myers. We shall refer to defendant by 
her manied name in this appeal. 
7 2. The material facts may be briefly summarized. 
Ms. Myers was the sole owner of a sixty-acre 
wooded lot in the Town of Lowell. In 1994, she 
began a personal relationship with Mr. Quimby. 
Quimby claims that he and Myers entered into an 
oral agreement in which he agreed to sell his house 
and use the proceeds to construct a pole barn and 
apartment on the Lowell property for use in a 
business to breed and sell horses. Although 
Quimby claims to have invested about $30,000 
fiom the sale, the evidence at trial showed that he 
gave Myers two checks from the proceeds totaling 
$19,000. Quimby further testified that he and 
Myers entered into a "50150 agreement" under 
which, if the relationship ended, "we'll sell, we'll 
split, and we'll be gone." Thereafter, Myers 
brought a number of her horses to the property, and 
Quimby claims that together they acquired several 
more and that he used his income to pay for the cost 
of feed, utilities, and taxes. Quimby acknowledged 
that although he pressed Myers "to give me 
something in writing" she refused, and that he 
consequently threatened to sue under the "original 
agreement" for "[hlalf of everything. Half of the 
house, barn, half of the horses that we had acquired. 
3, 
7 3. The parties' relationship ended in 1999. In 
August 2000, Quimby filed a complaint against 
Myers, seeking a dissolution of the partnership, an 
accounting, and enforcement of the oral agreement 
to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally 
upon the dissolution of the parties' relationship. 
The court denied Quimby's motion for writ of 
attachment and, thereafter, granted Myers's motion 
for summary judgment, ruling that the oral 
agreement for reimbursement of the proceeds that 
Quimby had allegedly invested in the business was 
invalid under the Statute of Frauds, 12 V.S.A. $ 
181(5). MZ In Quimby v. Schaufus, No.2001-528, 
slip op. at 2, 2002 WL 32813805 (Vt. June 27, 
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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2002) (unreported mem.), however, we reversed the 
judgment, holding that an agreement for repayment 
of money, even if it requires liquidation of real 
property, does not require a writing. See *I30 
Cameron v. Burke, 153 Vt. 565, 571-72, 572 A.2d 
1361, 1365 (1990) (Statute of Frauds does not 
apply to promise to repay debt from proceeds of 
resale of land, which does not create interest in 
property within the statute). We also noted that 
material issues remained in dispute concerning 
Quimby's allegation that the parties had an oral 
agreement to operate a business, and his claim for 
an accounting. Quimby, No.2001-528, slip op. at 2; 
see Harman v. Rogers, 147 Vt. 11, 14-15, 510 
A.2d 161, 163-64 (1986) (partnership may be 
created by "tacit agreement"); Dutch Hi11 Inn, Inc. 
v. Patten, 129 Vt. 466, 469, 282 A.2d 815, 817 
(1971) (holding that evidence was sufficient to 
support fmding of oral partnership agreement). 
FN2. This section provides that, unless the 
agreement is in writing and signed by the 
party to be charged, an action at law may 
not he brought on "[a] contract for the sale 
of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or of 
an interest in or concerning them. 
Authorization to execute such a contract 
on behalf of another shall be in writing." 
7 4. Following our decision, Qnimby acquired new 
counsel and filed an amended complaint, alleging 
that the parties bad agreed to be equal partners in 
the horse f m  business, that they were equal 
owners of the horses, and that the house and land 
were also "partnership property along with the 
personal property." He requested that the 
partnership be dissolved and that the assets be 
liquidated and distributed under the terms of the 
parties' agreement. The amended complaint added 
Myers's new husband, Joseph T. Myers, as a named 
defendant, alleging that Myers's conveyance of the 
property to Mr. Myers and herself as tenants by the 
entirety in June 2001 constituted a fraudulent 
conveyance. The amended complaint included an 
additional claim for unjust enrichment. Myers, in 
response, filed a counterclaim, asserting that 
Quimby had been unjustly enriched from Myers's 
services to the household, storage of Quimby's 
personal items, and contributions to Quimby's 
antique business. 
7 5. Prior to trial, Myers moved for partial 
summary judgment, arguing that Quimby was not 
entitled to a division of the real property as a 
partnership asset because she had not transferred 
the property to Quimby or the partnership in 
writing, as required by the Statute of Frauds. 
Although the court failed to rule on the motion, it 
later overmled Myers's objection, based on the 
Statute of Frauds, to proposed jury instructions 
permitting the jury to fmd that the land and 
improvements were partnership assets. Myers 
renewed her objection to the charge at the 
completion of the court's instructions. The jury 
returned a special verdict, answering "yes" to the 
question whether Myers and Quimby had "enter[ed] 
into an oral agreement to form a 50150 business 
partnership," and specifically identified the 
partnership property as laud worth $36,600, a house 
worth $40,900, and horses worth $42,000, for a 
total of $1 1 9 , 5 0 0 . ~ ~  
FN3. Having so found, the jury, as directed 
by the special verdict form, did not address 
Quimby's alternative claims for recovery 
based on promissory estoppel and unjust 
enrichment. The court had previously 
dismissed the fraudulent conveyance 
claim. The jury also answered "No" to 
the question whether Quimby had been 
unjustly enriched from Myers's services. 
7 6. Thereafter, Quimby moved for a 
nonpossessory writ of attachment or constructive 
trust on the partnersbip property, and for liquidation 
of the partnership property through a judicial sale to 
pay him half the value of the assets. Myers, in 
response, moved for a judicial accounting and 
distribution of the assets, including the 
contributions of the partners, under 11 V.S.A. 5 
3277(a). The court granted Quimby's motion and 
reserved ruling on Myers's request. In April 2004, 
following a hearing, the court issued a written 
judgment, ruling that the parties had agreed, upon 
dissolution of the partnership, to a sale of the 
partnership assets and a fifty-fifty division of the 
O 2006 Thomsoflest. No Claim to 0ri.g. U.S. Govt. Works, 
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proceeds, and accordingly awarded Quimby 
damages of $59,750, *I31 noting that Quimby 
could petition the court for sale of the partnership 
real estate if the judgment were not satisfied. The 
court also denied Quimby's request for attorney's 
fees, and ordered interest to run from the date of 
judgment. 
[l] 7 7. On appeal, Myers renews her argument 
that the Statute of Frauds barred Quimby's claim to 
the real property as a partnership asset. We agree. 
It is well settled that a writing is required to transfer 
real property, already owned by one partner, to 
another partner or to the partnership. See, e.g., 
Johnson v. Gilbert, 127 Ariz. 410, 621 P.2d 916, 
919 (Ct.App.1980) (contract providing for "transfer 
of land from one partner or joint venturer to another 
is within the Statute of Frauds"); McCloud v. 
Davison, 719 So.2d 995, 997 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1998) (agreements between 
partners or joint venturers to buy or sell land are not 
within the purview of the Statute of Frauds "unless 
there is a provision for transfer of title to specific 
real property from one of the parties to another"); 
Amendola v. Kendzia, 17 A.D.3d 1105, 793 
N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (2005) (afftrming motion to 
dismiss partner's claim for accounting of alleged 
partnership asset in real property on ground that 
oral agreement to convey property to partnership 
was barred by Statute of Frauds); Ludwig v. Walter, 
75 N.C.App. 584, 331 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1985) (" 
[Tlhe general rule is that land owned individually 
by one who enters into a partnership cannot become 
a partnership asset absent some written agreement 
sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds."); 
Gunsorek v. Heartland Bank, 124 Ohio App.3d 
735, 707 N.E.2d 557, 563-64 (1997) (trial court 
erred in failing to grant summary judgment based 
on absence of writing under general rule that 
partner's agreement to transfer real property he 
already owned as his contribution to the partnership 
is within Statute of Frauds); Shire Dev. v. Frontier 
Invs., 799 P.2d 221, 223-24 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (if 
agreement provides for transfer of real property 
interests among partners, "it would have to be in 
writing in order to comply with the statute of frauds" 
); see generally 1 Z. Cavitch, Business 
Organizations 14.03[2], at 14-15 (2005) 
(observing that Statute of Frauds applies "where 
real property [is] to be conveyed from one partner 
to another"); 9 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts, 5 
25.17, at 606 (4th ed.1999) (noting general rule that 
agreement that new partnership shall have an 
interest in realty owned by one of the partners is 
within the Statute of Frauds). 
7 8. As these authorities demonstrate, while 
partnership or joint venture agreements need not be 
in writing as a general matter, the fact that 
agreements covered by the Statute of Frauds-such 
as those relating to interests in real property-are 
made in the context of a partnership or joint venture 
agreement does not render the statute inapplicable. 
Merely because the agreement involves parties to a 
business partnership does not negate the interests 
traditionally safeguarded under the statute. As the 
court in East Piedmont 120 Assocs. v. Sheppard, 
209 Ga.App. 664, 434 S.E.2d 101 (1993), cogently 
observed: "The evidentiaiy and cautionary 
purposes of the statute-to prevent fraud and pe jury 
on the one hand and to ensure that parties are aware 
of the serious consequences of their actions on the 
other-are implicated when a promise to convey an 
interest in land is made in the context of a 
partnership or joint venture agreement just as they 
are when such a promise is made in any other 
context." Id. at 103; see also Mason v. Anderson, 
146 Vt. 242, 244, 499 A.2d 783, 784 (1985) 
(purpose of Statute of Frauds "is to prevent a party 
from being compelled, by oral and perhaps false 
testimony, to be held responsible for 9 3 2  an 
agreement he or she claims was never made"). 
[2] 1 9. As noted, it is undisputed here that Myers's 
alleged agreement to convey to Quimby or to the 
partnership a half interest in her land and the 
improvements thereon was never reduced to 
writing. Accordingly, consistent with the general 
principles and authorities set forth above, we 
conclude as a matter of law that Quimby's claim to 
an interest in Myers's real property was barred by 
the Statute of Frauds, and that the trial court erred 
in permitting the jury to characterize the real 
property in question as partnership assets. That 
portion of the judgment, therefore, must be reversed. 
[3] 7 10. The question remains whether, as Myers 
contends, we must also' remand the matter for a 
O 2006 ThomsonlWest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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judicial dissolution, accounting, and distribution 
under the partnership dissolution statute, 11 V.S.A. 
$ 3277. Myers asserts, in this regard, that the court 
erred in failing to consider the "contributions of the 
partners" as liabilities owed to their respective 
accounts prior to dividing the remaining assets, as 
required by the statute. Id. $ 3277(a). The 
partnership statute expressly provides, however, 
that subject to certain exceptions not applicable 
here, "relations among the partners and between the 
partners and the partnership are governed by the 
partnership agreement." Id. 5 3203(a) (further 
providing that, "[tlo the extent the partnership 
agreement does not otherwise provide, this chapter 
governs relations among the partners and between 
the partners and the partnership."). Thus, where a 
partnership agreement provides for distribution of 
the partnership property, the agreement controls 
over the statute.FN4 This is consistent with 
statutory and case law nationwide. See, e.g., 
Disotell v. Stiltner, 100 P.3d 890, 893 (Alaska 2004) 
(under partnership statute, partners "are free to 
make alternative provisions in the partnership 
agreement" from those in dissolution statute, but 
absent agreement "the statuto~y provisions govern 
by default"); Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 404 Mass. 
419, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1260 (1989) (noting that 
partnership statute "expressly defers to the method 
of dividing the partnership's assets which the parties 
bargained for in their partnership agreement"); 
McCormick v. Brevig, 2004 MT 179, 7 35, 322 
Mont. 112, 96 P.3d 697 (oral agreement will suffice 
to create partnexxhip, and such agreement will 
govern over dissolution statute, which applies "only 
in the absence of a partnership agreement to the 
contrary"); Hunter v. Straube, 273 Or. 720, 543 
P.2d 278, 281 (1975) ("[Ilf the partnership 
agreement provides for the distribution of the 
partnership property the rights of the partners are 
governed by the partnership agreement rather than 
by the Uniform Partnership Law."); see generally 
1 Z. Cavitch, Business Organizations $ 29.08121, at 
29-87 (2005) (an agreement between partners 
concerning distribution of assets controls over 
dissolution statute). 
FN4. The prior version of the partnership 
statute, in effect until January 1999 
(shortly before the parties here dissolved 
their relationship), similarly provided that, 
"[iln settling accounts between the partners 
after dissolution, the following rules shall 
be observed, subject to any agreement to 
the contrary." 11 V.S.A. $ 1332, repealed 
1997, No. 149 (AdjSess.), $ 2. 
7 11. Here, the court specifically found that 
Myers and Quimby had agreed, in the event that 
they dissolved their relationship and business, to 
sell the business assets and divide the proceeds 
equally. Although the court, at one point in its 
decision, referred to the "net proceeds," it is clear 
from the decision that the court did not fmd an 
intent to distribute the assets on *I33 the basis of 
individual capital contributions, but rather-as the 
court explained-on the basis of a stmight "50150 
split of the value of the assets of the partnership." 
Although there was not a great deal of evidence on 
this point, Quimby did testie repeatedly to an 
agreement to sell the business assets and divide the 
proceeds equally ("we would have a horse business 
and if anything went bad with the relationship, we'd 
split up, sell everything, split it 50150"). 
Accordingly, we fmd no error in the court's decision 
to dishibute the assets on the basis of the parties' 
agreement. Having previously determined that it 
was error to include the real property among those 
assets, we conclude that the judgment must be 
modified to reflect an equal division of the sole 
remaining asset, the horses, valued at $42,000, for a 
corrected award of $21,000 to Q ~ i m b ~ . ~ ~ ~  
FN5. Myers asserts in passing that there 
was no evidence she intended the horses 
that she owned prior to her relationship 
with Quimby to become partnership 
property. The claim, set forth in a single 
sentence, is not adequately briefed, and in 
any event is belied by Quimby's repeated 
testimony that he and Myers had agreed to 
pool their resources, including the horses, 
in the partnership, and to sell the assets 
and divide the proceeds equally in the 
event of a dissolution. 
7 12. The parties' remaining claims require little 
:)aim to Onig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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extended discussion. In light of our holding that 
title to the real property was not, as a matter of law, 
validly conveyed to Quimby or the partnership, and 
that Myers therefore remained the sole owner until 
she conveyed the property to herself and Mr. Myers 
as tenants by the entirety, we agree with Myers's 
claim that the court erred in imposing a constructive 
trust as a basis for securing partnership property. 
The evidence was also clear that, as Myers's 
primary residence, the property was exempt from 
the writ of attachment for the amount of the 
judgment ($59,000) under the homestead statute. 
See 27 V.S.A. 5 101 (homestead consisting of 
dwelling house and la* not exceeding $75,000, 
shall he exempt from attachment). Myers also 
claims that the court erred in dismissing on its own 
motion her counterclaim for unjust enrichment. 
Although the conrt observed during the charge 
conference that it did not approve of awarding 
compensation for domestic services provided in the 
course of an intimate relationship, it did not dismiss 
the claim. Indeed, the court specifically charged 
the jury on Myers's claim for labor and storage 
services that she had provided, and the jury returned 
a special verdict fmding that Quimby had not been 
unjustly enriched by her services. Accordingly, we 
discem no error. 
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defendant following*134 Myers's allegedly 
fraudulent conveyance of the real property. As the 
fraudulent conveyance claim was properly 
dismissed, there was plainly no basis for the motion. 
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is 
remanded for modification of the judgment 
consistent with the views expressed herein. 
Vt.,2005. 
Quimby v. Myers 
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[4] 7 13. Qnimby has raised three issues in his END OF DOCUMENT 
cross-appeal. First, he contends the court erred in 
denying his fraudulent conveyance claim. As the 
claim was premised, incorrectly, on Quimby's 
assertion that the real property was a partnership 
asset, we fmd no basis to reverse the court's 
decision. Quimby further contends the court erred 
in awarding interest from the date of judgment, in 
April 2004, rather than from the date he allegedly 
demanded his partnership interest in 1999, or the 
date of suit in August 2000. The prevailing party is 
entitled to prejudgment interest when the principal 
sum recovered is liquidated or capable of ready 
ascertainment. Bull v. Pinkham Eng'g Assocs., 170 
Vt. 450, 463, 752 A.2d 26, 36 (2000). Quimby has 
cited no facts or case law demonstrating how the 
damages in this case were clearly ascertainable 
prior to the judgment. Thus, we find no error. 
Finally, Quimby contends the conrt erred in denying 
his motion for attorney's fees incurred when he was 
allegedly compelled to join Mr. Myers as a party 
O 2006 Thomsonlwest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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BACKGROUND 
Defendants: Thomas A. Banducci, G. Rey Reinhardt IV, and Dan Gordon 
of Greener, Banducci, Shoemaker, P.A. for 
DefendantICounterclaimant MRI Associates, LLP 
l7 11 This litigation stems from Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care's (SADC) 
18 
19 
20 
23 1 1  contract and wrongful dissociation, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the implied 
dissociation from an ldaho limited liability partnership, MRI Associates, LLP (MRIA). 
SADC filed an action against MRIA to determine the buyout terms of this dissociation 
21 
22 
under ldaho law. In turn, MRIA filed a counterclaim against SADC, Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center (SARMC)' (collectively "Saint Alphonsus") alleging breach of 
24 
25 
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Both the Plaintiffs Complaint and the 
26 'SADC is an ldaho nonprofit corporation whose sole voting member is SARMC 
Defendant's Counterclaim sought declaratory relief and damages. The Defendant filed 
the First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint on March 7, 2006, adding 
fifteen (15) new claims against SARMC and three (3) third parties, Intermountain 
Medical Imaging, LLC (IMI), Gem State Radiology, LLP (GSR), and Imaging center 
Radiologists, LLP (ICR). 
Presently, MRlA and Saint Alphonsus have filed cross-motions for partial 
summary judgment centering on the issue of whether SADC's dissociation from MRlA 
was "wrongful" under the MRlA Partnership Agreement and Idaho's partnership 
statutes. Saint Alphonsus has filed two (2) motions to strike relating to the pending 
summary judgment motions. Also, both Saint Alphonsus and the Third-Party 
Defendants (IMI, GSR, and ICR) have filed motions to dismiss claims from MRIA's First 
Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint under ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. These motions 
came before the Court for oral argument on Tuesday, June 6,2006. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Saint Alphonsus Motions to strike2 
ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires that all supporting and opposing 
affidavits "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein." Any document evidence offered in support of a 
motion must be properly authenticated and attached to such an affidavit. Importantly, 
'These motions were filed on May 5 and May 30.2006. The Court signed an order to shorten timeon the 
second motion on Monday, June 5,2006. 
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the facts asserted in an affidavit submitted in support or opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment must have a proper evidentiary foundation. See I.R.C.P. 56(e) If 
the statements in or exhibits to an affidavit would not be admissible, they should not be 
considered when deciding the motion for summary judgment. Cafes v. Alberfson's Inc., 
126 Idaho 1030,1034,895 P.2d 1223,1227 (1995). 
Saint Alphonsus first motion to strike seeks to strike: 1) paragraph 6 of the 
Affidavit of Thomas E. Henson, M.D. in Support of MRI Associates' Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 2) all portions of MRI Associate's memorandum supporting their 
motion for partial summary judgment that refer to "internal" documents of Saint 
~ l ~ h o n s u s ~ ;  and 3) paragraph 4 and Exhibit C of the Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in 
Support of MRI Associates' Motion for Summary Judgment (the referenced "internal" 
document). These affidavits were filed on March 21, 2006. 
Saint Alphonsus contends that the challenged statements and documents are 
inadmissible pursuant to the parol evidence rule. This rule holds that where a contract 
is complete, clear, and unambiguous on its face, "extrinsic evidence of prior or 
contemporaneous negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary, 
alter, add to, or detract from the terms of the contract." Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 
139, 141-42, 106 P.3d 465, 467-68 (2005). Saint Alphonsus further contends that 
even if admissible under the parol evidence rule, the statements and exhibits are 
'Although the memorandum cited to "Exhibit C of Mr. Reinhardt's affidavit for the "internal" document, 
Exhibit C was actually a copy of the minutes of an SARMC meeting presented at the deposition of Ms. 
Sandra Bruce and the document referred to in MRIA's memorandum in support of its motion was 
nadvertently omitted. The document referred to in MRIA's memorandum was later attached as Exhibit A 
:o the Supplemental Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRI Associates' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, filed on May 26, 2006. These discrepancies were remedied by Saint Alphonsus' second 
notion to strike, which specifically addresses Exhibit A to the supplemental affidavit. 
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extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent regarding an unambiguous partnership 
agreement, and are therefore inadmissible. See Lewis v. CEDU Educ. Servs., Inc., 135 
ldaho 139,144.15 P.3d 1147,1152 (2000). 
At oral argument on these motions, the parties essentially agreed that the Court 
should strike the challenged affidavits andlor exhibits. The parties both urged the Court 
to determine the motions for summary judgment on basic principles of contract 
interpretation, eschewing reference to facts and circumstances beyond the partnership 
agreement. Because the Court does find the partnership language unambiguous with 
regard to SADC's right to dissociate from MRIA, the Court will not consider the 
challenged evidence. See id. Therefore, the Court will grant both of Saint Alphonsus 
motions to   trike.^ 
11. Motions for Partial Summary Judgment 
ldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) states that summary judgment shall be 
rendered "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment may be 
rendered upon an entire case, or discrete claims or issues. See I.R.C.P. 56(d). To 
defeat a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party may not simply rely upon 
mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts in an affidavit 
presenting a genuine issue of fact for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 
ldaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). On a motion for summary judgment, all 
In the event the stricken documents or statements are later found relevant to remaining claims, the Court 
may consider the proffered evidence on issues other than those addressed in this motion, so long as a 
prober foundationis demonstrated. 
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facts and inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. 
~ollingsworN1, M.D. et al., 136 ldaho 800,41 P.3d 228 (2001). 
The parties' motions for summary judgment overlap to a substantial extent. 
Although each party's motion must be evaluated on its own merits, Intermountain Eye & 
Laser Centers PLLC v. Miller, 142 ldaho 218, 222, 127 P.3d 121, 125 (2005), where 
both parties have filed motions for summary judgment on the same evidentiary facts, 
issues, and theories, the parties have effectively stipulated that there is no issue of 
material fact. See Komrei v. Aid Ins. Co., 110 ldaho 549,716 P.2d 1322 (1986). Here, 
both motions center on whether SADC's dissociation from MRIA was "wrongful" under 
the MRIA Partnership Agreement and ldaho law. MRIA's motion additionally requests 
summary judgment to determine the formula for computing the partnership share 
salculation for SADC because of SADC's disassociation from the partnership. The 
Court agrees with the parties that these motions present a pure issue of law for the 
Court. 
The partnership agreement at issue was entered into and made effective on April 
1, 1985. At that time, ldaho had enacted a version of the Uniform Partnership Act. 
Jnder that Act, a partner could rightfully leave a partnership and cause dissolution by 
3xpress will at any time unless the partnership was for a specific term or undertaking, or 
,thewise restricted in the partnership agreement. See ldaho Code § 53-331 (repealed 
3ffective July 1, 2001). After passing the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), the 
daho legislature allowed a period of time for existing partnership agreements to be 
nodified in light of the changes in the existing law. As of July 1, 2005, the RUPA 
3pplied retroactively to govern all ldaho partnerships. ldaho Code fj 53-3-1204. 
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Therefore, the provisions of the RUPA govern the MRlA partnership agreement, even if 
3ntered into in 1985. 
Idaho's version of the RUPA states that, except in enumerated circumstances, 
'relations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership are 
~overned by the partnership agreement. To the extent the partnership agreement does 
qot otherwise provide, [the RUPA] governs relations among the partners and between 
:he partners and the partnership." ldaho Code $ 53-3-103.~ Generally, where an 
axpress provision of the partnership agreement applies to a given situation, the parties 
3re bound to the terms of the partnership agreement. If there is no provision of the 
3artnership agreement that applies to a given situation, the RUPA provisions act as 
jefault rules, filling in the gaps left by the lack of agreed upon provisions. 
A. SADC's Dissociation from MRIA 
Although a partner always has the power to withdraw, a partner's dissociation will 
3e deemed wrongful if: 1) the dissociation breaches an express term of the partnership 
iigreement; 2) the partnership was to last for a specific, identified term and a partner 
jissociated before the end of the term; or 3) the partnership was for a particular 
~ndertaking, and a partner dissociated before the end of the undertaking. ldaho Code 
3s 53-3-103(b) (6). -602. Thus, THE RUPA acknowledges the parties' rights to restrict, 
mlarge, or entirely eliminate the circumstances upon which a partner may rightfully 
jissociate from the partnership. See ldaho Code $3 53-3-103(a), -602(b) (1). The 
~rimary disagreement here is whether an express term of the MRIA partnership 
Although subsection (b) lists certain un-alterable provisions, these exceptions to the general rule are not 
applicable to this dispute. See ldaho Code $53-3-103(b). 
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~greement restricted SADC's right to dissociate for any reason. 
MRlA is an Idaho limited liability partnership that currently has five (5) corporate 
~artners: Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc., SADC, MedNow, Inc.; West Valley 
Aedical Center; and Holy Rosary Medical Center. SADC was included as one of the 
Hospital Partners" of MRIA under the MRlA Partnership Agreement. The only section 
~f that partnership agreement discussing dissociation provides: 
ARTICLE 6 
WITHDRAWAL OF A HOSPITAL PARTNER 
6.1 Conditions for Withdrawal. Any Hospital Partner may 
withdraw from the Partnership at any time if, in a Hospital Partner's 
reasonable judgment, continued participation in this partnership: (i) 
jeopardizes the tax-exempt status of such Hospital Partner or its parent or 
its subsidiaries; or (ii) jeopardizes MedicareIMedicaid or insurance 
reimbursements or participations; (iii) if the business activities of the 
Partnership are contrary to the ethical principles of the Roman Catholic 
Church as designated from time to time; or (iv) is or may be in violation of 
an local, state or federal laws, rules or regulations .... 
~ffidavit of Thomas E. Henson, M.D. in Support MRI Associates' Motion for Summary 
udgment ("Henson Aff."), Exhibit A. The above section is the only provision of the 
IRIA Partnership Agreement discussing withdrawal of a Hospital Partner. Neither 
arty disputes the fact that SADC did not dissociate or intend to dissociate from MRlA 
nder any of the four (4) listed provisions in section 6.1 of the MRlA Partnership 
greement. The first question for the Court is whether the only reason a Hospital 
'artner could rightfully withdraw is for one of the circumstances listed in paragraph 6.1. 
MRlA asserts that the use of "if' in section 6.1 before the list of circumstances 
nits a Hospital Partner's ability to dissociate under the MRlA Partnership Agreement. 
ecause SADC admittedly did not withdraw due to the presence of one or more of the 
:ated circumstances, MRlA contends SADC's dissociation was "wrongful." As MRlA 
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correctly points out the specified circumstances set forth in this paragraph are of great 
significance to the hospital partners. These enumerated circumstances could each 
cause significant ramifications to the hospital partners from the standpoint of economic, 
legal and religious support. 
On the other hand, Saint Alphonsus contends that while SADC could dissociate 
under those four (4) provisions, these were not an exclusive list of circumstances upon 
which a Hospital Partner could rightfully withdraw from MRIA. Thus, Saint Alphonsus 
claims that their dissociation was not in violation of an express provisions of the 
partnership agreement and therefore not wrongful under ldaho Code $53-3-602(b). 
Contract language is ambiguous if the language is "reasonably subject to 
sonflicting interpretations." Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 ldaho 604, 114 
?.3d 974, 984 (2005) (quoting Jerteling v. Payne, 131 ldaho 389, 392, 957 P.2d 1387, 
1390 (1998)). The ldaho Supreme Court has held that when opposing parties submit 
'equally plausible reading[sIs of a contract provision, the provision is, by definition, 
ambiguous. Intermountain Eye, 142 ldaho at 223, 127 P.3d at 126. If the withdrawal 
~rovision is found to be ambiguous, the interpretation of that provision presents a 
question of fact that precludes summary judgment. Id. In this case, however, the Court 
'inds that the contract provision at issue is not ambiguous because the language in 
question is not reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations or two (2) "equally 
~lausible" readings. 
The Court agrees with MRIA's interpretation of section 6.1. The critical phrase 
eads: "Any Hospital Partner may withdraw from the Partnership at any time if. ..." The 
Ise of "if' at the end of that clause is explicitly conditional and clearly indicates that the 
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iospital partners can withdraw rightfully for the four (4) reasons listed. Saint Alphonsus 
argues that, in order to read the list in section 6.1 as exclusive, the Court would have to 
'mply "only" before the word "if." Saint Alphonsus concludes that because "only" is 
mplied and the language is not expressly restrictive, SADC was not limited to 
~ithdrawing for one (1) of those four (4) reasons. 
When reading contract terms, the Court must apply the ordinary and plain 
neaning to the words used. The word "if' is commonly defined as "a: in the event that, 
3: allowing that, c: on the assumption that, d: on condition that." See http://www.m- 
~.com/dictionary/if. Substituting one of these definitions into the contract language, 
jection 6.1 allows the Hospital Partners to withdraw on the condition that one of the 
isted events occurs. In the reverse, if one of the four reasons is not present, the 
iospital Partners may not withdraw from the partnership rightfully. In the Court's view, 
.he use of "only" before "if" would be redundant in this context. The title of the section, 
'Conditions for Withdrawal" lends further support to the Court's finding that "if' was 
?xpressly conditional language.6 
Saint Alphonsus also argues that the use of the word "may" indicates that section 
I was not intended to restrict the Hospital Partners' ability to withdraw at any time. 
The Court disagrees. The use of the word "may" does not contradict the restrictive "if." 
4s MRlA points out, the use of the permissive "may" merely entitles the Hospital 
'artners to dissociate for the four (4) reasons in section 6.1, but does not require those 
While the Court recognizes that the title of section 6.1 does not itself decide the issue, it is within the four 
:orners of the contract and is instructive as to the interpretation of the terms following it. 
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partners to dissociate upon the happening of the listed events7 Thus, the Court cannot 
find that the word "may" in any way changes the interpretation of the subsequent "if' as 
used in section 6.1. 
Saint Alphonsus urges the Court took look at the legal backdrop at the time the 
partnership was entered into. As Saint Alphonsus points out, the terms "withdrawal" 
and "dissociate" were not used in the UPA; rather, a partner's expression of intent to 
leave the partnership triggered dissolution of the partnership. Saint Alphonsus 
concludes that, in the context of the UPA, section 6.1 is more properly read as an 
additional grant of rights, not a restriction on the partners' ability to "withdraw" because 
the UPA didn't recognize a right of "withdrawal" without dissolving the partnership. 
The Court will find that this argument is without merit. First, assuming for the 
purposes of this argument that this section was an addition of rights under the UPA, 
section 6.1 is clearly restrictive viewed in the context of the RUPA, which applies 
retroactively to all ldaho partnership agreements. ldaho Code $$ 53-3-1204. Second, 
even viewed in the context of the UPA, this section did not grant any rights to the 
Hospital Partners that were not already available under the UPA. Under the UPA (like 
the RUPA), the Hospital Partners had the power to leave the partnership at any time, 
but the partnership agreement could still limit the partners' ability to leave and dissolve 
the partnership rightfully.8 The RUPA merely changed the rights of the partnership 
7 The Court will also note that a partnership agreement cannot, as a matter of law, restrict a partner's 
power to dissociate from a partnership. ldaho Code 3 53-3-103(b)(6). Thus, the partnership agreement 
could not use the alternative '%an" in place of "may" in section 6.1 because the agreement could not 
restrict that the Hospital Partners ability to dissociate for one of the four (4) reasons listed in section 6.1. 
Even if the UPA didn't use the term "withdrawal" or recognize "dissociation" as the RUPA does, the 
various partners still had the ability to leave the partnership and the UPA still allowed the partnership 
agreement to determine whether when such a departure was wrongful. Therefore, the Hospital Partners 
did not gain any rights by the inclusion of section 6.1 that they did not already have under the UPA. 
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once a partner expressed the will to leave because the RUPA did not mandate 
dissolution upon a partner's departure.g Therefore, under either the UPA or the RUPA, 
section 6.1 clearly acts as a restriction on the way the Hospital Partners could rightfully 
extricate themselves from the partnership. 
The Court recognizes that one of the fundamental policies underlying partnership 
law aims to allow partners to free themselves from business arrangements that they 
come to find intolerable without exposing themselves to liability. Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 1996 WL 340002 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Given this policy, courts 
regularly require restrictions on a partner's ability to rightfully withdraw to be explicit and 
unequivocal. Id.; Cooper v. Isaacs, 448 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
Partnership law also generally supports the partners' ability to vary statutory 
construction and formulate contract that accurately reflects the intent of the parties. 
See Idaho Code § 53-3-103(a). Thus, restrictions in a partnership agreement on a 
~artner's ability to withdraw from a partnership are regularly upheld when clearly 
2xpressed. See Prudential, at *4; see also Cooper, 448 F.2d 1202. 
In this case, the Court finds that such a restriction was clearly and unequivocally 
3xpressed. Section 6.1 of the MRIA partnership agreement allowed SADC to rightfully 
~ithdraw from the partnership upon the occurrence of one (1) of four (4) listed events. 
Saint Alphonsus has repeatedly conceded that they did not dissociate from MRIA due 
o any of the four (4) enumerated circumstances in section 6.1 and has not introduced 
-- 
' As Saint Alphonsus describes, the RUPA introduced a philosophical shift from the UPA's "aggregate" 
heory, where the partnership is viewed as a group of individuals, to the "entity" theory, where the 
)artnership maintains its own identity separate from its various partners and therefore continues on as a 
usiness even as partners withdraw. 
flEMORANDUM DECISION - CASE NO. CVOC040821SD - PAGE 12 
any evidence to the contrary. Affidavit of G. Rey Reinhardt in Support of MRI 
Associate' Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibits A & B. Therefore, the Court will find 
that SADC's dissociation from MRlA was wrongful as a matter of law. 
B. Buy-Out Calculation 
MRlA also seeks summary judgment on the appropriate buyout calculation. 
MRlA contends that, regardless of whether SADC's dissociation was wrongful, any 
payment owed to SADC upon dissociation should be determined based upon the 
formula in section 6.2 of the MRlA Partnership Agreement. A partnership agreement 
may also spell out the manner in which a partner's share is to be determined upon 
withdrawal from the partnership. ldaho Code § 53-3-103. If an applicable buy-out 
provision is not set out in a partnership agreement, ldaho Code § 53-3-701 provides the 
appropriate method to calculate the amount due to the dissociating partner. 
After the language restricting the Hospital Partners' right to withdraw, but under 
the same section number and heading ("6.1 Conditions for Withdrawal"), the 
partnership agreement states: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, the withdrawing Hospital Partner shall 
only be entitled to receive for its interest in the Partnership an amount which 
is equal to the balance in such Hospital Partner's capital account at the time 
of withdrawal." Henson Aff.. Exhibit A. 
Next, section 6.2 sets out the timing for making the aforementioned payment, 
stating that amount owing is to be paid "without interest, in installments equal to, and 
due at the same time as, distributions of the Net Cash Flow which the Hospital Partner 
~ o u l d  have received had it remained a Partner in the Partnership." Id. 
MRlA maintains that the terms of the withdrawing partner's buy-out are 
jetermined by sections 6.1 and 6.2 of the MRlA partnership agreement, regardless of 
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whether the withdrawal was made for one of the enumerated reasons in the first 
paragraph of paragraph 6.1. Saint Alphonsus argues that the formula in paragraph 6.2 
only applies where the Hospital Partner opts to withdraw under one of the 
circumstances listed in section 6.1. Because SADC did not dissociate from MRlA due 
to one of the four (4) enumerated circumstances, Saint Alphonsus concludes that 6.2 
does not apply. Rather, Saint Alphonsus argues that their share should be determined 
under the default provisions of the RUPA, specifically ldaho Code § 53-3-701. 
When interpreting specific terms in a contract, "the contract must be viewed as a 
whole and in its entirety." See Clear Lakes Trout Co., lnc. v. Clear Springs Foods, Inc., 
141 ldaho 117, 120, 106 P.3d 443, 446 (2005). Thus, a specific provision in a contract 
may not be viewed in isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the surrounding 
terms and the entire framework of the contract as a whole. If these buy-out provisions 
are read in isolation, they appear to apply to any withdrawing Hospital Partner, 
regardless of whether the withdrawal was rightful or wrongful. However, reading the 
buy-out provisions in 6.1 and 6.2 in the larger context of the partnership agreement, the 
Court finds the aforementioned language ambiguous. 
On one hand, the paragraph discussing the withdrawing partner's share is 
included under the heading "Conditions for Withdrawal" and follows a list of reasons for 
a Hospital Partner's rightful withdrawal. This could indicate that the buy-out provision at 
the end of section 6.1 applies only when a partner withdraws for one of those four (4) 
.easons. However, the paragraph in section 6.1 and section 6.2 are the only provisions 
n the partnership agreement defining the terms for compensating a withdrawing 
3artner. The absence of any language specifically discussing wrongful dissolution 
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could either indicate the parties' intent to rely on the default dissolution provisions of the 
UPA, and later the payment provisions of the RUPA, or show that the parties intended 
any distribution to a withdrawing partner to be handled under sections 6.1 and 6.2. 
Because either reading of these provisions, in light of the contract as a whole, is 
equally plausible, this Court must find that terms of the payment owed to SADC are 
ambiguous as a matter of law. Intermountain Eye, 142 ldaho at 223, 127 P.3d at 126. 
Ambiguities in contract terms are a question of fact for the trier of fact. Shawver v. 
Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 ldaho 354, 361, 93 P.3d 685, 692 (2004). Therefore, 
MRIA's motion for summary judgment regarding the terms of payment to a dissociating 
Hospital Partner is denied. 
Ill. Saint Alphonsus I.R.C.P. 12(b) (6) Motion to Dismiss Counts Vlll, IV, X and 
XI of the MRIA's First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint 
The Defendant's motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b) (6) for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court may only grant a 
motion to dismiss under 12(b) (6) "when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle [the plaintiffl to relief." 
Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 ldaho 400, 405, 353 P.2d 782, 787 (1960). With few 
exceptions, ldaho is a notice pleading state. Cook v. Skyline Corp., 135 ldaho 26, 33, 
13 P.3d 857, 869 (2000). Notice pleading only requires that the Plaintiff's complaint 
contain a simple, concise, and direct statement fairly apprising the Defendant of claims 
and grounds upon which the claims rest. Myers v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 
114 ldaho 432,439,757 P.2d 695,702 (Ct. App. 1988). 
The only facts a court may consider on a Rule 12(b) (6) motion are those 
appearing in the complaint, supplemented by those facts of which the court may 
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properly take judicial notice. See Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118 ldaho 273, 796 P.2d 150 
(Ct. App. 1990). The nonmoving party, here MRIA, is entitled to have all inferences 
from the records and pleadings viewed in his or her favor. See ldaho Schs. for Equal 
Educ, Opportunity v. Evans, 123 ldaho 573, 850 P.2d 724 (1993). The Court must 
make every reasonable intendment to sustain a complaint against an I.R.C.P. 12(b) (6) 
motion to dismiss. ldaho Comm'n on Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 ldaho 215, 217, 
506 P.2d 112, 114 (1973). 
This standard applies equally to antitrust claims given the antitrust cases require 
no special deference to defendants. Hospital Building Co. v. TRS. of Rex Hosp. Co. 
425 U.S. 738. There is no heightened pleading requirement in antitrust cases. 
Towmbly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99. 
SARMC and Third Patty Defendants have joined in filing a Motion to Dismiss 
MRIA's Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). MRlA 
alleges that as a result of SARMC and Third-Party Defendants' illegal attempt to 
monopolize the relevant market that, competition has been damaged, consumers will 
suffer and MRlA has been damaged specifically in an amount to be proven at trial. 
115 of the Counterclaim. In addition MRlA has alleged that in furtherance of SARMC 
and the Third Party Defendant's willful attention to acquire and maintain market and 
ultimately monopoly power, SARMC and Third-Party Defendants have acted in concert 
with the intent of suppressing, inhibiting and destroying competition in the relevant 
market. 
SAMRC and Third-Party Defendants assert that what MRlA has asserted is 
simply a reshuffling of competitors although the vast majority of the allegations set forth 
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in the Counterclaim and this dispute between competing businesses does not rise to 
the level of a monopolistic practice. 
The Court will find that the allegations of MRIA's foreclosure from market forces, 
referral of consumers to purchase magnetic imaging services from IMI when they would 
potentially prefer to purchase from some other providers including MRIA, and finally 
allegations that SARMCs anticompetitive conduct that has resulted in unspecified 
injuries to competition including increases in price, lower quality and lower output of the 
provision of magnetic imaging services, are sufficiently pled to withstand a 12(b)(6) 
motion. The Court is satisfied from the MRIA's pleadings that they have sufficiently 
alleged that MRlA was damaged by SARMC's and Third Party Defendants alleged 
anticompetitive conduct. 
The next issue raised by SARMC and Third-Party Defendants is that MRlA does 
not have standing to pursue this antitrust claim. The focus of the standing argument 
relates to whether or not MRlA qualifies as an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws. 
Essentially SAMRC and Third-Party Defendants assert that MRIA's interest in obtaining 
benefits of an exclusive practice do not coincide with the best interests of patients and 
that as a result, individuals such as patients, referring physicians or insurers are more 
efficient enforcers of MRIA's antitrust claims. These contentions by SAMRC and Third- 
Party Defendants could be determined after discovery and upon a motion for summary 
judgment. However, this Court is constrained by the provisions of 1.R.C.P 12(b)(6). 
This Court cannot adopt a per se rule denying standing to allege exclusionary practices 
based on the face of the pleadings. 
The next assertion by SARMC and Third-Party Defendants is that Count VIII, the 
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exclusive dealing claim, is deficient as a matter of law. The basis for this assertion is 
that Count Vlll has failed to allege the existence of an exclusive agreement between 
Saint Alphonsus and IMI because no such agreement exists. SARMC and Third-Party 
Defendants focus on the language contained in the Counterclaim and those terms are 
"urge* and "referral." SARMC and Third-Party Defendants assert that that very 
language illustrates that there is not an exclusive dealings agreement between Saint 
Alphonsus and IMI and therefore MRIA has failed to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. 
SARMC and Third-Party Defendants focus that first an exclusive dealing contract 
involves a commitment by a buyer to deal only with a particular seller. Western Parcel 
Express v. United Parcel Senlice of No& America, Inc., 190 F.3d 974. To rise to a 
level warranting antitrust scrutiny, a contract must foreclose competition in a substantial 
share of the line of commerce affected. Omega Environ., Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127 
F.3d 1157. SARMC and Third-Party Defendants go on to assert that the agreement 
between Saint Alphonsus and IMI does not foreclose competition because the 
agreement does not prevent doctors at Saint Alphonsus from referring patients to MRI 
technicians other than IMI. 
The First Amended Counterclaim asserts that physicians were urging referrals to 
IMI but not compelling or foreclosing referrals to MRI, thus SARMC and Third-Party 
Defendants allege that where a contract has the ability to deal with other parties in that 
contract, the contract is not an exclusive dealings contract. 
MRIA correctly points out that courts analyze exclusive dealing agreements 
under the rule of reason rather than treating such agreements as per se unlawful. 
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Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320. The traditional framework for 
analysis of a rule of reason claim involves three steps. First, the plaintiff bears the 
initial burden of showing that the challenged action has had an actual adverse affect on 
competition in the relevant product and geographic markets. Second, if the plaintiff 
succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish the pro-competitive effects of 
the restrained on commerce. Thirdly, if the defendant satisfies this shifted burden, the 
plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant could have achieved such legitimate 
objectives by means of less restrictive alternatives. 
This Court is again constrained by the parameters of I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) to only 
examine this case from the face of the pleadings. The Court is satisfied that MRlA has 
properly pleaded the existence of an exclusive dealing agreement. As the Court noted 
above, through discovery and motions for summary judgment, this issue may be 
resolved depending upon what facts are discovered as to the allegation of "an exclusive 
dealing agreement." If through the enlightenment of discovery SARMC and Third-Party 
Defendants establish that doctors were potentially urged to refer patients to IMI and that 
:here was still an ability by those physicians to deal with other parties, then obviously 
.he contract is not an exclusive dealings contract and this claim for relief may be 
jismissed as a matter of law. 
SARMC and Third-Party Defendants argue that Count IX of the First Amended 
2ounterclaim fails to state a claim for relief on the allegation of attempted 
nonopolization on the part of Saint Alphonsus, IMI and Gem State Radiology. 
SARMC and Third-Party Defendants argue that the federal antitrust provisions 
;et forth in Section II of the Sherman Act, is contrary to the Section I focus on illegal 
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contracts, combination or conspiracies and is generally directed at a single firm 
conduct. SARMC and Third-Party Defendants go on to set forth that an attempted 
monopolization claim requires proof of the following elements: (1) that the Defendant 
has engaged in predatory or anti-competitive conduct with; (2) a specific intent to 
monopolize; and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power. 
In summary, SARMC and Third-Party Defendants assert the attempted 
monopolization claim by MRlA fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cognizable claim 
for relief. SARMC and Third-Party Defendants set forth the reason that there is not a 
cognizable claim for relief is because it is unclear what specific entity MRlA alleges has 
committed the offense of attempted monopolization. Secondly, they assert that MRlA 
has not alleged facts demonstrating that Saint Alphonsus engaged in a conduct which 
can fairly be characterized as predatory or exclusionary, such that it might support an 
attempted monopolization claim. 
MRlA asserts in their Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint they 
have set forth with sufficient specificity, conduct which can be characterized as 
predatory or exclusionary. 
The Court concurs with MRlA that these arguments look past MRIA's 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and border on a motion for summary 
judgment. For this Court to dismiss the claim pursuant to 12(b)(6) would require the 
Court to look beyond the face of the pleadings and consider extrinsic evidence that has 
not been presented to the Court in the form of a summary judgment proceeding. 
Therefore the Court will deny the 12(b)(6) relief requested by SARMC and Third-Party 
Defendants. 
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SARMC and Third-Party Defendants assert that Count XII, the claim for relief 
focusing on "the essential facility", should be dismissed. SARMC and Third-Party 
Defendants assert that as a matter of law, any cause of action based upon the 
essential facilities doctrine must allege that Saint Alphonsus possesses monopoly 
power. From the facts alleged in the Counterclaim MRlA is asserting this is an actual 
monopolization case and not an attempted monopolization issue. 
MRlA alleges that IMI, through their relationship with Saint Alphonsus, holds 
45% of the alleged relevant market for outpatient TCMRl services. This allegation is set 
forth in 7 60 of the First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. The 
Counterclaimantrrhird-Party Plaintiff goes on to assert at 7 63 that 'Yhere is a 
substantial likelihood that IMI with the assistance of SARMC, SARGJGSR and ICR will 
secure monopoly power for more than 50% market share in the relevant Boise-Meridian 
TCMRI market." 
MRlA asserts that this is not a proper motion to dismiss, that these arguments 
are fact dependant, and can only be resolved after the parties have had an opportunity 
to conduct the necessary discovery. 
The Court, in reviewing the case authority regarding this judicial doctrine of 
essential facilities, will find that based upon Rebel Oil Company, Inc. v. ANantic 
Richfield, 51 F.3d 1428, that on the face of the pleadings, Counterclaimantihird-Party 
Plaintiff has not demonstrated the threshold percentage amount required to sustain a 
claim for actual monopolization in Count XI1 of their claim for relief. The Ninth Circuit 
has addressed this issue and held that in actual monopolization cases that a market 
share of less than 50% is presumptively insufficient to establish such a claim for relief. 
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-he 45% of market share set forth in MRIA's Counterclaim is insufficient as a matter of 
aw to establish that IMI is a monopolist and therefore insufficient to sustain the 
~llegation of liability under the essential facilities doctrine. 
The Court then will dismiss the Count XI1 claim for relief without prejudice. The 
:ourt in so ruling need not address whether or not the PACSlRlS System meets the 
:riteria of an essential facility. The Court concurs with the MRlA that these are issues 
~f fact outside the scope of the pleadings and are not appropriate for a 12(b)(6) motion 
3 dismiss. 
The Court will further note that with the remaining counts in the antitrust 
~llegations, that the Court has not dismissed, MRlA is still in a position to discover 
iformation that may in fact demonstrate a greater percentage than alleged in the First 
unended Counterclaim thus allowing them the opportunity to potentially amend the 
:ounterclaim to assert a higher percentage if the facts so demonstrate. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court will GRANT MRIA's motion for summary judgment and find that 
srmination of the Partnership Agreement was wrongful. The Court will decline to grant 
ARIA'S Motion for Summary Judgment as to that portion of 7 6.1 of the Partnership 
igreement that pertains to damages and will find that this paragraph is ambiguous. 
'he Court will decline to grant the 12(b)(6) motions filed by SARMC and Third Party 
befendant with the exception of the Count XI1 claim for relief and the Court will dismiss 
?at claim without prejudice. 
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The Court will set a Telephonic Status Conference for August 21, 2006 at 3:45 
1.m. to address the issue of the current trial date as requested by the parties. 
DATED this /2f day of JUIY 2006. n 
. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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